The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898. Volume 19 of 55. Unknown
consist in that, both for attack and defense—that they are acquiring and will continue to acquire those riches daily, with greater forces. And, as they continue to increase in strength, their ambitious designs will also extend further. In the same degree as the enemy grows stronger, it is certain that our forces will continue to decrease—and so much that, if relief does not arrive there in time, the day will come in which not one of your Majesty’s vessels can be placed on the sea, because of the many that the enemy will have there. Inasmuch as there is no one in the world today who can oppose the enemy except your Majesty, they hate our interests with all their strength, and will attempt to destroy and ruin them by all possible methods.
The method of preventing all those most considerable troubles is the one that your Majesty is attempting, by despatching the eight vessels that you are sending under color of reënforcements—and would that it had been with a fleet of sixteen vessels, each one of which would carry three hundred sailors and soldiers and be very well armed with artillery. For with that the rest [of the enemy’s forces] would be driven away, and that crowd of thieves, who are becoming arrogant and enriching themselves—so much to the cost of our holy religion, of your Majesty’s reputation and prestige, and of your most loyal vassals, by disturbing your Majesty’s most holy designs—would be forced from those seas and even from these. For it is very certain that if that [trade] be taken away, the enemy would have no resources with which they could preserve themselves; while if your Majesty has all that profit—as beyond doubt, God helping (for whose honor it is being done), you will have it, by encouraging your royal forces and by enforcing your holy purposes—all the heads of that many-headed serpent of the enemy will be destroyed.
Inasmuch as it is proper for us who, like myself, are zealous for your royal service, let us hasten on that service, by as many roads as God makes known to us. I declare, Sire, that in order to encourage those most loyal though most afflicted vassals whom your Majesty has now in Manila, it is advisable for the present reënforcement to be sent; and that its route be by the shortest path and the one of least risk—namely, by way of the Cape of Buena Esperança; not only is the weather more favorable in that route, but it passes through less longitude.
I mention the weather, for from this time on the weather is favorable, as was determined in a general council of experienced pilots of all nations that was held at Manila by Governor Don Juan de Silva. [I mention] also the longitude, because the time taken to go by the above route is known—namely (to one who follows his course without making fruitless stops) seven months; which, counted from the first of December, places the arrival there at the end of June.
Some one may object to all this by saying that the intention is to import this relief into Manila, so that all that region may not be lost; and that, if it shall go by that route [i.e., of the Cape], it runs the risk of meeting the enemy and of being lost, and incidentally that all that region [of Filipinas] will remain in its present danger, and even greater, because of your Majesty’s resources being wasted, and the necessity of getting together a new relief expedition—but [such objector would say], if this relief be sent by another route all those troubles will be obviated and the purpose attained. I answer that objection by saying: First, that eight vessels are not so weak a force that they should fear those of the enemy who, on their homeward trip—inasmuch as they do not fear along that route any encounter that will harm them—come laden with their goods, in great security, and carelessly; and they have at best only two or three galleons, while our eight galleys, ready and prepared for fighting, not only have nothing to fear, but can from the start expect the victory, in case they meet the enemy. Second, for this reason, if once our galleons cause the enemy loss in the chief thing that takes the latter there, namely, trade, they will have to diminish their forces, and will lose credit with their backers. Hence I infer that not only should this route and [possible] encounter not be avoided, but that express orders be given to the commander of this relief expedition to follow the routes taken by the enemy and to reconnoiter their chief factory of Batan, which is not fortified. For if God permits him to find and destroy that place, many and very important results will follow: First, that immediately word will be passed to all those nations—who love changes and cry “long live” to the conqueror—and they will lose the little affection that they have for the enemy at present; while they will incline toward and join us, turning against our enemy, as they have promised. Second, that our soldiers, flushed with the beginnings of victory, will be worth after that for other victories just twice as much; nor will they be without military discipline for the first victory, for the Spanish infantry begins its military duty from the day when it establishes its camp, and daily becomes more valuable. Third, inasmuch as when the vessels of this relief expedition reach Manila, they will necessarily arrive there in need of rest, and already the enemy will be warned to resist whatever sally they try to make, that which will now be made against them with eight vessels cannot later be made against them with many more. Fourth, because, on the journey they will lay down the complete and fixed route that should be taken by that course, so that your Majesty’s fleets may go and come as do those of the enemy. Fifth, because the enemy are at present not only not sending any fleet to those regions, but are obliged to collect their forces in order to resist those of your Majesty in their own territory, because of the expiration of the truce.1 Consequently the attempt must be made to inflict all the damage possible on the enemy during these years, until they are driven entirely out of the Orient and your Majesty becomes lord of it all. For if that result be once accomplished, the fruits of that victory will allow sufficient fleets to be maintained, both in these seas and in those, for the defense and conservation of that region and much more. Moreover, in order to check the enemy and to remove completely from their eyes this illusion that has given and gives them so strong a belief that your Majesty’s forces are exhausted by the large sums that you have spent in protecting our holy religion, I declare, Sire, that an effective plan occurs to me whereby this matter may be concluded without the expense of one single maravedi from your royal treasury. This is, that loans be asked from the rich and wealthy persons in the provinces of Nueva España and Peru (for there are many such), until you have two millions [of pesos]. Your Majesty can prepare a large fleet with that sum, and will finish with the enemy once for all. The vassals of those kingdoms will give that loan cheerfully if you ask it, proportioning to each one the amount in accordance with what he can give without inconveniencing himself. For they are also greatly interested in this matter; and the payment will be easily made, if the result be thus attained. With that money, it would be best to go to Yndia to build the fleet; for there it can be built better and at a less cost than anywhere else.
Second point. In order to return from those islands to España, it will be advisable to come but lightly laden, and well provided with arms, in order to withstand any encounter with the enemy; and that they follow the same route that is taken by the Dutch, or by the fleets of Portugal, for by no other route can the voyage be made so quickly as by that route—considering that, if one wishes to come by way of Nueva España (which is the shortest course except that by the Cape of Buena Esperança), the voyage from Manila to Acapulco will last five or six months, even with favorable weather. Arrived there it is necessary to cross from one sea to the other over one hundred and sixty leguas of very bad road, and then to sail for another three months before reaching España; and the vessels must wait from January, the time when they arrive from Philipinas, until June, when they embark for España. In all more than thirteen months will be spent in the voyage. In case that one should prefer to come not by way of Nueva España, but by the Strait of Magallanes or that of Mayre, the delay is equal or greater, and the food will of necessity spoil and the men die; for the food of Manila, as that is a hot country, very soon spoils and rots.
Third point. The voyages from Manila to Terrenate are three hundred leguas, or a trifle more or less; and those from Manila to Malaca a trifle more than four hundred.
Fourth point. The seasons required for those voyages are as follows: To go from España to Philippinas it is advisable to sail from España after the sun passes the equator in the direction of the Tropic of Capricorn, namely, from September twenty-third on; for, since one must mount to thirty-five degrees of latitude in the southern hemisphere, it is advisable to be in that hemisphere when the sun by its presence has put to flight the furies of the winds of those seas, since even with that care that Cape of Buena Esperança bears the reputation of a stormy headland: In order to return, one
The twelve-year truce between the States-General and Spain, signed in 1608.