Death or Victory: The Battle for Quebec and the Birth of Empire. Dan Snow
had told Versailles that ‘of all enemies the most redoubtable is the famine to which we are exposed’. This had been averted although the man responsible for feeding the army and the colony, François Bigot, the short, red-haired, ugly Intendant, calculated that he had received about eighty days’ rations for the regular army, ‘at the rate of half a pound of flour and half a pound of pork per head’, which was less than ‘the proper ration’. Canada received about a third of the food that the colonial authorities had asked for.29 She would have to find the rest herself: cows were requisitioned; two families would have to share one beast to pull their ploughs. Montcalm dramatically announced to Vaudreuil that despite the disappointing supplies from France, ‘trifles are precious to those who have nothing…I shall entirely devote myself towards saving this unfortunate country and if necessary, die in the attempt.’30
The many threats to Canada had meant that Montcalm had spent the winter in Montreal near the centre of the colony and best placed to react to whichever proved to be the most pressing. He had informed the aged Duc de Belle Isle, the Minister for War, that ‘the rest of the troops remain in their quarters; they hold themselves in readiness to march on the first notice’. He would stay in Montreal until it became clear ‘to what point it will be necessary to proceed; that will depend on the enemy’s movements; their superiority forces us to receive the law from them in regard to our movements’.31 Early rumours brought to him at the beginning of May by ‘several English prisoners…unanimously concurred in reporting, that great preparations were in making in the British colonies for the invasion of the whole of Canada; and that the intention of making three simultaneous attacks was spoken of, in which more than 60,000 men were to be employed’.32 These wildly inflated reports were swallowed whole by Montcalm and did nothing to lighten his sense of doom.
The arrival of the intelligence which was brought by the flotilla from France had left him in no doubt that Quebec was where his duty now lay. Within hours of arriving in Quebec, Montcalm, in his own words had ‘already given activity to many necessary arrangements’. He went to bed on 24 May but was awoken at midnight with the first reliable intelligence of the British movements. The couriers informed him ‘of the arrival of 15 large ships of the line’, an exaggerated account of Durell, and Montcalm rightly assumed that ‘it’s assuredly the vanguard of the English army destined to attack Quebec’. He finished his letter in typical style, half bellicose, half defeatist, ‘I fear not tell you, My Lord, that our arrangements here are somewhat tardy…whether strong or weak, we shall fight somewhere or other, and perhaps be fortunate.’33
The news was corroborated by beacons which burnt brightly on the southern bank across the narrows from the city of Quebec. The chain of beacons ended with the ‘fires on Point Lévis’, which pierced the darkness. The guns of the town fired as if in receipt of the signal. Their deep booms rolled across the basin of Quebec; it was a grim augury. 34
There was consternation. It was a universally embraced axiom of Canadian life that the St Lawrence was an impenetrable obstacle. Vaudreuil had airily assured Versailles that ‘I do not presume that the enemy will undertake coming to Quebec.’ One journal records flatly that, ‘the rumour in regard to [an attack on] Quebec was not generally credited; because the river, from the difficulty of its navigation, was considered an impenetrable barrier’. Yet here were the British little more than fifty miles from the town. It was ‘astounding’ to launch ‘an enterprise apparently so daring, and at a time when the season was so little advanced’. The diarist blamed the ‘North East wind, which had constantly blown for several days’. With a ‘favourable wind’ the ‘whole of the enemy’s fleet…might be before Quebec, in less than three days’. He describes the sense of helplessness: ‘the alarm was general throughout the country—there was no troops in Quebec—the town was open on every side—no plan of operation, or of defence had been formed;—every body hastened to pack up, and to place their effects in securityby sending them to Trois Rivières, or to Montréal’.35
Montcalm threw himself into preparing Quebec for a siege. The winter before Governor General Vaudreuil had rather pompously informed Versailles of his plans: ‘on the first news I shall receive of the enemy being in the river, I shall provide for the security of the frontiers of this government. I shall go down, in person, to Quebec.’ He would take with him the militias of Montreal and Trois Rivières to get them building defences. He assured Versailles that ‘I shall always feel great pleasure in communicating to them [Montcalm and Lévis] all the movements I have ordered, and even in making use of such reflections as place and circumstances will suggest to them.’ This does not suggest that Vaudreuil was preparing himself for a campaign season of constructive cooperation. News from France of Montcalm’s promotion and orders to defer to him in military matters cannot have improved his attitude.36
True to his word Vaudreuil hurried to the capital where he and Montcalm would spend the rest of the summer bickering over who was responsible for what. Montcalm wrote to his second in command, Chevalier de Lévis, that ‘I have still less time, my dear Chevalier, for writing since the arrival of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, for I have to allow him to play the role of general. I act as secretary and major for him, and greatly long to have you with us.’ At least one journal agreed, ‘in the midst of this chaos, M le Marquis de Vaudreuil arrived, council upon council was held, at which every person who chose to assume airs of importance was invited to assist—but at these councils no decisive measures were resolved upon’. They were unruly affairs, people crushed in ‘pell mell…whatever may be their stations’. Whatever Vaudreuil’s strengths or weaknesses as a strategist he was certainly no chairman. The councils were chaotic with people ‘squeezing [and] elbowing—and where persons of low stature, slip under the arms of taller ones to gain the front row;—where they all scream and interrupt each other’s speeches; and talk loudly all at the same time, and upon matters, totally irrelevant to the subject of the debate—such is the council chamber—such the form of the council!’37
One of Vaudreuil’s priorities was the well-being of the civilian subjects of Louis XV. With the British fleet already at Bic he needed to decide quickly how he would respond to the calls for assistance from the Canadian settlers along the banks of the river. Everyone had a plan; many of them involved aggressive counter-attacks aimed at the British ships. However, as Vaudreuil made clear right away, ‘owing to the position of the enemy and lack of provisions’, it was impossible to move a serious body of troops down the river. Instead of waiting for succour the habitants must evacuate. Vaudreuil’s commands raced down the extensive postal network, carried by horse and carriage, typically nine miles between each post. They ordered old men, women and children to retreat as far as Quebec. Forage was to be destroyed in the evacuated areas and valuables left behind in caches. Cattle were to be brought with them, to feed the hungry mouths of Quebec. An officer, de Léry, was sent to instil the necessary urgency and to arrest those who refused to cooperate. Two scouts each with three fast horses would stay behind from every deserted parish to report on British movements. The young men would form militia units and oppose enemy attempts to land; anyone capable of bearing arms was to be included, ‘none must be left from 15 years upwards’.38 Unsurprisingly many of the habitants proved unwilling to abandon their land, cattle, and crops to the British. It took a lifetime of toil to clear the strip of land on which families depended for their survival. For generations Canadians had defended it tenaciously against all comers. Abandonment was a grave decision. Vaudreuil was forced to compromise. On 31 May he acknowledged that ‘the difficulties made by the inhabitants have multiplied to that degree that he has been obliged’ to allow them to take to the woods, staying with their possessions and cattle and lying low. Despite this concession he told de Léry to impress upon the habitants the gravity of the situation