The History of the Russo-Japanese War. Sydney Tyler
chief point of disembarkation of the Mikado's army was Chinampo, a small and obscure treaty port situated about 150 miles north of Chemulpo. We have already related the landing of the Japanese advance guard at Chemulpo on February 8th, before the naval battle which resulted in the destruction of the Varyag and the Korietz. This force, which belonged to the 12th Infantry Division under General Inouye, and consisted of 2,500 men, was billeted at once in the little town, and was followed during the next few days by the remainder of the Division, with transport corps, train, and engineers. When the Mikado's advisers had been assured of the success of the initial naval operations and of Admiral Togo's supremacy at sea, a small expedition was immediately landed near Haiju, a place situated about half-way between Chemulpo and Chinampo, and sent forward by the Seoul-Wiju road to seize Ping-Yang, a strategical point the importance of which was amply demonstrated in the Chino-Japanese war. The main body of General Inouye's Division followed with all possible speed from Chemulpo.
The hardships which these troops had to face were terrible indeed. The weather was at its worst. Heavy rain was succeeded by frost, and on the top of the frost came snow, and cruel blinding blizzards, in the teeth of which the little Japs, each man burdened with a weight of 100 lbs., had to struggle as best they could. In the circumstances the achievement of these forerunners of the Mikado's main army did an admirable piece of work. They did a steady march of 25 miles a day, bivouacking in the dirty Korean villages by night. At last, after four or five days, the force reached Ping-Yang and proceeded with all expedition to fortify it against possible attack. By the end of February a considerable body of troops was in occupation of Ping-Yang, and patrols were being pushed northwards to Anju.
The seizure of this strong position, providing as it did against any immediate danger from the north, enabled the Japanese to land higher up the coast than Chemulpo, and henceforth the main work of disembarkation in this quarter was carried on at Chinampo, access to which is gained by an arm of the sea called the Ping-Yang Inlet.
Here we find the complement of the operations which at Nagasaki and Ujina excited such keen admiration on the part of foreign critics. Perfect order and discipline characterized the disembarkation of the Japanese, as it had characterized their embarkation. The Pink-Yang Inlet is difficult of navigation at the best of times, but the inherent difficulties were enormously enhanced at this period of the year by the drift ice, which rendered landing an awkward and, in some cases, a hazardous undertaking. But the Japanese showed that admirable forethought which has characterized every step they have taken, and the transports brought with them large numbers of pontoon wharves, which enabled the troops to disembark from the sampans at some distance from the shore, and to march easily on to firm land. Here the hardy Japanese, in spite of the severe cold, bivouacked for the most part in the open, and were then pushed forward with all possible rapidity towards Ping-Yang. By the middle of March, as far as can be estimated, at least 80,000 men had landed in Korea ready to advance northwards as soon as the weather would permit; General Kuroki, commanding the 1st Army Corps, assuming the direction of affairs until the arrival of Baron Kodama, the Chief of the General Staff, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief.
RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE DESTROYERS AT CLOSE QUARTERS, MARCH 9TH.
In the meanwhile a strong force, under General Inouye, had marched upon Seoul, and without difficulty overawed the feeble Emperor and his corrupt Court. On the 12th of February M. Pavloff, whose name had for so long been a word to conjure with in Korea, left the capital for Chemulpo under the humiliating protection of a Japanese guard. M. Pavloff, it is said, was thunderstruck by the news of the disasters to the Russian navy, and by the sudden revelation of the real strength of the hitherto despised Island Empire. It was now clear to the world, and not least to his dupes, the Koreans, that the diplomatic bluff in which he, in common with his administrative chief, Admiral Alexeieff, had been indulging for so long was ludicrously out of proportion to the naval and military preparations which would ultimately have to support it. But the power of this able man at the Court of Seoul, though broken for the moment, was not by any means destroyed. So well had he done his work that even in the hour of Japan's triumph he still managed to find tools in the corrupt servants of the Emperor, and when he had taken his departure for Shanghai more than one attempt to communicate with him had to be frustrated by the Japanese.
For the time being, however, the star of Japan was unquestionably in the ascendant at Seoul. The Emperor hastened to congratulate the Mikado on the victory of his fleet, and assured him that in view of Korea's position her satisfaction equalled that of the Japanese. At the same time the Korean local officials were ordered by the central Government to give every facility to the invading troops.
But a more definite acknowledgment of Japanese supremacy followed. On February 23rd an important agreement was signed at Seoul by M. Hayashi, the Minister of the Mikado, and General Yi-Chi-Yong, the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs. By the terms of this Protocol, Korea, "convinced of Japan's friendship," undertook to adopt the advice of the Japanese Government in regard to administrative reform "with a view to consolidating the peace of the Orient." On the other hand, Japan guaranteed the safety of the Imperial family and the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. In pursuance of this provision, the fourth Article declared that an encroachment by a third Power, or an internal disturbance resulting in danger to either of these interests, would justify prompt measures on the part of Japan, who would receive assistance from Korea, and in order to give effect to such action Japan might occupy strategical points in Korea if necessary.
The object of this agreement was, of course, to regularize Japan's position in the eyes of the Powers and at the same time to give a sop to the dignity of Korea. Its most important point, as far as the future was concerned, was the definite guarantee on the part of Japan of the independence and territorial integrity of the Hermit Kingdom. The significance of this action of the Mikado's Government, as foretelling the lines of their permanent policy in the event of a final victory over the forces of the Czar, was heightened by the visit to Seoul a few weeks afterwards, on a special mission, of Japan's most famous statesman, the Marquis Ito. The attention was reciprocated by the dispatch of a special envoy from the Korean Court to Tokio. The most important immediate effect, however, of the complete ascendancy now acquired by Japan at Seoul was of military rather than of civil interest. This was the granting of a concession to the Japanese under Article 4 of the Protocol, for the construction of the projected railway between Seoul and Wiju, on the Yalu River, while at the same time arrangements were made for the completion of the southern portion of the line between Seoul and Fusan, a port at the southern extremity of Korea.
Here the marvelous organization of the Japanese War Office came into evidence once more. All the preparations for acting upon this concession had already been made. The material which had been intended for the construction of some unimportant railways in Japan was at hand ready to be transferred to the seat of war, and the engineer and pioneer corps only waited for the conclusion of the necessary formalities to begin operations. On March 8th a body of 8,000 men started work on the line between Seoul and Wiju, and the enterprise was conducted at high pressure, the material being conveyed with all possible speed by steamers from Japan. The value of this railway for strategical purposes will be obvious to anyone who studies the map; and, more fortunate than the Russians, the Japanese, provided that they could hold the northern part of Korea at all, were not likely to be faced with the difficulties which had proved so embarrassing to their enemy, in the shape of brigands and train-wreckers, in Manchuria. The completion of the whole line as far as Fusan would furthermore make them practically independent of sea transport for men as well as supplies, except, of course, as far as the narrow Korean Channel is concerned.
It will thus be seen that, considering the inevitable delay due to the severity of the season, the preparations for a general advance by the Japanese army had been conducted with remarkable celerity and success, and that by the middle of March great progress had been made.
We must now turn to the Russian side of the war.
One of the first consequences of the reverses at Port Arthur was a change in the commands. The unexpected collapse of the Russian navy under the attacks of the despised Japanese caused grave searchings of heart at St. Petersburg, and there can be no doubt that the Czar himself was greatly shocked by