The History of Rome: Rise and Fall of the Empire. John Bagnell Bury
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Sigimer, the brother, and Segimund, the son of this Sejestes, threw themselves into the enterprise of Arminius, and Thusnelda, the daughter of Segestes, married the young patriot against the wishes of her father.
It was the policy of the contrivers of the insurrection to keep the design dark until the last moment, and in the meantime to lull Varus, already secure, into a security still more complete. Of the five Germanic legions, two had their winter-quarters at Moguntiacum, the other three at Castra Vettra on the Lower Rhine, or at the fortress of Aliso on the Luppia. In summer they used sometimes to visit the interior parts of the province; and in 9 A.D., Varus, with three legions, occupied summer-quarters on the Visurgis, probably not far from the modern town of Minden and the Porta Westfalica. The camp was full of advocates and clients, and the chief conspirators were present, on intimate terms with the governor and constantly dining with him. Autumn came, and as the rainy season approached. Varus prepared to retrace his steps westward. There can be no doubt that a line of communication connected his summer station with Aliso; and, if the army had returned as it came, Arminius could hardly have been successful in his plans. But a message suddenly arrived that a distant tribe had revolted, and Varus decided to take a roundabout way homewards in order to suppress it. This news was suspiciously opportune for the rebels. The Romans had to make their way through a hilly district of pathless forests, and their difficulties were increased not only by the encumbrances of heavy baggage and camp-followers, but by the heavy rains, which had already begun and made the ground slippery. The moment had come for the German patriots to strike a desperate blow for independence. Segestes warned Varus of the impending danger, but the infatuated governor trusted the asseverations of Arminius. As the legions were making their laborious way through the saltus Teutoburgiensis, they were assailed by the confederate insurgents. This Teutoburg forest cannot be identified with any certainty, but it seems to have been somewhere between the Amisia and the Luppia, north-east of Aliso. It is impossible to determine how far the circumstances of the case and how far the incompetence of the general were to blame for the disaster which followed.
For three days the Romans continued to advance, resisting as well as they could the attacks of the foe, and if Varus had possessed the confidence of his soldiers and known how to hold them together it seems probable that he might have passed through the danger in safety. But both officers and soldiers were demoralized under his command. The prefect of the horse deserted his post, taking all the cavalry with him, and leaving the foot-soldiers to their fate. Varus was the first to despair; he had received a wound, and he slew himself. Others followed his example; and the rest surrendered. The prisoners were slain, some buried alive, some crucified, some sacrificed on the altars. The forces of Varus consisted of three legions (XVII, XVIII, XIX), six cohorts, and three squadrons of cavalry. The army had been weakened by the loss of detachments, which, at the request of the conspirators, had been sent to the territories of various tribes to preserve order. These detachments, taken chiefly from the auxiliary cohorts, were slaughtered when the insurrection broke out. Of the troops which were entrapped in the Teutoburg forest, numbering probably almost 20,000 men, only the cavalry escaped and a few individual foot-soldiers. The three eagles of the three legions fell into the hands of the victors. Such a disaster had not befallen since the day of Carrhae.
The peoples of central Germany from the Rhine to the Visurgis had thus thrown off the Roman yoke; the cause of freedom had been victorious. Two results, fraught with great danger to the Roman Empire, seemed likely to follow. It was to be feared that the triumphant Germans would push across to the left bank of the Rhine, arouse a revolt there, and perhaps shake the fidelity of Gaul. And seemingly it was to be feared that Maroboduus, lord of the Marcomanni, and chief of the Suevic confederacy, would declare himself on the side of the insurgents, now they were successful. But neither of these dangers was realized. The first was foiled by the bravery of Lucius Caedicius, commander of the garrison in Aliso, and the promptness of Lucius Nonius Asprenas, who commanded the two legions stationed at Moguntiacum. The first movement of the rebels after their victory was to attack Aliso, but Caedicius defended it so bravely that they were obliged to blockade it. When provisions ran short and no relief came, the garrison stole out on a dark night, and made their way, harassed by the attacks of the enemy, to Castra Vetera. Thither Asprenas, when the news of the disaster reached him, had hastened with his two legions, to hinder the Germans from crossing the Rhine.
The other danger was frustrated by the peculiar temper of Maroboduus himself. Arminius had triumphantly sent him the head of Varus as a token of his own amazing success, hoping to persuade him to join the confederacy against Rome. But the message was ineffectual. Maroboduus refused to link himself with the insurgents or to depart from his policy of neutrality.
When the news of the defeat reached Rome, Augustus met the emergency with spirit and energy. The citizens seemed indifferent to the crisis; many of them refused to place their names on the military roll; and the Emperor was obliged to resort to fines and threats of severer punishment. Troops hastily levied from the veterans and freedmen were sent with all speed to the Rhine; and the Germans, who served as an imperial bodyguard, were disarmed and driven forth from Rome. In the following year (10 A.D.) Tiberius assumed the command of the Rhine army, which was increased to eight legions. Four of these were doubtless stationed at Moguntiacum and four at Vetera; and it was probably the Emperor’s intention that when the immediate crisis was past, the command of the Germanic armies should be divided between two generals. During the first year Tiberius seems to have been engaged in organizing the defence of the Rhine, restoring the confidence of the old legions, and establishing discipline among the new. In the next year, 11 A.D., he crossed the river, and spent the summer in Germany, but he does not seem to have ventured far into the country or to have attempted any hostile enterprise. He was accompanied by his nephew Germanicus, to whom proconsular powers had been granted. In the following year the duties of his consulship retained Germanicus at Rome, but in 13 A.D. he succeeded Tiberius in the sole command on the Rhine. During these years nothing was done against the Germans, though the state of war still continued; but Germanicus was not long content with inactivity. Upon him seemed to devolve the duty of restoring his father’s work, which had been so disastrously demolished, and he burned to do it. But his efforts to recover the lost dominion and reach the Albis once more must form the subject of another chapter.
SECT. IV. — THE DEATH OF AUGUSTUS
The slaughter of the Varian legions in the wilds of Germany tarnished the lustre of Roman arms, and cast a certain gloom over the last days of the Augustan age. The Emperor himself, now stricken in years, felt the blow painfully. He let his hair and beard grow long. It is said that he dashed his head against the walls of his chamber, crying, “Varus, Varus, give me back my legions!”. Every year he went into mourning on the anniversary of the defeat. He knew that his end must soon come, and he began to set his house in order. In 12A.D. he addressed a letter to the senate, in which he commended Germanicus to its protection, and commended the senate itself to the vigilance of Tiberius. In the following year he assumed once more the proconsular power for a period of ten years. At the same time (as has been recorded in Chapter IV.), Tiberius was raised to a position almost equal to that of the Emperor himself, and his son Drusus received the privilege of standing for the consulship in three years, without the preliminary step of the praetorship.
A census was held in 14 A.D., and after its completion Tiberius set out for Illyricum, where he was to resume the supreme command. Augustus accompanied him as far as Beneventum, but in returning to the Campanian coast was attacked by dysentery and died at Nola (August 19). Tiberius had been sent fur without delay, and came, perhaps in time to hear the parting words of his stepfather. There is no good reason to believe the insinuation that the Emperor’s death was caused or hastened by poison administered by Livia. Her son’s accession was sure, and Augustus was old and weak; so that it would hardly have been worthwhile to commit the crime.
Both contemporaries and posterity had good cause to regard Augustus as a benefactor; he had given them the gift of peace. They also esteemed him fortunate (felix); and his good fortune became almost proverbial. Yet it has been truly remarked that luck was the one thing that failed him. Both points of view are true. He was unusually fortunate. When he entered upon his career as a competitor for power, his motives were probably as vulgar as those of his rivals; there is no reason