U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James
periods of electing the members of the first branch with the words, "every year;" Mr. Sherman observing that he did it in order to bring on some question.
Mr. Rutlidge proposed "every two years."
Mr. Jennifer2 proposed, "every three years," observing that the too great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.
Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to & from the seat of national business.
Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections as the only defence of the people against tyranny. He was as much against a triennial House as against a hereditary Executive.
Mr. Madison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it would be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; & still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper Government. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself — The respectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of Citizens, will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.
Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators. If the reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed a limited Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an innovation.
On the question for the triennial election of the 1st branch
Mass. no. (Mr. King ay.) Mr. Ghorum wavering. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The words requiring members of the 1st branch to be of the age of — — years were struck out Maryland alone no. The words "liberal compensation for members," being considered Mr. Madison moves to insert the words, "& fixt." He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the National legislature to be provided for by the State Legislations, because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat or some other article of which the average price throughout a reasonable period preceding might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard.
Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1. the different States would make different provision for their representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2. the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that as had already happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.
On the question for inserting the words, "and fixt"
Massachusetts no. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Doctor Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "liberal." He would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem con.
On the motion of Mr. Pierce, that the wages should be paid out of the National Treasury,
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.
Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of 1st branch,
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of members of the National Legis: to State offices,"
Massachusetts divd. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pennsylvania no. Del. no. Maryland divd. Virginia no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question for making members of the National Legislature ineligible to any office under the National Government for the term of 3 years after ceasing to be members,
Massachusetts no. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania no. Del. no. Maryland ay. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for such ineligibility for one year,
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland divd. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of re-election into 1st branch of the National Legisl. for — — years, and subject to recall" agd. to nem. con.
On question for striking out from the Resol: 5 the words requiring members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of — — years at least
Massachusetts no. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland no. Virginia no. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. divd.
On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the qualification; it was agreed to,
Massachusetts ay. Connecticut no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Mr. Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointments to the 2d branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years."
Mr. Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which would be between the terms of the 1st branch & of the executive.
Mr. Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.
Mr. Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this 2d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the National Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive,