The Formation & Evolution of the American Constitution. Madison James
of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters; the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political authority lodged in them the smaller the number the greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one.
Mr. Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. by the 1st branch of the National Legislature. This would create a dependance contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the National Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. 3. by the people. The people have two great interests, the landed interest, and the commercial including the stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest; the people being Chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it. 4. by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the Commercial interest against the landed; without which oppression will take place, and no free Government can last long where that is the case. He was therefore in favor of this last.
Mr. Dickenson.1 The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. The Gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson) wished he said to extinguish these planets. If the State Governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence would be that the national Government would move in the same direction as the State Governments now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13 small streams into one great current pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large number, and that their influence from family weight & other causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as their No. was augmented and gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of (Mr. Madison) was good it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced below ten, the highest No. of the Tribunitial corps.
Mr. Wilson. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Government cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by the Nationonal Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national Government. He was not however for extinguishing these planets as was supposed by Mr. D. — neither did he on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country. He could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest would be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an election through the medium of the Legislatures than by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an election by the people in large districts which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters.
Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr. D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice would be made? If an election by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived thro' that channel than from the people thro' some other. The great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say that the National Legislature without a proper check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.
Mr. Sherman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.
Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied interest would be more secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the Legislatures are against it. In Massachusetts the County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that would sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There would therefore be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three powerful objections against elections by districts, 1. it is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds would be unavoidable. 2. small States forming part of the same district with a large one, or large part of a large one, would have no chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 a new source of discord would be opened between different parts of the same district.
Mr. Pinkney thought the 2d branch ought to be permanent & independent; & that the members of it would be rendered more so by receiving their appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode would avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective sizes, & for allowing to the 1st class three members, to the 2d two, & to the 3d one.
On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's motion referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's for referring it to the people.
Mass. no. Connecticut no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pennsylvania ay. Del. no. Maryland no. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the National Government a certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the National Government. In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the National Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Governments. Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Congress does not apply. Congress had no power to carry their acts into execution, as the National Government will have.
On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State Legislatures,
Mass. ay. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr. Gerry gave notice that he would tomorrow move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the National Executive in order to substitute an appointment by the State Executives.
The Committee rose & The House adjourned.
1 It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States & dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a proportional representation in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body