WILLIAM LE QUEUX: 15 Dystopian Novels & Espionage Thrillers (Illustrated Edition). William Le Queux
distress, were able to place their securities in a handbag and withdraw them to happier countries.
They may justly be blamed for this want of patriotism, but their reply was that they had been unjustly and mercilessly taxed by men who derided patriotism, misused power, and neglected the real interests of the nation in the desire to pander to the mob. Moreover, with the income-tax at 3s. 6d. in the pound, and with the cost of living enormously enhanced, they declared that it was a positive impossibility to live in England, while into the bargain their lives were exposed to danger from the enemy.
As a result of this wholesale emigration, in London and the country the number of empty houses inordinately increased, and there were few well-to-do people left to pay the rates and taxes. The fearful burden of the extravagant debts which the British municipalities had heaped up was cruelly felt, since the nation had to repudiate the responsibility which it had incurred for the payment of interest on the local debts. The Socialist dream, in fact, might almost be said to have been realised. There were few rich left, but the consequences to the poor, instead of being beneficial, were utterly disastrous.
Under the pressure of public opinion, constrained by hunger and financial necessities, and with thousands of German prisoners in their hands, the British Government acceded to the suggested conference to secure peace. Von Kronhelm had asked for a truce, his proposals being veiled under a humanitarian form. The British Government, too, did not wish to keep the German prisoners who had fought with such gallantry longer from their hearths and homes. Nothing, it added, was to be gained by prolonging the war and increasing the tale of bloodshed and calamity. A just and honourable peace might allay the animosity between two great nations of the same stock, if both would let bygones be bygones.
The response of the German Government was chilling and discouraging. Germany, it practically said, had no use for men who had surrendered. Their hearths and homes could well spare them a little longer. The destruction of the German Navy mattered nothing to Germany, who could build another fleet with her flourishing finances. Her army was in possession of Holland and the mainland of Denmark, and would remain so until the British Army — if there were any — arrived to turn it out. The British Government must state what indemnity it was prepared to pay to be rid of the war, or what surrender of territory it would make to obtain peace.
At the same time the German Press, in a long series of inspired articles, contended that, notwithstanding the ultimate British successes, England had been the real sufferer by the war. The struggle had been fought on British soil, British trade had been ruined, British finances thrown into utter disorder, and a great stretch of territory added to the German Empire. Holland and Denmark were ample recompense for the reverses at sea.
The British blockade of the German coast was derided as ineffective, and the British losses due to German mines were regarded as a sign of what the British Navy had to expect if it continued the war. Then a picture was painted of Germany, strong, united, triumphant, confident, firm in her national spirit, efficient in every detail of administration, while in England corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence were alleged to be supreme.
But these Press philippics and the haughty attitude of the German Government were, in reality, only attempts to impose upon the British people and the British Government. Subsequent information has shown that German interests had suffered in every possible way, and that there was grave danger of foreign complications. Unfortunately, the behaviour of the German Press had the expected effect upon England. The clamour for peace grew, and the pro-Germans openly asserted that a cessation of hostilities must be purchased at any price.
At the mediation of the French Government negotiations between the British and German Governments were resumed in the first days of November. But the Germans still adhered inflexibly to their demand for the status quo. Germany must retain Holland and Denmark, which were to become States of the German Empire, under their existing dynasties. Turkey must retain Egypt, whither the Turkish troops had penetrated during the chaos caused by the invasion of England. The Dutch East Indies must become a part of the German Empire.
Certain foreign Powers, however, which had been friendly to England now avowed their readiness to support her in resisting these outrageous demands. But the outcry for peace in England was growing continually, and the British Ministry was helpless before it. The Germans must have got wind of the foreign support which was secretly being given to this country, since at the eleventh hour they waived their demands as regards Egypt and the Dutch East Indies.
The lot of these two territories was to be settled by an International Congress. But they finally secured the consent of the British Government to the conclusion of a peace on the basis that each Power should retain what it possessed at the opening of October. Thus Germany was to be confirmed in her possession of Holland and Denmark, while England gained nothing by the peace. The British surrender on this all-important head tied the hands of the foreign Powers which were prepared to resist vehemently such an aggrandisement of Germany.
As for the Congress to deal with Egypt and the East Indies, this does not fall within the sphere of our history.
* * * * * * *
Peace was finally signed on 13th January 1911. The British Empire emerged from the conflict outwardly intact, but internally so weakened that only the most resolute reforms accomplished by the ablest and boldest statesmen could have restored it to its old position.
Germany, on the other hand, emerged with an additional 21,000 miles of European territory, with an extended seaboard on the North Sea, fronting the United Kingdom at Rotterdam and the Texel, and, it was calculated, with a slight pecuniary advantage. Practically the entire cost of the war had been borne by England.
Looking back upon this sad page of history — sad for Englishmen — some future Thucydides will pronounce that the decree of Providence was not undeserved. The British nation had been warned against the danger; it disregarded the warning. In the two great struggles of the early twentieth century, in South Africa and the Far East, it had before its eyes examples of the peril which comes from unpreparedness and from haphazard government. It shut its eyes to the lessons. Its soldiers had called upon it in vain to submit to the discipline of military service; it rebelled against the sacrifice which the Swiss, the Swede, the German, the Frenchman, and the Japanese made not unwillingly for his country.
In the teeth of all entreaties it reduced in 1906 the outlay upon its army and its fleet, to expend the money thus saved upon its own comfort. The battalions, batteries, and battleships sacrificed might well have averted invasion, indeed, have prevented war. But to gain a few millions, risks were incurred which ended ultimately in the loss of hundreds of millions of money and thousands of lives, and in starvation for myriads of men, women, and children.
As is always the case, the poor suffered most. The Socialists, who had declaimed against armaments, were faithless friends of those whom they professed to champion. Their dream of a golden age proved utterly delusive. But the true authors of England’s misfortunes escaped blame for the moment, and the Army and Navy were made the scapegoats of the great catastrophe.
That the Army Council and the Admiralty had been criminally weak could not be denied. Their weakness merely reflected the moral tone of the nation, which took no interest in naval or military affairs, and then was enraged to find that, in the hour of trial, everything for a time went wrong. When success did come, it came too late, and could not be utilised without a great British Army capable of carrying the war into the enemy’s country, and thus compelling a satisfactory peace.
The End
Whoso Findeth a Wife