The Reality of War: A Companion to Clausewitz. Stewart Lygon Murray
"We hope you are proud of your pupils."
Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter. He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is the founder of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic. I maintain that every one who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence of Clausewitz.
In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The War in the Far East," by the Times military correspondent. In his short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war), it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.
Reflections
Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force.
To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of "imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall."
CHAPTER III
THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ
The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham (the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete shape.
We must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But, on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc., arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and evolution of military thought. For his great aim was "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or favour, as far as he could go—essentially "a realist" of war—and what better aim can we set before ourselves?
As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his "Friends in Council," every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I wish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to form such a main stem in the military culture of British officers.
In the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves as the writings of a gentleman of fine character.
In the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in other writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such pedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study. There is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical importance.
In the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the practical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, "The flowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of Experience, their proper soil."1 He is the great apostle of human nature and character as being everything in war. "All war supposes human weakness, and against that it is directed."2 I believe that the British officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker on war, who asserts that "Of all military virtues Energy in the conduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of arms."3
In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation of all elaborate plans, because Time is required for all elaborate combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy will not give us,—and his consequent deduction that all plans must be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "In war all things are simple, but the simple are difficult,"4 gives the key to his writings, for to overcome those simple yet great difficulties he regards as the art of war, which can only be done by the military virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.
In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:
"Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war."5 And we can all reflect, without reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate battles, in their details, is more useful than a general knowledge of several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed narratives and journals than regular works of history."6 He wants history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states that the history of the