An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe
by that, from one that has but 999 sides: The not observing whereof, causes no small Error in Men’s Thoughts, and Confusion in their Discourses.
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§ 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we are apt to think, we have a positive comprehensive Idea of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration, which is not clearly contained in our Idea. ’Tis true, that he that thinks so, may have a very clear Idea of Duration […]: But it not being possible for him to include in his Idea of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration, where he supposes no end, that part of his Idea, which is still beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. […]
§ 16. […] when we talk of the divisibility of Matter in infinitum, […] we have but very obscure, and confused Ideas of Corpuscles, or minute Bodies, so to be divided, when by former Divisions, they are reduced to a smalness much exceeding the perception of any of our Senses; and so all that we have clear, and distinct Ideas of, is of what Division in general, or abstractly is, and the Relation of Totum and Pars: But of the bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Progressions, I think, we have no clear, nor distinct Idea at all. […] we [364]have no more a clear Idea of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a clear Idea of an infinite Number […]: endless Divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct Idea of actually infinite Parts, than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct Idea of an actually infinite Number. They both being only in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added, (wherein consists the Infinity,) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused Idea. […]
Of Real and Fantastical Ideas
§ 1. BESIDES what we have already mentioned, concerning Ideas, other Considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are
First, Either real, or fantastical.
Secondly, Adequate, or inadequate.
Thirdly, True, or false.
First, by real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes. Fantastical or Chimerical, I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly [366]referr’d, as to their Archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of Ideas before-mentioned, we shall find, that,
§ 2. First, Our simple Ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the Images, or Representations of what does exist, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewed. But though Whiteness and Coldness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet those Ideas of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain, etc. being in us the Effects of Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us such Sensations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities, that are really in things themselves. […]
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§ 4. Secondly, Mixed Modes and Relations, having no other reality, but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more required to those kind of Ideas, to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These Ideas, being themselves Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent Ideas. […]
§ 5. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being made all of them in reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in Things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical, which are made up of such Collections of simple Ideas, as were really never united, never were found together in any Substance; v. g. a rational [368]Creature, consisting of a Horse’s Head, joined to a body of humane shape, or such as the Centaurs are described. […]
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas
§ 1. OF our real Ideas some are Adequate, and some are Inadequate. Those I call Adequate, which perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate Ideas are such, which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,
§ 2. First, That all our simple Ideas are adequate. Because being nothing but the effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the Ideas, which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure there is a power in Sugar to produce those Ideas in our Minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. […]
§ 3. Secondly, Our complex Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collections of simple Ideas, which the Mind puts together, without reference to any real Archetypes, or standing Patterns, [370]existing any where, are, and cannot but be adequate Ideas. Because they not being intended for Copies of Things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of Ideas, and thereby that perfection which the Mind intended they should: So that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. […] But in our Ideas of Substances, it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy Things, as they really do exist; and to represent to our selves that Constitution, on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our Ideas attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they still want something, we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mixed Modes and Relations, being Archetypes without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to itself. […]
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§ 5. […] these complex Ideas of Modes, when they are referred by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the Ideas in the Mind of some other intelligent Being, expressed by the Names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate. Because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their Archetype, and Pattern: In which respect only, any Idea of Modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account, our Ideas of mixed Modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing right.
§ 6. Thirdly, What Ideas we have of Substances, I have above shewed: Now those Ideas have in the Mind a double [372]reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real Essence of each Species of Things. 2. Sometimes they are only design’d to be Pictures and Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by Ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these Copies of those Originals, and Archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.
First, it is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And names standing for nothing but the Ideas, that are in Men’s Minds, they must constantly referr their Ideas to such real Essences, as to their Archetypes. […] And yet if you demand, what those real Essences are, ’tis plain Men are ignorant,