Perspectives on Morality and Human Well-Being. Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi

Perspectives on Morality and Human Well-Being - Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi


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connected, chapters. These chapters are developed as follows.

      ii) Chapter 3 demonstrates that the current practice of excluding religion as a source of universally accepted norms of economic behaviour, i.e., truth, honesty, impartiality, individual liberty, justice, equality, rights, fulfilling contracts, etc., has not at all been helpful, even in Western societies. Elaborate nonbinding general frameworks of ethical rules and norms are no substitutes for clearly articulated and voluntarily-held ethical mores which flow from the religious beliefs that are accepted voluntarily by believers as binding. True, the former embellish intellectual discourse; but they seldom spill over into concrete action. In sharp contrast, the latter get ‘internalised’ in individual consciousness. They act as effective sanctions against unethical practices – e.g., ‘free-riding’, ‘moral hazard’, ‘principal-agency syndrome’, ‘fraud’, etc., – which undermine the efficient working of market-based social and economic institutions. The internalisation of moral values has the entirely wholesome effect of reconciling private interests with collective welfare, at significantly lower ‘policing’ and regulatory costs than secular economic and social systems normally incur. Indeed, in the latter case, such costs are not adequately incurred because they tend to be prohibitively high; but this neglect loosens the moral bindings of the socio-economic fabric. Religious ethical values are now accepted as central to “the functioning of an individualist, contractual economy” [Hirsch (1977); p. 141]; yet this remains a minority opinion in the heavily secularised climate of Western thought.

      iii) Chapter 4 asserts that Islamic moral values link the individual to collectivity, by balancing individual freedom with social responsibility; and gives a fairly detailed account of the basics of Islamic morality, especially with reference to central economic issues. Like all religions, Islam can accomplish its social objectives because it does not make excessive demands on the stock of scarce altruistic resources. Performing a morally edifying economic act itself enhances the supply of altruism; and, since it recognises a legitimate role for self-interested objectives (though not self-interested behaviour) in the running of a market economy, the demand for altruism remains manageable. An added attraction here is that, contrary to Western (secular) thought where religion is seen mainly, if at all, as an instrument to achieving better economic results, Islam regards religion to be constitutive of a fuller human life in which material and spiritual urges of humankind coalesce. It then goes on to investigate what that means for a smooth functioning of a market economy.

      iv) Chapter 5 gives a thorough analysis of the Islamic ethical system, and its ‘inner’ logical structure. It shows that the system can be effectively used to spell out and implement Islam’s moral vision, and to broaden it by drawing selectively on ‘alien’ philosophies. Chapter 6 attempts to test the implicit hypothesis of the preceding chapter, namely that an ethics-based economic system need not become altogether dysfunctional and that it may even energise economic agents to work for the betterment of society. The supporting empirical evidence, which is presented here for the first time, gives both the strong and the not-so-strong aspects of Muslim practices, and to some extent, of Islamic ethics. The general points that come out are: (a) morality makes a significant impact on an individual’s economic and social behaviour; but that the microscopic power of religious morality makes it even more effective than secular morality in achieving social goals. (b) Religious moral values guide only if these are explicitly and emphatically stated. (c) They misguide if not properly interpreted and if they do not creatively respond to the needs of society. And, finally, (d) a proactive public policy must supplement private morality to maximise collective good.

       Notes


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