A Calculated Risk. Evan M. Wilson
on the Department and the Foreign Service pointed out at the time, the Near East Division, like its counterpart the old Far Eastern Division, dealt with “questions that often have little or no resemblance to the problems of Western nations.”4 Not only were there profound cultural differences between the peoples of the Near East and ourselves, but the work of the Division was set apart by special problems stemming from capitulary rights (still in force in certain countries as late as the mid-1940s) and the presence in the area of important American educational, medical, missionary and archaeological institutions. In other words, the Division handled many problems outside the range of ordinary diplomatic and consular work. It had thus become a sine qua non that its personnel should have experience in the area. Indeed, it should be noted that shortly after the Near East Division was established in the year 1909, it was made a Departmental requirement that the Division be staffed by officers who had served in the Near East. This policy was still being generally followed when I joined the Division in 1943.5
There was nothing sinister in this, but it gave rise to accusations that the officers dealing with the Palestine problem tended to side with the Arabs against the Jews. This led to repeated requests by the Zionists that jurisdiction over Palestine be taken out of the Division and placed in a special office dealing with Jewish affairs. It also led to allegations that some of the officers in question were anti-Semitic, a charge repeated, I am sorry to say, by Truman in his memoirs.
In point of fact, we in the Near East Division and in our posts overseas were simply trying to further United States interests. A corollary of this happened to be that most of us considered that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be detrimental to our other interests in the Near East. The published diplomatic correspondence for these years contains many warnings to this effect, but this is not the same as promoting the Arab point of view in the dispute. Some of these officials may have been slow to recognize the significance of the American Jewish interest in Palestine, but the accusation of anti-Semitism (in the loose sense of anti-Jewish) is wholly unwarranted. We could take little comfort from the fact that we were often thought by the Arabs to be pro-Zionist because our work brought us into contact with Jews. This was just another consequence of the dilemma inherent in our Palestine policy.
The personality of Wallace Murray dominated the old Near East Division. Murray had a quick mind, a formidable knowledge of Near Eastern affairs, and a lively appreciation of the importance of the area to the United States. At the same time, he did not suffer fools gladly and he tended to show a proprietary attitude toward everything that he considered to be within his bailiwick. At this period the division chiefs were constantly feuding with one another and Murray was a past master at defending his prerogatives. Toward the Palestine question, he held very firm views, based on long exposure to that vexing problem. His manner toward the Zionists sometimes implied that he regarded them as intruders on an otherwise placid, or comparatively placid, Near Eastern scene. As a consequence, his meetings with the Zionist leadership, which were infrequent, were marked by a certain coolness on both sides and he was often a target of criticism on the part of the Zionists and their supporters in Congress. Dr. Weizmann, for example, states categorically in his memoirs (Trial and Error, Vol. II, 425) that Murray was “an avowed anti-Zionist and an outspoken pro-Arab.”
Certainly, the record contains a number of instances in which Murray expressed opinions that could not be regarded as sympathetic to the Zionist point of view. Among other things, as the Foreign Relations papers show, he warned President Roosevelt against the harmful effects of Zionist agitation on the war effort, and he recommended against approaching the British to keep Palestine open to Jewish immigration. Small wonder that when word spread in 1945 that he was to go out to the field, the Zionist leaders called on Acting Secretary of State Grew and urged Murray's replacement by someone who, as they put it, “understood the whole broad problem of the Jews and Palestine.”6
In all fairness to Wallace Murray, it should be pointed out that though he frequently gave voice to his deep-seated suspicion of Zionist motivations, and though he was never one to remain silent when the occasion called for forthrightness, he was a devoted public servant whose overriding concern was to do what he thought was right for the American interest. His reports to his superiors were notable for the prescience which they displayed and for accurately forecasting, at this comparatively early date, the effect that the adoption of a pro-Zionist policy would have on the standing of the United States in the Near Eastern region.
So formidable was Murray's reputation that our opposite numbers in the British Foreign Office regarded him with some trepidation. The British record of his 1944 visit to London, in the Foreign Office Palestine files at the Public Record Office, London, contains a number of comments expressing surprise that he turned out to be, unexpectedly, quite affable in his dealings with British officials.
Murray's deputy, Alling, had likewise served in the area and had been in the Division for many years, but he was the antithesis of Murray in personality. He had a genial, kindly manner and was universally popular. He succeeded in calming down many a visitor who found Murray's acerbic approach a bit hard to take. Like his chief, he had a wide-ranging knowledge of Near Eastern matters, particularly those pertaining to Syria and Lebanon, where he had seen service.
Merriam, too, was experienced and knowledgeable. His approach to the explosive Palestine issue was marked by a calm, business-like manner. His drafting ability was a tremendous asset in dealing with the subtleties and nuances of the problem.
Henderson, Murray's successor, was a very different type. His Foreign Service background, prior to going to Iraq, had been in Eastern European affairs and his approach to the problems of the Near East showed a broader perspective than that of many who had concentrated on that one area. He was objective and fair in his attitude toward the Palestine question, and sincerely interested in finding a solution. In view of this it is ironic, though perhaps inevitable, that he should later have been so fiercely attacked by the Zionists. Henderson encouraged those of us who were concerned with Palestine to have Jewish as well as Arab contacts, and Departmental meetings with the Zionists became less stiff and formal than in the past. A revealing comment on the contrasting styles of Murray and Henderson is to be found in Lord Trevelyan's little book on diplomacy. Trevelyan, who served in Washington during the war as a representative of the government of India, writes: “We had first to deal with Mr. Wallace Murray, whom we found difficult and openly hostile to the British in India. He left and was succeeded by Mr. Loy Henderson. The whole situation was transformed by his friendly and helpful approach.”7 Even so consistent a critic of the Department and its Palestine policy as the chairman of the Political Committee of the extremist United Zionists-Revisionists of America, Dr. Joseph B. Schechtman, found Henderson to be sincere, not an anti-Semite, and seeking what he conceived (mistakenly, Schechtman thought) to be the American interest.
THE OLD NEAR EAST DIVISION: RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATIONS
In considering the way in which the Palestine question was handled by the Near East Division, it must be borne in mind that the Division was responsible for our relations with over a score of countries, of which Palestine was only one. Essentially our task was to carry out United States policy toward the countries of the area and to protect and promote U.S. interests. Sometimes the latter were in conflict, as in the case of Palestine. In such an event, we did not consider that it was incumbent on us to pursue any single interest at the expense of another, but rather to attempt to reconcile the conflicts to the extent that seemed to be possible within the context of overall policy objectives. It follows that the criticism sometimes made by Zionists to the effect that we were remiss in not promoting the Jewish National Home more assiduously was wide of the mark. Not only was this not our principal task, but also (and this is the essential point) we never received instructions from the Secretary of State or the President that it should be so. Conversely (and this is equally important), we never were instructed to favor the Arab side in the dispute. It goes without saying that to carry out our duties in the light of the dilemma imposed by our conflicting commitments required a high degree of detachment and objectivity.
The responsibilities of NE, as listed in the 1946 Register of the Department of State, are reproduced in Appendix B. It will be noted that we were specifically charged with making recommendations to the Secretary with regard