Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Martin Heidegger

      The change in the position of logic is nothing less than the transformation of the idea of the system. But this transformation is not a rejection of the previous standpoint as untenable, which is the judgment that the professional pen-pushers like to record in their history of philosophy. Rather, it is the transformation of the system enforced by the initial realization of the phenomenology-system. It is thus that the Phenomenology of Spirit itself comes to be regarded as superfluous.

      If we do not differentiate both systems as first and second, it is because another system, the so-called Jena-system, precedes the phenomenology-system. This is, of course, only a general designation. The various indications are that it was precisely in the Jena period that the specifically Hegelian idea of system matured; and accordingly the drafts took many forms. Although the sources are still insufficient, there is reason to believe that already prior to his Jena period in Frankfurt, Hegel projected his entire philosophy—the system. This took place in close connection with a systematic and penetrating confrontation with Hellenism, with which Hegel had familiarized himself at that time, especially because of his friendship with and close proximity to Hölderlin. The effect of the confrontation with Hellenism—and philosophically with Plato and Aristotle—is so fundamental and lasting for the Jena-system that no one who has ever made a similar attempt would imagine that anything like it could be accomplished in one semester, even if he could apply the full force of Hegel’s mind to it. That confrontation must have begun and developed its essential clarity already in Frankfurt. Therefore, one can with some justification speak of a Frankfurt-system. One can also assume, in judging Hegel’s philosophical existence as we must, that he left Frankfurt for Jena for more than simply becoming a university lecturer and embarking upon an academic career. When he left Frankfurt, Hegel knew what he as a philosopher sought in Jena; he knew it as any 31-year-old can know what philosophy intends to do with him, if he happens to be Hegel.

      Thus, in summary we have the following sequence of systems and plans for systems: the Frankfurt-system, the Jena-system, the phenomenology-system, and the encyclopedia-system. Hegel’s final and proper system, the encyclopedia-system, shows much more strongly a relationship to the earlier plans for system than to the phenomenology-system. The phenomenology-system has a singular place in the whole of Hegel’s philosophy, and yet it belongs necessarily to its inner form. This is so because, to repeat what was said earlier, the Phenomenology of Spirit remains the work and the way that not only once but always, and in a definite and indispensable manner, prepares the ground—better: the space, the dimensionality, the realm of expansion—for the encyclopedia-system. The fact that the phenomenology is left out of the encyclopedia-system as a fundamental part of it is not a deficiency of this system. Rather, the omission of the phenomenology—after it inaugurated the system—marks the beginning of the system which has the logic as its only appropriate beginning. This is so because the system of absolute knowing, if it understands itself correctly, must have an absolute beginning. Now, since on the one hand the phenomenology does not begin as absolutely as the logic does and thus must be left out of the beginning of the system, while on the other hand the phenomenology prepares the domain for a possible absolute beginning, the omission of the phenomenology from the encyclopedia-system articulates its indispensable affiliation with and relationship to this system. But sufficient justice is not done to this affiliation when the phenomenology shrinks into a segment of a segment of the third part of the encyclopedia-system, although the system for its part also requires such shrinking. Therefore, the Phenomenology of Spirit occupies a double position in the encyclopedia-system: In a certain way the phenomenology is a foundational part for the system while being at the same time an affiliated component within the system.

      This double position of the Phenomenology of Spirit is not the result of Hegel’s failure to gain clarity about this work and its role, but is the outcome of the system. Thus, in the course of our interpretation from now on, we shall have to ask:

      1. How is the double position of the Phenomenology of Spirit systematically grounded?

      2. To what extent can Hegel accomplish this grounding on the basis he provides?

      3. Which fundamental problem of philosophy comes to light in the double position of the Phenomenology of Spirit?

      We cannot avoid these questions. But we can formulate them and respond to them only after we have first grasped clearly the primary character and the essential dimensions of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

§2. Hegel’s conception of a system of science

a) Philosophy as “the science”

      The foremost character of the Phenomenology can be determined only by considering the intrinsic mission that is initially and properly assigned to this work as a whole, as it stands at the service of the Hegelian philosophy and begins its exposition. But this intrinsic mission for the whole of Hegel’s philosophy is announced in the complete title of the work, which reads: System of Science: Part I, Science of the Experience of Consciousness. (Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit). A preparatory discussion of this title offers a rough and ready understanding of that task and so allows a glimpse of what actually takes place in that work.

      Thus, we repeat our initial question: To what extent does the system of science require the science of the experience of consciousness, respectively the science of the phenomenology of spirit, as its first part?

      What does System of Science mean? Let us note that the main title is not System of Sciences. This expression has nothing to do with the compilation and classification of various existing sciences of, say, nature or history. The system is by no means aiming at such things. Here we are dealing with the science and its system. The science also does not mean scientific research in general, in the sense that we have in mind when we say: “Barbarism threatens the continued existence of the science.” The science, whose system is at issue, is the totality of the highest and most essential knowledge. This knowledge is philosophy. Science is taken here in the same sense as in Fichte’s notion of the “doctrine of science.” That doctrine is not concerned with sciences—it is not logic or theory of knowledge—but deals with the science, i.e., with the way in which philosophy unfolds itself as absolute knowledge.

      But why is philosophy called the science? We are inclined—because of custom—to answer this question by saying that philosophy provides the existing or possible sciences with their foundations, i.e., with a determination and possibility of their fields (e.g., nature and history), as well as with the justification of their procedures. By providing all sciences with their foundation, philosophy