Flight of the Eagle. Conrad Black
became disorganized in the forward trenches and impediments Montcalm had just had crafted from felled trees, and then cut the British down in droves. About 2,000 were killed or seriously wounded, as Abercromby, from behind the lines, ordered renewed attacks over the corpses and wounded of the previous failed charges all day. Then, as night fell, he ordered a retreat that became a panic and a rout, and many wounded and much supplies were abandoned. Montcalm thought at first it was a stratagem to lure him out, as Abercromby still had a great superiority of manpower and artillery and supplies. Abercromby stabilized his forces at the old Fort William Henry; Montcalm remained at Carillon until late August, and then had to release most of his men to return and bring in the harvest. He had, by his skill and decisive leadership, and Abercromby’s incompetence, saved New France for another winter. But the British, under so determined a leader as Pitt, were not to be put off so easily.
The other access to Canada, via the St. Lawrence, was not approached with such hesitancy. Amherst had arrived in strength near Louisbourg on June 8 and began investing the town and fort. Louisbourg was a formidable installation, but the techniques for reducing a fortress in a siege were well-known and could not be countered if the attacking forces were adequately numerous and supplied and the besieged object could not be resupplied. Trenches were dug to bring siege guns forward and holes were blasted in the walls and other trenches were dug to enable columns of attackers to come forward and surge through the ruptured walls. Other artillery would fire over the walls and create as much havoc as possible for as long as was necessary. The British boxed in and gradually outgunned the French men o’ war in the harbor, and invested the fort on all landward sides and were eventually able to pour fire from the naval squadron straight into the town. The French defended valiantly but had no chance of being relieved, and by July 26, the French commander, Drucour, asked for terms, as the British had at Fort William Henry.
The legacy of that frightful episode intruded. Instead of recognizing that the French had fought honorably and tenaciously, as they had (and had taken 400 dead and 1,300 wounded in a garrison of 5,000), and allowing them to retire under their colors and with their possessions, Amherst required that the entire garrison be taken as prisoners of war and the entire civilian population of 8,000 from the surrounding area be deported to France. This was the larger, second half of the removal of the Acadians from 1755, and was another outrage. But the British felt that the earlier, prewar precedent and the antics of the French and Indians at Fort William Henry would have justified even sterner measures. The fall of Louisbourg left the St. Lawrence wide open to the Royal Navy, though there was not time to organize an attack up-river in 1758.
The third British target, Fort Frontenac, at the eastern end of Lake Ontario where it empties into the St. Lawrence, fell easily on August 26, to a deft and stealthy approach by Colonel John Bradstreet at the head of 3,100 men against a garrison of only 110 soldiers, the rest having been taken forward by the troops-starved Montcalm. Bradstreet captured stores and bread for more than 4,000, plus all the lake-craft the French had on Lake Ontario. The supply route between Montreal and the Ohio and western Pennsylvania forts was now heavily interdicted.
Abercromby, who despite his lethargy and lack of imagination as a commander had moments of strategic boldness, ordered Forbes to take Fort Duquesne, which involved some sort of rapprochement with some of the Indian tribes (or nations, as they preferred to be called). Abercromby was then sacked by Pitt, in favor of Amherst. The Indians remembered Fort William Henry, and despite Montcalm’s repulse of Abercromby at Carillon, they knew of the fall of Fort Frontenac and the approach of Forbes at the head of a large force. They spurned the request for alliance of the French commander at Duquesne, François-Marie Le Marchand de Lignery, and the Frenchman evacuated Fort Duquesne, blew it up on November 23, and withdrew his diminished garrison up the Allegheny for the winter. Pittsburgh would arise on the ashes of Fort Duquesne, Ligonier would be its most prosperous suburb, Duquesne a distinguished university, and for many years Forbes Field would be Duquesne’s baseball stadium. The route was clear from Philadelphia into the Ohio country, and the French presence in North America had been eradicated except for Montreal, Quebec, a few lesser towns along the St. Lawrence and St. Maurice Rivers, and partially, New Orleans.
7. THE WAR IN THE WEST INDIES AND AFRICA, 1759
On the heels of his successful seizure of the Senegalese slave trade, Pitt followed the advice of a Jamaican sugar plantation owner, William Beckford (who was also a London alderman), and seized the French island of Guadeloupe, which had a sugar production equivalent to Jamaica’s (20,000 tons a year), and was a staging port for attacks by French privateers against British sea commerce in the Caribbean. Possession of it would give Britain control of the sugar market and pricing procedure opposite most of Europe, and a bargaining chip to trade for Minorca, a valued base for the British fleet in the Mediterranean. (The British would take Martinique, too, in 1761.) A financial bonanza followed, as Martinique and Guadeloupe provided Britain with great quantities not only of sugar but of coffee, rum, molasses, and tropical fruit, and the wealth generated by these activities transformed the City doubters about Britain’s rising debt to purring tabbies, financing these exotic industries. The cautious and envious Newcastle periodically advised Pitt that the London City financial community, which bought British bonds, had to believe in the war for it to be paid for; in fact, Pitt, as long as his military operations were successful, could have forced the country’s bonds on the City, though it would have been a huge inconvenience. Pitt had sold his ability to deliver much of the world to British rule and profit, and to push France back into her own country, and he was delivering on his promise. There were 71,000 men in the Royal Navy and 91,000 in the army and it was proposed to add 10,000 to the army. Britain’s capacity to build ships was at its outer limits. With the activities of Britain in America, the Caribbean, West Africa, and India, as well as Hanover, there were only about 10,000 troops, strengthened by the flabby and almost untrained home guard of 32,000, to protect the home islands in case of need.
For once, Montcalm would not be looking forward to the end of the Quebec winter. In Paris, it had been a dismal military year, and all Louis XV had to show for his exertions was to have thrown the paltry Hanoverians back across the Rhine. The Duke de Choiseul was named chief minister to go head-to-head with Pitt. His strategy would be the familiar one to mass the French navy to facilitate an invasion of England by the main French army, and leave it to Austria and Russia and the Swedes to give Frederick of Prussia a well-deserved thrashing, and give up the overseas campaigns as an improvident beau geste where France had little interest and less chance of success against the maritime-focused British. Of course, the problems with this were that Choiseul had no short-term ability to devote the forces necessary to build a fleet that could seriously threaten the British Isles; Pitt could always bribe Europeans into tearing scraps out of the frontiers of France; and the long-term strategic future was in vast continents and subcontinents, such as North America and India, and not in the cordons sanglants, slivers of territory between the Great Powers of Europe such as Flanders, Alsace-Lorraine, Silesia, and the trackless political wasteland of the Balkans, which changed hands back and forth at intervals for centuries.
Choiseul’s impatience with the overseas operations was understandable, and coincided with the king’s irritation at their cost and difficulty. But in building up an army of 100,000 in the Channel ports and waiting for an opportunity to attack across the Channel with naval superiority, he was seeking an instant gratification of a long-held wish that the British had never permitted to be filled. The only way to defeat Britain was successfully to occupy the home islands. This would require a substantially stronger navy than Britain’s, as well as an army large enough to defeat and occupy England, while maintaining sufficient strength to repel an invasion by a land neighbor, while busy trying to subdue the British Isles. Thus the secret of crushing Britain, as was never realized by its greatest continental adversaries, was to be at peace with all continental powers, which would require a greater army than all continental rivals, and then to have a greater navy than Britain’s. This would effectively require the combined naval and military force of the three other greatest powers in Europe. The geography and history of Europe never yielded any country such an advantage, and the British talent for dividing Europe with well-purchased and supported coalitions prevented that, even against leaders who dominated most of Europe for a time. This is why Britain has not been seriously invaded since the arrival of William the Conqueror in 1066. Choiseul’s plan appealed to Gallic logic and King Louis