The New Totalitarian Temptation. Todd Huizinga
the broader question of the democratic legitimacy of transferring powers from a democratically accountable national government to a poorly understood, much more loosely accountable European Union. Upon wrapping up the agreement, Prime Minister Schluter had commented, “We can now expect a clear ‘yes’ in the next referendum. I am very happy that our future participation in European co-operation now seems ensured . . . .”6 With seven of the eight political parties in the Danish parliament pushing for it, those in favor of the Maastricht Treaty won a strong victory: 56.7% of voters said yes, with an 86.5% turnout.
The other countries that held a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty were France and Ireland. Voters in both countries approved the treaty. In Ireland, 69.5% voted in favor, with a 57.3% turnout. It was different in France: with an overall 69.7% turnout, the yes votes just squeaked by, at 51%. Serious misgivings about the ushering in of “European Union” were clearly not limited to Denmark.
TEACHING THE IRISH A LESSON OR TWO
Ireland has traditionally looked favorably on EU membership and closer European integration, as demonstrated in the voters’ approval of the Maastricht Treaty by almost 70%. There are two main reasons for this. The most commonly cited reason is that EU membership gave Ireland access to EU markets and massive amounts of EU “structural funds,” fueling its economic boom and its rise from one of the poorest Western European countries to one of the richest. It is quite true that Ireland had seen impressive growth by the time the eurozone crisis hit, and boasted a per capita GDP rivaling that of the very richest member states. The second reason, less often cited but just as important, is the troubled history of Great Britain’s dominance of Ireland. The Irish believe that EU membership gives them independence and freedom to maneuver vis-à-vis their much larger neighbor to the east, between Ireland and the continent. Nevertheless, the Irish have twice failed to vote the “correct” way, and consequently have twice been called upon to “get it right the second time.”
In June 2001, Irish voters rejected the Treaty of Nice by a solid majority. This treaty was ostensibly an effort to reform the EU in order to handle the upcoming enlargement from fifteen to twenty-five member states (with most of the new ones coming from the former Eastern Bloc). In reality, though, it was also an attempt to deepen European integration, taking more powers from the member states and handing them to the EU. In Ireland, 53.8% of voters said no to the treaty, with only 34.8% of registered voters participating in the referendum.
According to common wisdom, Irish voters were concerned that the Treaty of Nice might threaten Irish neutrality (as Ireland is a convinced neutral militarily and is not, for example, a member of NATO), and they worried that it gave too much power to the large member states, putting smaller ones at a disadvantage. But the Nice Treaty vote was also a wake-up call to both Irish and EU leaders. The Irish voters wanted their voices to be heard by their elected leaders. At the same time, the low turnout for the referendum was an example of a growing trend in EU-related votes: a great many voters are becoming complacent and apathetic toward a distant and complex EU that they do not understand. They become resigned to their lack of a voice, and give up.
As was the case after the Danish rejection of Maastricht in 1992, loud and insistent voices from Brussels and other member-state capitals asserted that the Irish result was not acceptable. Another vote must be held so the Irish could get it right. The Irish government acquiesced, but first managed to obtain the Seville Declaration,7 upholding Irish military neutrality, among other concessions. A second referendum on the Treaty of Nice was held in October 2002. Under massive pressure from throughout the EU, Irish voters approved the treaty by a resounding majority of 62.9%, with a turnout of close to half of registered voters.
The whole scenario repeated itself several years later when the Treaty of Lisbon – the repackaged EU constitution – came up for approval. On June 12, 2008, Irish voters rejected the treaty by 53.4%, with a 53.1% turnout. That this result was a great surprise to the Irish political establishment is testimony to the gulf between the decision makers and the average voters.
The predictable uproar ensued. Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg’s foreign minister, said that Ireland would need to have a second vote, adding, “The question is how can we prepare it so that it can be won.”8 Elmar Brok, a senior MEP from Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (Angela Merkel’s party), declared controversially that Ireland would need to vote again and that a new referendum would decide whether Ireland stayed in the EU or not.9
Now the Irish political establishment was worried. They saw themselves between the rock of revealing their disrespect for Irish voters yet again, and the hard place of finding themselves shamefaced and excluded among their peers in the EU elite.
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