Putin on the March. Douglas E. Schoen

Putin on the March - Douglas E. Schoen


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      © 2017 by Douglas E. Schoen

      All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601, New York, New York, 10003.

      First American edition published in 2017 by Encounter Books,

      an activity of Encounter for Culture and Education, Inc.,

      a nonprofit, tax exempt corporation.

      Encounter Books website address: www.encounterbooks.com

      The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48 1992 (R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).

      FIRST AMERICAN EDITION

      LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA IS AVAILABLE

      EBOOK: 978-1-59403-998-0

       Interior page design and composition by BooksByBruce.com

      Contents

       GOING OPERATIONAL

       Chapter Two: Russia’s Petro-Politics

       Chapter Three: Forming the New Russian Empire

       Chapter Four: Diplomacy and Pressure: Russia’s Backroom Dealings

       Chapter Five: Espionage: Spies, Leaks, and Cyberwarfare

       PART TWO

       FIGHTING BACK

       Chapter Six: Countering Russian Aggression

       Chapter Seven: A New World Oil Order

       Chapter Eight: Containment for the Twenty-First Century

       Chapter Nine: Closer Allies, Clearer Goals

       Chapter Ten: Empowering Cyber-Counterintelligence

       Notes

       INTRODUCTION

       Vladimir Putin Is Winning

      How does a nation with a weak and vulnerable economy and inferior military go on an international military and intelligence winning streak the likes of which haven’t been seen in years? How does a nation with a fraction of America’s striking power exert its will in the Middle East and Eastern Europe and sow doubts about the legitimacy of American democracy—further polarizing and dividing an already-divided superpower?

      How does Russia win?

       –DAVID FRENCH, NATIONAL REVIEW 1

      [Russian information warfare is] about destabilizing democracy and pitting us against each other to limit the influence of the United States on the world stage.

       –JONATHON MORGAN, FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL 2

      Remember the 2012 presidential election, during which President Obama held off the challenge of the Republican nominee, Mitt Romney?

      Remember the debates? There were three. In the first, Romney scored a decisive win over an off-his-game Obama. In the second, in the “town hall” format, the president rallied and had a good night. And in the third, devoted to foreign policy, the two candidates had this exchange:

      OBAMA: Governor Romney, I’m glad that you recognize that Al Qaeda is a threat, because a few months ago when you were asked what’s the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said Russia, not Al Qaeda; you said Russia—the 1980s, they’re now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because, you know, the Cold War’s been over for 20 years . . .

      ROMNEY: Russia does continue to battle us in the U.N. time and time again. I have clear eyes on this. I’m not going to wear rose-colored glasses when it comes to Russia, or Mr. Putin.3

      Obama won the soundbite war, and he won the election. But five years later, it is clear that Romney’s warnings were correct and that Obama’s dismissals of Vladimir Putin’s Russia were woefully, damagingly wrong.

      Moreover, something else is clear: Putin and Russia are winning at every level in which they are engaged, and there is little sign that their victories will be reversed.

      What has Putin achieved since that October evening when Obama and Romney debated? Consider just the leading points: He has forcibly annexed Crimea from Ukraine, causing international condemnation for Russia but few other genuine costs; he has destabilized and weakened Ukraine, which is fighting a low-level war for its independence and survival. And in the course of moving against Kiev—in a part of the world Russia has always considered its “near abroad”—Putin made a successful bet that the Western democracies, led by the United States, would do nothing to stop him. He was correct then and he appears to be correct still.

      In the charnel house that is Syria, again with the condemnations of world leaders ringing in his ears, Putin boldly intervened on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship despite the risks of a military confrontation with the United States or other Western powers. Here, too, Putin bet that the United States and its Western allies, when push came to shove, would want no part of any fighting in Syria. They would talk, and they would levy sanctions, but if he held firm and stood by his ally, he would prevail. And he has. Assad is in power to stay, and Putin has made Russia a power broker in the Middle East.

      Putin’s triumph in Syria has had the residual effect of causing a refugee crisis that is flooding Europe with desperate people, most of them Muslim and more than enough of whom are prone to radicalism and terror. European capitals are roiling with political anger and divisions over how to handle the influx of people—or whether to accept them at all. The rise of nationalist, antiglobalist parties in most EU countries can in many cases be closely tied to the Syrian refugee


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