In the Shadow of Policy. Robert Ross
relevant government policies and programmes; lack of clarity on authority and accountability; uncertainty and confusion as to who is leading the pilots; insufficient community participation; and lack of clear time frames or a functioning system of monitoring and evaluation. The conception of rural development embodied in the CRDP is highly problematic. The programme involves funding of a plethora of micro-projects within selected districts within the former ‘homelands’, and it is not clear how multiplying such projects is envisaged to lead to ‘the emergence of rural industrial and financial sectors marked by small, micro and medium enterprises and village markets’ (DRDLR 2009: 18).
It is unclear how these projects link up with or contribute to the ‘agrarian transformation’ component of the CRDP, which focuses on improved levels of agricultural production in communal areas, or to the land reform component – which appears to be prioritising ‘emerging commercial farmers’ on medium- to large-scale farm units (in practice, if not in theory). A coherent overall strategy to reconfigure the inherited (and largely intact) unequal agrarian structure, and the associated spatial divide between sparsely settled commercial farming areas and very densely settled ‘communal areas’, is conspicuous by its absence.
Recent agricultural sector reform initiatives
Within the agricultural sector, ‘reform’ has been taken to mean the opening up of opportunities for black business interests and emerging farmers. A policy framework for black economic empowerment was published in 2004, followed by an Agri-BEE Charter in 2008, the key objectives being to encourage black ownership and control of agribusinesses. A scorecard establishes targets for variables such as equity ownership, employment of senior managers and employment equity, the main incentive for companies being to secure procurement contracts from government. A survey of 30 large companies by the Agricultural Business Chamber in 2010 revealed that 30 per cent had completed a scorecard with a further 50 per cent ‘in progress’. Half of the businesses had black ownership of between 14 and 35 per cent, and there were high scores for enterprise development, average scores for preferential procurement and low scores for management control, employment equity, and skills development (Van Rooyen et al. 2010: 4). Some companies were attempting to support emerging farmers, but in most cases this was limited to a few individuals and small groups in the former ‘homelands’ and it appeared that many of these initiatives would not be sustained (Van Rooyen et al. 2010: 5).
A range of private sector actors within the agro-produce sector, from large sugar and forestry companies to individual commercial farmers, have embarked on farmer support programmes, some involving land reform beneficiaries (Kleinbooi 2009; Mayson 2003). It is unclear just how many farmers or land reform beneficiaries are benefiting from these private sector projects, but indications are that only limited numbers are involved. There appear to be few examples of successful contract farming schemes, with the much-vaunted sugar industry subject to precipitous declines in smallholder cane production in recent years (Dubb 2012), and negative experiences abound in Limpopo province irrigation schemes (Tapela 2005). This seems to be the case for fresh produce contracts with supermarkets too: apart from a few localised examples (Louw et al. 2007; Vermeulen et al. 2008), the character of these value chains means that ‘in the absence of a wider set of procurement regulations and incentives, the practices and requirements of dominant market actors exclude small-scale farmers’ (Aliber and Hall 2010: 35).
In summary, attempts to ‘transform’ agriculture by supporting the entry of significant numbers of emerging black commercial farmers appear to have met with limited success to date. This outcome probably has much to do with the highly competitive nature of the sector, as well as sector-wide policies, such as deregulation, which have been distributionally regressive. The sector has become increasingly integrated into global markets for both inputs and outputs, and profits are strongly influenced by global conditions and exchange rates. Trends such as the growing concentration of farm ownership and declining levels of employment have been noted above.
Some government policy documents stress the potential for agriculture to create new jobs and help reduce unemployment. The New Growth Path document published by the Economic Development Department, for example, suggests that opportunities for 300 000 households in ‘agricultural smallholder schemes’ can be generated by 2020 (EDD 2010: 18), and the National Development Plan (NPC 2011: xx) asserts that one million new jobs can be created in agriculture and related industries over the next two decades. Many will come from labour-intensive forms of small-scale farming in communal areas and on redistributed land. The National Planning Commission suggests that there is potential to expand the area under irrigation from 1.5 million hectares to 2 million hectares (NPC 2011: 197), and asserts that market opportunities exist for increased production of fruit for export and vegetables for the domestic market, as well as niche crops such as nuts, olives and berries which are small-scale and labour-intensive in character (NPC 2011: 201–204). Both documents assert that more effective land reform policies will also be required, but there is little that connects their proposals to those set out in the 2011 Green Paper. The lack of overall coherence in government policy, and the absence of any attempt to identify the reform of agrarian structure as a central challenge, persists.
The incoherence of post-apartheid policymaking on land and agriculture
How have the key challenges of rural reform been responded to by post-apartheid policies on land redistribution and agriculture? Firstly, in relation to an unequal and spatially divided agrarian structure, land and agricultural policies have not been conjoined within a coherent, overall strategy aimed at reconfiguring both the distribution of land and current systems of production and marketing; if anything, these policies have pulled in opposite directions. The key thrust in agricultural policies has been liberalisation and deregulation – that is, on state withdrawal and the promotion of ‘market efficiency’ (which, its advocates in the early 1990s argued, would create opportunities for efficient small farmers). Land reform, in contrast, was premised on state intervention in land markets, in order to acquire land for black South Africans unable to afford to do so themselves. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, land reform policies have not actively promoted small-scale farming. The withdrawal of state subsidies to commercial farmers has boosted increasing concentration within the sector, and if anything, has raised, rather than reduced, barriers to entry by small-scale farmers.
Secondly, in relation to the challenge of defining the beneficiaries of land redistribution, the early emphasis in policy was on a broad and ill-defined category, ‘the rural poor’, but also included were women, farm workers, labour tenants and ‘aspirant farmers’. Emerging black commercial farmers were identified as an additional key target group after 1999. Given the hegemony of the large farm model, the latter have been the main focus of the limited ‘transformation’ initiatives undertaken in the agricultural sector to date. In recent years a rhetoric of supporting ‘smallholders’ through land reform and agricultural development in communal areas has emerged, but the term is poorly defined, and the means whereby they will be enabled to overcome barriers to entry, and compete with large-scale capitalist enterprises in an increasingly competitive and concentrated sector, remain unclear. In practice, the recent evolution of the PLAS programme suggests that land redistribution may be subject to elite capture by black business people.
Thirdly, in relation to the mechanisms for land redistribution, a combination of political, ideological and pragmatic considerations was probably responsible for the ANC’s acceptance of the protection of property rights in a new constitution, and also for the adoption of a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ (market-friendly) approach to the acquisition of land. The primary mechanisms until 2006/07 were grants to land reform beneficiaries for land purchase and land development, the establishment of legal entities to hold land for groups, and business planning to ensure ‘viable’ farm plans for large farm units (in other words, without subdivision). The state played the central role in negotiating prices with landowners and approving grants and plans, through long-winded bureaucratic procedures; consultants played key roles in writing constitutions for legal entities and producing business plans, which were often poorly aligned with the needs or desires of beneficiaries; landowners who were unwilling to sell were able to veto land transfers in specific locations; the lack of capital and ineffective post-settlement support measures have hamstrung the ability of beneficiaries to engage in commercial farming; and the absence of area-based planning