Ethnic Boundaries in Turkish Politics. Zeki Sarigil
boundary contestations.
Hypotheses
When and under what conditions do boundary contestations (internal and external) take place? This section proposes some exploratory hypotheses about the processes of boundary contestation. To begin with external boundary contestation, we note that electoral periods in polities allowing competitive politics increase the likelihood of boundary work and boundary struggles. External boundary contestation in particular becomes much more common during such periods. As Wallman (1978) suggests, the need for group definition facilitates the proliferation of boundary messages. During electoral periods especially, political elites feel the need to distinguish themselves (e.g., (re)iterating their own mission, programs, and policies) from those of competing groups. Such actions and statements occur because electoral politics involves intense elite competition for legitimacy and popularity in the eyes of potential voters. Political elites not only try to increase their appeal but also attempt to discredit or delegitimize their opponents.
A common strategy pursued by competing political actors is othering, which refers to identifying, categorizing, or treating certain actors as different from oneself or the mainstream. As one form of external identification or social categorization (see earlier), othering serves two main purposes: (1) marking and naming those who are thought to be different from oneself and (2) (re)constructing one’s identity in reference to others (Weis 1995; Jensen 2011). Actors involved in othering practices tend to declare or treat certain actors as different, marginal, unorthodox, inferior, incompetent, or illegitimate. Obviously, such discourses, attitudes, and actions constitute one form of identity formation and so boundary making (see also Lamont 2000; R. Jenkins 2008; Jackson 2015a).
Since political elites frequently resort to such discourses and actions during electoral periods, electoral competition involves the constant making, remaking, and unmaking of boundaries (ideological, ethnic, religious, moral, etc.). Hence, electoral periods provide great opportunity for researchers to investigate boundary processes (ethnic or nonethnic). Unfortunately, the study of elections tends to focus on political or economic issues. Such an orientation, however, is “unable to incorporate electoral politics based on identities, in which the competition is often over how politicians and voters define the identity categories to which they belong rather than their issue-positions” (Chandra 2012b, 44). Thus, we can put forth the following:
Hypothesis 1: Electoral periods increase the likelihood of boundary work in general and external boundary contestation in particular.
The Kurdish case appears to be quite useful to illustrate the plausibility of this hypothesis. As this book’s empirical chapters show, boundary work by competing elite groups (e.g., the secular Kurdish ethnopolitical elites and Islamist or conservative elites) gets rather intense during electoral periods. For instance, during the visits of conservative political elites to Kurdish areas while campaigning, they frequently label the secular Kurdish movement as “atheist” or “un-Islamic.” In other words, they attempt to contract religious boundaries to undermine the societal popularity and legitimacy of the secular Kurdish movement in the eyes of conservative Kurdish voters. Not surprisingly, such efforts trigger counter boundary work by Kurdish ethnopolitical leadership. As Watts (2010, 130) also observes, electoral periods provide “important means by which pro-Kurdish politician-activists could legally challenge official discourse, promote a pro-Kurdish political platform, publicize the parties, and appeal to different constituencies.”
Regarding internal boundary contestation, in the case of ethnic groups with a high degree of internal diversity or heterogeneity, boundary makers’ efforts might trigger reactions or resentments among coethnics (intraethnic dissension), paving the way for internal competition and tensions. For instance, as boundary makers attempt to expand symbolic or social boundaries to include new ideational elements or groups, some insiders might try to restore previous boundaries or even shrink them. Thus, as an exploratory proposition, we might put forward the following:
Hypothesis 2: In relatively more heterogeneous ethnic groups or movements, internal boundary contestation (struggle over boundaries among coethnics) becomes more likely.
This hypothesis appears to be quite relevant to the Kurdish case. A widely acknowledged feature of Kurdish society is its high degree of internal heterogeneity. Besides tribal differences, Kurds are divided into various linguistic (e.g., Kurmanji, Sorani, and Gorani), sectarian (e.g., Sunni-Shafi, Sunni-Hanefi, and Alevi) and ideological (e.g., nationalist, secular, Islamist) groups. Given such a heterogeneous group structure, it becomes highly likely that the ethnopolitical leadership’s boundary work would be contested by certain groups within the Kurdish ethnic category.
It is not surprising that power differentials might also condition internal boundary contestation. As Wimmer (2009, 258) also suggests, “the distribution of power between various participants in these struggles influences their capacity to shape the outcome.” For instance, in hierarchically organized ethnic groups, internal boundary contestations take place within the shadow of power hierarchies. This situation implies that opposition by subordinate coethnics to the boundary-making efforts of ethnopolitical leaders would more likely be suppressed in hierarchically organized ethnic groups or movements characterized by clear leadership and power relations. In other words, in hierarchical ethnic categories, boundary makers (i.e., superordinates, located at the top echelons of the power hierarchy) would face fewer overt internal challenges. Therefore, in the case of such ethnic groups and movements, boundary work would be relatively smoother. Thus, another hypothesis about boundary work could be the following:
Hypothesis 3: In hierarchically organized ethnic groups or movements, internal boundary contestation is less likely to succeed.
Again, the Kurdish case provides a quite useful context for investigating this hypothesis. As discussed in the following chapters, the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement is characterized by a highly centralized, hierarchical organizational structure. Thus, we might expect that coethnics’ contention of the boundary work initiated by the Kurdish ethnopolitical leadership would have limited impact on the leadership.
However, internal boundary contestation might be potentially more destabilizing in the case of strong divisions or cleavages at the elite level. Differences might emerge in the ruling cadre or among superordinates regarding where ethnic boundaries should be drawn. This situation would facilitate the efforts of boundary contesters or challengers. In the case of strong elite divisions, subordinate coethnics might find some allies at the elite level and so challenge more effectively the existing or redrawn boundaries defended by another elite faction. In other words, elite competition or rivalry would favor internal boundary contestation by opposing subordinate coethnics, increasing the likelihood of successful boundary contestation. Thus, we might postulate the following:
Hypothesis 4: In case of highly unified ethnopolitical leadership (i.e., absence or weakness of elite competition or rivalry), internal boundary contestation would be less likely to succeed.
This hypothesis should also hold in the Kurdish case because another defining feature of the Kurdish movement in the Turkish setting is a high degree of elite unity. Given the strong leadership cult and the tendency to associate any internal opposition with treason or betrayal to the leadership and the Kurdish cause, it would be quite difficult or highly costly to challenge the position of the leadership. Hence, the movement has not allowed any counterelites to emerge and gain power vis-à-vis the leadership. Such an organizational structure and culture would limit the chances of coethnics’ contesting ethnic boundaries successfully.
Conclusion
Since almost all ethnic and nationalist identifications and movements involve boundary processes (e.g., the creation, maintenance, and transformation of ethnic or national identities and boundaries), ethnic boundary-making theory emerges as a highly relevant and valuable theoretical device in ethnicity and nationalism studies. As Wimmer (2013, 3) also claims, “Focusing on social and categorical [symbolic] boundaries allows us to study the formation and dissolution of ethnic groups with more precision than standard sociological approaches that take the existence and continuity of such groups and categories for granted.”