What the Thunder Said. John Conrad
merely fill their canteens in the Cataraqui River? One assumes so. How many boats of ammunition did Bradstreet bring, what sorts of specialized equipment, and how much food did his force, almost as large as our current Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, require? How long did he intend to fight, presuming everything went well? These questions fall into the realm of logistics, and though they might occur to the disciplined student of history, they are usually among the last ones to be considered by Canadian officers. The logistics specialist can grasp the operational points of the Bradstreet raid, but he or she must reduce aspects of the plan to a time-honoured calculus. The application of violence, both blood and steel, must be appreciated in an additional dimension.
Canada and Afghanistan pose the same challenges to an army: crushing geography and a climate that can kill. In the earliest military history of our great nation, logistics were synonymous with survival. We live in a land defined by large tracts of space with a climate that can often be lethal to its inhabitants. Canada is the second-largest country in the world in terms of geographical area, comprising some 9,984,670 square kilometres and stretching for nearly 9,000 kilometres along the border it shares with the United States.8 From the strategic support bases of Hochelaga and Stadacona in Quebec, through to the building of the great transcontinental railway, logistics systems have been designed to carry essential matériel across our vast and rugged country. The Red River Rebellion of 1869–70 showcased the earliest, rudimentary editions of these Canadian lines of supply. The Red River crisis was the first military test for the young Dominion of Canada and logistics in a Canadian context. The rebellion was sparked when the Dominion government purchased the belt of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company. The less than 10,000 residents of what is now Manitoba were unhappy with the Dominion’s plans, and under the leadership of Louis Riel stood up in resistance. Riel formed a provisional government in Manitoba in an act meant to show defiance and Métis sovereignty. A federal force of 1,044 men, made up of some 400 British regulars and enlisted Canadians from Ontario, was mobilized and placed under the leadership of General Garnet Wolseley. The Dominion force followed an arduous route across Lake Superior, and a “rugged canoe route” from the lakehead to Manitoba.9 It can be said without exaggeration that getting to Manitoba was half of the battle. The Dominion forces were successful in quashing the Red River Rebellion without bloodshed. Riel fled in exile to Montana.
Louis Riel later incited the North-West Rebellion of 1885 in what is now known as Saskatchewan. This rebellion illustrates well the logistics challenges a big country like Canada poses to a fighting force. Riel set up a second provisional government at Batoche and enlisted the military leadership of Gabriel Dumont to fight the Dominion forces. The great transcontinental railway was not yet complete, but by using the existing Canadian Pacific Railway lines and American railways south of the border, an effective movement system was put in place. Of greater import was what Desmond Morton has called the “ready-made supply system” in the form of the network of Hudson’s Bay posts to glean the bulk of the required supplies.10 General Middleton had to lean on these hardy trading posts to furnish the supply needs of his force. Over the course of two western uprisings, the Canadian militia got the job done, even though it lacked dedicated military logistics.
The Boer War (1899–1902) saw a small Canadian Expeditionary Force made up of newly minted units such as the Royal Canadian Regiment and, in the second contingent, the Royal Canadian Dragoons. The Canadian detachment fought inside the larger framework of the British Army and received its logistics support from it. More than 8,000 Canadian soldiers fought in the Boer War, and yet there was no formal Canadian supply chain. The Canadian government was responsible to pay for the initial kitting of the Canadian contingent and the costs of their transport to theatre of operations. Once in South Africa, logistic support to the Canadians was the responsibility of the British Army. Two hard lessons were borne of Canadian experiences in the Boer War. The first lesson centred on the Canadian soldier’s first look at an irregular style of warfare. After the British victory at Paardeburg, in which Canadian forces figured prominently, the Boers reverted to guerrilla-style tactics to further their aims. These tactics included attacking British supply lines on the veldt, which made resupply a tactical challenge. The second lesson followed from the tendency for Canadian troops to be served after the regular British units by the British Army logistics system. Victims of another nation’s supply chain, it was not uncommon for Canadian soldiers to endure weeks on half rations or to be routinely served only after British units. This tier-two treatment left an indelible impression on the contingent and it cut a deep groove in the memory of the fledgling Canadian Army: it is always better to bring your own. When war erupted in Europe a decade later, the Canadian Expeditionary Force would at last include tactical logistics units among their number. We have been bringing our own logistics troops to Canada’s fights ever since.
TRIUMPH OF PERSONALITIES
Most of us tend to think of the First World War as a mass of senseless bloodshed — an unfortunate clash of empires in which there are few relevant military lessons. It is easy to understand this view. The “Great War for Civilization” claimed over 60,000 Canadian lives out of a population of eight million.11 A modest exhibit at the Canadian War Museum struck me most poignantly in the spring of 2007. This particular exhibit displayed the ephemera and awards a grieving mother received after her two sons were killed in action in the war. The two Memorial Crosses behind the glass mesmerized me. These little bits of silver were all that the grieving mother had to show for her brilliant boys, her best heart’s blood. Losses like these were widespread across the Dominion of Canada and virtually every hamlet and village in Canada maintains some form of memorial tribute to their First World War fallen.12 I have never contemplated the silver cross from the perspective of knowing so many fresh recipients.
Canadian General Dave Fraser, my boss in Kandahar and the commander of the Canadian Task Force as well as the Multinational Brigade in RC South, had to prepare his fighting force for a new type of battlefield. Such a difficult intellectual task was not without precedent. Combat in the trenches of Europe from 1914 to 1918 was defined by an industrialized lethality that rocked the paradigm of contemporary field commanders. The logistics structures and systems bearing the weight of the British Expeditionary Force and by extension the Canadian Corps on the Western Front were initially static and lacked the capacity to support this industrialized battlefield.13 The British commanders that held direct sway over the Canadian Corps, specifically Douglas Haig and one of his subordinate corps’s commanders, Julian Byng, invested time in their sustainment structure. Both of these generals were able to enhance the logistics functionality of the Canadian Corps in a profound manner. The British Army Field Service Regulations (Part 2) of 1912, which is like an owner’s manual for operating in the army, encouraged commanders to remain aloof from matters of administration and logistics.14 This is an antique bias that unfortunately still finds traction in the current edition of the Canadian Forces. Remarkably, the actions of Haig and Byng strongly suggest that they understood the importance of logistics in the projection of combat power despite the prevailing convention of their time.
Has history been unkind to Field Marshal Haig? Haig’s reputation has been shredded for his steerage through such atrocious campaigns as the Somme and Third Ypres. Most military libraries hold at least some books and academic papers that criticize his blunders. I do not consider myself an apologist for Haig but I believe it is easy to overlook accomplishments that speak to his abilities and staying power as the commander-in-chief of the BEF from late 1915 through to the end of the war. Can you imagine for a second the moral and physical demands that such an immense responsibility would have placed on the man for such a long period? Gervais Phillips strikes an accurate chord in recollecting Haig’s administrative accomplishments:
His army was well supplied in the field, his wounded swiftly evacuated and well cared for ... the figure of Haig looms ever larger as that of the man who foresaw more accurately than most, who endured longer than most and who inspired most confidence amongst his fellows.15
Not only did Haig have to solve the challenges that came with unprecedented volumes of matériel, but he also had to deal with enormous advances in technology. Some of the biggest seeds of innovation that would impact the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days were sown at his insistence after the butchery of the Somme offensive of 1916. Most