The Astonishing General. Wesley B. Turner
had just learned of Brock’s appointment and hoped his brother would not quit “his enviable situation, for a mere major-general’s appointment in Europe.” The family had lost heavily. William, Savery, and Irving became dependent upon small incomes while a brother-in-law, John Tupper, lost between £12,000 and £13,000, enormous sums for the time, but at least, he escaped total ruin. No further correspondence about this family crisis has been found, but the brothers would become reconciled. On October 13, 1812, William wrote to Savery that Isaac wished William and Irving to become reconciled, and so William “went up to day on seeing him and shook hands. He then showed me two lines which he had just received from Isaac. It is satisfactory to me that we shook hands before I was aware of the contents.” [25]
The fact that Edward Ellice was willing to take on the Brock family debt out of esteem and friendship for Isaac tells a good deal about the regard for the general in English-Canadian civilian society. Born in 1783, Ellice was still a young man when he took over leadership of his father’s widespread business enterprises upon his death in 1805. Edward is described as “a prominent merchant-banker and shipowner in the City [London], trading in furs, fish, sugar, cotton, and general merchandise in North and South America, the East and West Indies, and Europe.” He was well educated (he had received his Master of Arts in 1800), well connected socially and politically in Britain, for he had married Lady Hannah, daughter of Charles, 1st Earl Grey, a leading figure in the Whig aristocracy, and wealthy — he inherited his father’s Scottish estate as well as the large seigneury of Beauharnois. One indication of his financial strength is the fact that in 1813, despite the financial strains of years of warfare, he was able to borrow £150,000 from the Bank of England to aid his business. Until his death in 1863, Ellice played important roles in Canadian and British politics and business. Brock would have met him in Lower Canada and obviously impressed him, for bailing out a financially distressed army officer was probably something rarely done by a shrewd businessman.
Brock’s complaint about the high level of expenditure that was expected of him and the resultant strain on his income was not an unusual situation. Officers were expected to maintain an expensive style of living that could, a times, strain their income. They were required to maintain a mess and that expense required a substantial private income of £200 to £300 above his pay. According to one historian, officers’ pay was low compared to professionals of similar social status and even with some extra payments, officers were “abysmally paid.”[26] An extra allowance was given for taking command of a garrison but there were deductions that sometimes surprised the officer. In February 1812, Major Donald Macpherson, commander of the garrison of Kingston, wrote that he understood in taking on the command he would receive a daily allowance of five shillings, which would be reduced by deductions to four shillings and nine pence. To his surprise he found that that amount would be reduced even further because it was subject to income tax. From an endorsement on the letter, it appears that the deductions remained.[27] Brock, too, watched his expenses carefully. In February he wrote to the military secretary (Noah Freer) that he had learned he was being charged £20 for his “portion of the expense of a canoe employed in taking Governor Gore and myself to York.” He asked that Prevost “may consider this sum a fair public charge.”[28]
While trying to cope with the family’s financial problems, Brock had to deal with administrative matters of the Upper Canadian government. After assuming both civil and military command, one of his first concerns was the management of the Indian Department. The accounts of that department had fallen into arrears and Craig had appointed a deputy commissary general to bring the accounts up to date. But this officer, John Lane, was stationed at Fort George and the deputy storekeepers at different posts were required to send their accounts to the storekeeper general at Lachine in Lower Canada before they were sent to Lane at Fort George. Clearly, the system was seriously inefficient and Brock, typically, suggested that it be simplified. Either the storekeeper general should move to Upper Canada or his role in dealing with the accounts should be taken on by Lane. Prevost preferred to keep control in Quebec by ordering Lane to move there, where all future Indian Department accounts were to be sent. Brock disagreed with this change on the grounds that their examination in Upper Canada would be easier and quicker because that was where the accounts originated. His concern for efficiency was in this instance not shared by Governor Prevost.[29]
Prevost may have been influenced in his decision to post Brock to Upper Canada by reports about the poor condition of the forts along the Niagara frontier and of their supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Bruyeres (commanding the Royal Engineers) reported in August 1811 on forts George, Chippawa, and Erie.[30] Fort George was “very much out of repair,” Fort Chippawa contained only a blockhouse and storeroom “enclosed with a line of picketing very much decayed,” and Fort Erie was to a great extent “unfinished and weak.” None of these forts could provide effective defence. This gloomy analysis was confirmed by a report in September from Major-General George Glasgow (commanding Royal Artillery) to Prevost. Fort George, the principal fortress for the frontier, had only twenty-one gunners and three artillery officers, and Glasgow wrote about the lack of horses and drivers for the artillery and powder magazines unfinished and unprotected. He concluded that no post in Upper Canada was safe or strong.[31] This information would have been provided to Brock.
The threat of American hostilities continued to grow. President Madison, in his annual address to Congress, appealed for an increase in the country’s military forces (see Chapter Three). In January 1812, the House of Representatives voted to increase the regular force by 10,000 men and authorized the president to raise up to 50,000 volunteers and to repair all naval ships.[32] The men in charge of the defence of the Canadas could not disregard these ominous actions. Brock undertook to gather information and to plan for the defence of his province. In December 1811, he sent a sweeping review to Prevost suggesting “precautionary measures … to meet all future exigencies.”[33]
He believed there had existed “a general opinion … that, in the event of hostilities, no opposition was intended,” but that view was changing because a strong regiment and military stores had been sent to Upper Canada and “a military person” had been appointed to administer the government. The regiment referred to was the 41st, which had been sent to Upper Canada in the summer to relieve the 100th (it was to go to Bermuda, but Prevost kept it in Lower Canada). Brock had recently visited Niagara and had found “the principal inhabitants” determined to defend “their property and support … the government.” But Brock also pointed out that Prevost needed to act for those people: “Look with confidence to your excellency, for such additional aid as may be necessary, in conjunction with the militia, to repel any hostile attempt against this province.” He went on to general observations and for a military commander with no experience as a political leader they demonstrate a remarkable grasp of political realities. He knew there were many “improper characters who have obtained extensive possessions, and whose principles diffuse a spirit of insubordination very adverse to all military institutions … It is certain that the best policy to be pursued … [if war came] will be to act with the utmost liberality, and as if no mistrust existed; for, unless the inhabitants give an active and efficient aid, it will be utterly impossible for the very limited number of the military … to preserve the province.” He had perhaps learned from the example of Craig’s mistakes in Lower Canada not to act as a high-handed martinet but to understand public opinion and work to change it.
After this introduction, Brock wrote about each area of the province. Significantly, he first reported on “the district of Amherstburg.” He saw the greatest American threat there, but he thought it the place where “active operations,” if undertaken, “must defer any offensive attempt on this province, from Niagara westward.” The Americans, fearing attack from native warriors, would be compelled to send large forces to that frontier. In order for the British to obtain “an active co-operation on the part of the Indians,” they would have to show them that “we are earnestly engaged in the war,” and the way to do that was to seize Detroit and Michilimackinac.[34] In other words, if war came, act aggressively rather than wait to be attacked.
Amherstburg Shoreline, 1804. In the shipyard on the extreme left of the painting is the schooner General Hunter, with its framing in the early stages of construction. Near