Foodscapes, Foodfields, and Identities in the YucatÁn. Steffan Igor Ayora-Diaz
of the nineteenth century, the Caribbean basin was beset by frequent commercial and military conflicts among different European powers. Spain, England, France, and the Netherlands were all vying for domination and commercial control of the region (Hinckley 1963; Sluiter 1948; Stern 1988). At an early stage, following its independence from Spain, Mexico promised to create a federation of republics, and when in 1821 Yucatán joined Mexico, it did so as the Republic of Yucatán, with autonomous power. However, elites in central Mexico fought with each other, and when the government adopted centralist measures subordinating the different regions, Yucatán declared its independence. Yucatán first remained independent from Mexico but then rejoined the Mexican Republic in 1823 without surrendering its autonomy. In 1841, when administrative policies shifted to enhance central powers, Yucatecans again declared their independence from Mexico, remaining independent until 1843, when the central government offered a new treaty of peace and reunion that, according to Williams (1929: 134; see also Alisky 1980), was dictated by Yucatecans and protected regional instead of Mexican interests. Since the Mexican government did not respect the terms of the treaty, Yucatecans voted again for their independence from Mexico in 1846. During this period of independence, a faction of the regional elites, overwhelmed by the so-called Caste War of Yucatán began flirting with the governments of Spain, England, and the United States, seeking annexation, while other factions sought outright independence. When their attempts failed, they were constrained to accept, in 1848, their reincorporation into Mexico, this time under central Mexican terms (Williams 1929: 143).
This final incorporation marked the beginning of the decline of Yucatecans' efforts at independence and the temporary silencing of their autonomous, regionalist identity. In 1862, the federal government of Mexico, recognizing the local power of factional elites located in both Mérida and the city of Campeche, first divided Yucatán into two different states, Campeche and Yucatán, the Campechanos having already declared unilaterally their autonomy from Yucatán in 1858 (see Wells and Joseph 1992: 182). Then, it granted portions of the Yucatecan territory to Guatemala and British Honduras and, as a strategy to deal with the Maya rebels of the peninsula, created in 1902 the federally administered territory of Quintana Roo, which became a full state in 1974 (Konrad 1991) at a time when the beach resort of Cancún was under construction. Since the time before independence, Yucatán was obligated to pay Mexico for military ‘protection', creating a fiscal debt that would later translate into the economic dependence of the region and its subordination to the Mexican Republic (Campos García 2004). However, in contrast to other Mexican states, where central elites overpowered regional ones, Yucatecan elites continued to develop their own strategies to control the resources of the state of Yucatán.
In a combination of global market forces that have been well-described and analyzed by different scholars (see, e.g., Brannon and Joseph 1991; Carstersen and Roazen 1992; G. Joseph 1986; Labrecque and Breton 1982; Moseley and Terry 1980b; Villanueva Mukul et al. 1990; Wells 1985; Wells and Joseph 1996), the Yucatecan elite of the late nineteenth century gained control of henequen production in Yucatán and dominated the global market for these natural fibers from the end of the 1800s to the first decade of the twentieth century. Their domination was approved of and encouraged by the US company International Harvester, which controlled prices and the marketing of Yucatecan fibers (used for twine and paper pulp) in the US (Carstersen and Roazen 1992; Wells 1985). The boom economy that emerged from the cultivation of henequen, from the local production of its fibers, and from the international market was important in supporting regional elites. Viewed as an exemplar of Yucatecan civilization and progress, their success was put on display by central Mexican científicos seeking to promote an enlightened image of Porfirio Díaz's dictatorship (Wells 1996; Wells and Joseph 1992).
During this period of economic expansion, Yucatecan elites sent their family members abroad, primarily to the United States, Cuba, and Europe, to obtain their education. The market with the Caribbean was enhanced, and when the central government had to deal with rebellions in the north, they sent Yaqui prisoners to work as indentured laborers in the henequen plantations. Similarly, when Yucatecans had to deal with the insurrection of Maya groups within the peninsula, they sold Maya prisoners as slaves to Cuban plantations (Rodríguez Piña 1990). To solve its labor shortage, the region attracted immigrants from Cuba, Germany, the Ottoman Empire (today Lebanon and Syria), Spain, and other Mexican regions. The arrival of these groups contributed importantly to the cultural mosaic that today characterizes Yucatecan society.6
The economic boom of the peninsula encouraged the import of commodities from Europe and the US. Some of the main ports in the Caribbean that were located in Cuba became a source of goods that the British, the Dutch, and the French had made available in the Antilles, and Yucatecans benefited from existing lines of commerce. Yucatecans hired French and Italian architects and imported Italian marble to build their palaces at the Paseo Montejo, the local interpretation of the Champs-Elysées. Rich plantation owners began to construct their mansions in 1888, and the luxurious residences and the large avenue were inaugurated in 1906 (Ovando Grajales 1995) (see fig. 1.1). The economic boom attracted overseas migrants. Some came to work in the haciendas as engineers and mechanics (Germans), while others took advantage of the growing market in commodities (Spaniards, Syrians, and Lebanese). Some were brought forcibly to perform the difficult job of harvesting the henequen and obtaining the fiber from it (southern Italians, Koreans, and Chinese), whereas others came seeking to advance their situations by working on the plantations until they had accumulated enough money to move into the city (Cubans, Spanish, and peasants from other Mexican regions) (Corona Baeza 2006; Padilla Ramos 2006; Peón Ancona 2006; Ramírez Carrillo 2006).
Figure 1.1. Palace at the Paseo Montejo
Photograph courtesy of G. Vargas Cetina, 2006.
In this way, the local Yucatecan elites managed to accumulate regional power, and since their commercial arrangements bypassed the Mexican government, they developed a large degree of autonomy in their management of regional affairs. Unhappy with this situation, central Mexican elites devised strategies to undermine the power of the Yucatecan elites. The partitioning of Yucatán into three different states was a first step. Later, the central administration instituted different economic levies that drew resources from Yucatán in the form of contributions in support of different enterprises and wars in which central Mexicans were engaged. When Yucatecans refused to participate in the war against Texas (a chief commercial partner), the Mexican government imposed a commercial and military blockade on Yucatecan ships, affecting the henequen trade with the US (Evans 2007). Also, when the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, Yucatecans did not get involved in the upheaval. In fact, the last recognizable and feeble attempt to gain independence occurred in 1914, when Mexican authorities demanded that the garrisons stationed in Yucatán travel to central Mexico and support the revolutionary struggle. As G. Joseph (1979, 1982) and Paoli ([1984] 2001) have argued, the revolution did not happen, but was imported into Yucatán from outside. Facing the resistance of Yucatecan elites to get involved in central Mexican struggles, in March 1915, President Venustiano Carranza sent Salvador Alvarado into Yucatán to subdue the local hacendados (hacienda owners). With the participation of Yucatecans and the regional Socialist Party of the Southeast, Salvador Alvarado, first, and Felipe Carrillo Puerto, later, conducted the expropriation of some haciendas and distributed lands to local peasants in the form of ejidos or collective farms (G. Joseph 1982). This move delivered a powerful blow to regional elites, who were already suffering the decline of their economic self-sufficiency due to competition from other natural and synthetic fibers. Although these reforms and transformations eventually brought regional elites to their knees, they failed to provide peasants with sustainable resources. Henequen continued to drive the local economy for a long time, even if in a limited way, until central Mexico implemented a series of structural economic reforms, withdrawing subsidies from the countryside and delivering a final blow to the regional economy (Baños Ramírez 1996; Fallaw 2001; Villanueva Mukul et al. 1990). It is, therefore, in the history of these interventions that many Yucatecans trace the origins of the regional subordination to central Mexican elites and politicians, who are perceived as the source and cause of Yucatecan ills.
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