Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right. Georg Cavallar
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgement is due for the following: A different version of ‘Kant’s Judgement on Frederick’s enlightened absolutism’ was first published in History of Political Thought, 14 (1993), 103–32. chapter 3 was first published in German as ‘Kants Urteilen über den Krieg’, in Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995 (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1995), vol. 2/1, 81–90. Parts of chapter 4 are taken from Theories of Dynamic Cosmopolitanism in Modern European History (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2017), pp. 116–24 and pp. 137–48. Parts of that text were first printed in ‘Kantian Perspectives on Democratic Peace: Alternatives to Doyle’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), 229–48; reprint: Arthur Ripstein (ed.), Immanuel Kant (Hants: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 535–54. ‘Kant, intervention, and the “failed state”’ appeared in Kantian Review, 2
Introduction: Mediating Between Pure Reason and Practice
Virtue itself turns vice being misapplied.
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet
This book argues that Kant’s so-called theory of international relations can and should be read as Kant’s attempt to apply the a priori principles of reason to a particular, historical situation, especially to the political conditions of the late eighteenth century. Conservative philosophers like Friedrich von Gentz (1764–1832) and August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757–1836) had criticized Kantian political philosophy for its alleged idealism and impracticability in the 1790s. Gentz turned away from Kant after he had translated Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France into German. He thought that Kant’s a priori doctrine of human rights was just preliminary work. If anyone wanted to realize this theory, the means to do so had to be studied as well. A ‘new theory based on experience’ should study human beings, their passions and talents, social conditions and history in order to find out which constitution was the best for a certain people. For Gentz, Kant’s theory was insufficient and incomplete.1 Rehberg thought that Kant’s doctrine could not be applied in reality as it presupposed morally and rationally perfect beings. The categorical imperative was so formal that it could not specify the content of particular duties. Kant’s principles were too generic and too idealistic to be applied in the real world.2
Kant was familiar with this explicit criticism of his theory, and developed his political philosophy in his later writings as a link between the pure doctrine of right and the real world. According to Kant, experience is systematically subordinated to the ‘precepts of theory’. However, experience has an important function as it helps us to learn how ‘theory could be better and more generally put to work, after one has adopted it into one’s principles’ (VIII, 289, 1–4). Some interpreters have become aware of this major aspect in Kant’s thinking, among them Wolfgang Kersting, Reinhard Brandt, Ingeborg Maus, Volker Gerhardt, Arthur Ripstein, Reidar Maliks, Francis Cheneval, Elisabeth Ellis, Pauline Kleingeld, Howard Williams, Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka.3 Back in 1962, Jürgen Habermas argued that Kant’s principle of publicity is an attempt to link the intelligible with the empirical. ‘[R]eason in its historical process of becoming actual required a union of empirical consciousness as a corollary to the intelligible unity of consciousness as such (intelligiblen Einheit des transzendentalen Bewußitseins)’.4 Citizens create with their rational discourse (based on publicity) a unity beyond the sphere of transcendental consciousness. Kant asserted a harmony between right and the ends of the public with his affirmative principle of public right. If maxims, he claimed, ‘can attain their end only through publicity, they must conform to the universal end of the public (happiness), and to be in accord with this (to make the public satisfied with its condition) is the proper task of politics’ (VIII, 386). This intended harmony seems strange because it is usually assumed that the wide gap in Kant’s philosophy between the sphere of transcendental right and the world of happiness and the needs of real people cannot be bridged. Many interpreters tend to reject passages as inconsistent or contradictory that do not fit into this picture of Kant’s philosophy. In this book, I argue for a profound revision of this very picture.
Apart from the principle of publicity, Kant’s attempt to mediate between pure reason and practice has two cornerstones: his concept of ‘permissive rights’ and that of popular sovereignty. Reinhard Brandt argues that Kant’s permissive rights are central for his legal theory.5 In Perpetual Peace, Kant distinguishes between leges strictae and leges latae (VIII, 347). The strict rights have to be applied at once; the other ones ‘allow some subjective latitude according to the circumstances in which they are applied’ (VIII, 347). They do not have to be executed at once. What is surprising here is that Kant accepts how contingent elements like circumstances can and should be taken into consideration. In addition, Kant allows for a ‘subjective’ element. What does Kant mean by this? Apparently, it refers to the judgement of the person who applies the objective principle of right (Rechtsgesetz).6 Existing states, positive law and institutions are provisional in character. They are an imperfect realization of the pure concept of right, and the ideal of a social contract. There are two consequences. First, existing possessions, for example, should be accepted, even though they do not ‘have what is required in order to be called a right’ (VIII, 347, 31). However, this acceptance is logically subordinated to the juridical duty to reform existing possessions so that they gradually approach the a priori ideal. This is the ultimate purpose that must not be neglected, or lost sight of. The ruler is ‘permitted only to delay doing so, lest implementing the law prematurely counteracts its very purpose’ (VIII, 347). Premature action might be counter-productive; here Kant agrees with conservatives like Gentz. However, pragmatic considerations – paying attention to circumstances, historical factors and human beings – are subordinated to the categorical principle of right. Here, Kant sides with the ‘revolutionaries’. With the help of the permissive rights, the principle of right can be applied to reality ‘by way of a gradual reform’.7 The permissive rights have the systematic function of bridging the gap between ideal and reality. The evolution of rational right is the ultimate goal, but politicians are entitled to continue existing unjust conditions provisionally until favourable conditions allow for changes.
It is useful to distinguish latitude (latitudo or Spielraum, cf. VI, 390, 6–7) in the juridical/political sphere from that of ethics. If ethics does not offer laws for actions, but laws for the maxims of actions (VI, 388, 32–3), then there is a latitude for the free will (Willkür) when and how to realize the moral law. Kant offers an example. He argues that the duty to promote the happiness of others may be restricted by the duty to help, assist and love one’s parents (VI, 390, 7–14). Again, reason cannot solve this problem on its own. Our faculty of judgement is required to find the proper way to implement the duty towards others. Kant admits that these judgements may be mistaken (VI, 433, 23–30). The difference between the juridical and the moral sphere (moral in the strict sense of ethics) is that, in legal matters, the latitude pertains to actions (e.g. disarmament), whereas in the moral