Images from Paradise. Eszter Salgó
sign of the unity and power of Europe” (22). Bearing in mind Jacques Delors’s comment—“nobody falls in love with a growth rate” or a single market—the document calls for the need to make sure that a “people’s Europe” exists in Europeans’ hearts (23, 40). To this end, it demands more investment in the use of the magic instruments of television, cinema, and videos that transmit culture through images capable of shaping citizens’ mindset day by day.
A year later, in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty conferred to the European Community prerogatives in the realm of cultural policy. According to Article 128, “The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore” (Council & Commission of the European Communities 1992: 48). The Treaty formally enabled the organization to intervene and propose measures in the fields of education, youth, and culture. As a result, in order to promote awareness of the European integration project, education and training programs (Erasmus, Leonardo, Tempus, and Socrates) were launched to reinforce the “European dimension” in educational discourse.
The document most revealing of the fantasies underlying European federalists’ palingenetic agenda is entitled Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community (De Clercq 1993). Officially, it was conceived as a contribution to the debate on the present and future of Europe in the period of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and as a response to citizens’ growing perplexity about the image of the European community. From this document’s diagnosis the reader can learn that the community is sick because its members are questioning the worthiness of the “good project” (i.e., European construction and integration), because there is little feeling of belonging to Europe. The causes of the illness are to be found in the EC’s failure to communicate to the citizens the “good project” in a relevant and persuasive way (so that everyone can understand and appreciate the benefits of a united Europe). The attempt to “sell the ‘wrong product”’ (i.e., the Maastricht Treaty), the lack of clarity about what must be communicated to whom and why, the absence of a clear and plain message with precise stimuli able to guarantee the desired reactions, and the failure to make a long story short are listed as factors contributing to the fiasco of trying to engrain European identity in peoples’ minds.
To build public awareness and approval of the European Union and to help win back credibility and trust in European institutions, a new communication and information strategy was proposed that would take into account citizens’ needs, hopes, and preoccupations. Bearing in mind that perhaps the deepest hope is return to maternal womb—the most heartfelt desire, especially in times of crisis and flux, relates to the prospect of enjoying again the idyll of primordial paradise—the De Clercq-led expert group came to the conclusion that European institutions “must be brought close to the people, implicitly evoking the maternal, nurturing care of ‘Europa’ for all her children” (De Clercq 1993: 9). Rather than offering more information, fewer electrifying and warm messages are needed to excite, motivate, move, and change the attitude of people (10). The Commission can launch these warm messages only if it possesses a “human face” and turns into a sympathetic, warm, and caring maternal figure that can guarantee the (physical and psychological) well-being of the citizens of Europe (15). While in the 1970s and 1980s, the goal was to bring European institutions closer to citizens, with De Clerq the mission was more ambitious—they had to exist together; they needed to form one inseparable dyad, reestablishing the perfect primordial unity:
Inherent in the notion of Union are the concepts of solidarity, harmony, common action. In human and personal terms, these can be expressed in the single concept “Together”. This is not just an adverb defining the relationship necessary for achieving objectives; it is also an imperative, a rallying call for action: “Together!” (De Clercq 1993: 14)
“Togetherness” became the new symbolic dogma, the inspirational credo that was supposed to appeal to the emotions, the common sense, to the hearts and minds of European citizens, and “involve us all in the great enterprise of building Europe” (22). “Mother Europe must protect her children”—narrates the document—so that the “European way of life,” the European heritage based on human rights, tolerance, democracy, and savoir-vivre, and the European culture “make us the envy of the world” (24). The star that was meant to show direction during Europeans’ journey back to the maternal womb is a “billboard” fabricated by experts of American marketing strategy. It suggests the promotion of the European Union as a “good product” (13), the positioning of the “good product” in the minds of the people as “the largest democratic, socio-economic, and political entity in the world,” and the selling of the European Union to target audiences. The document emphasizes the need to call on board PR experts to launch “total and continuous” programs covering television, radio, and press relations, editorial support, advertising, public relations, direct marketing, public speaking, interviews, visits by special-interest groups, special-issue EC postage stamps, the publication of specific-interest pamphlets, etc., in order to explain European citizenship in “acceptable, motivating terms” (awarding personalized certificates to all newly born babies attesting their birth as citizens of the European Union is mentioned as an example) (De Clercq 1993: 13, 14, 31). The (road)map that identity entrepreneurs were supposed to keep in their hands was the “Europe 99” program, seen as the best means to exploit all the excitement and expectations inherent in the arrival of a new millennium.
De Clercq’s authoritarian approach is evident in his recommendations to accompany every decision taken by the Commission with a binding agreement about the message to communicate and the means for its communication (the theme and scheme of each of the Commission’s programs must obtain the prior approval of the central office of communications). He pinpointed the necessity to start a continuous process of education about Europe at secondary-school stage, including the review of school books and the introduction of a “European dimension” in the study of the past; found a “European house” comprising a library, a museum, and various operational offices to disseminate information; promote European events in the fields of leisure, sports, culture, academia, and food; organize “European weeks” on issues of common concern; award European prizes particularly in areas relating to youth; persuade targeted newscasters and reporters to become “enthusiastic supporters of the cause”; and adopt the “utmost rigour” in formulating the questionnaires when testing citizens’ “European identity” “to ensure that emotional feelings as well as cerebral attitudes are accurately probed”—all of this in order to make Europe “the envied focus of culture, civilization, intellectual life and savoir-vivre in the world” (De Clercq 1993: 27, 35, 37, 33).
The “communication gap” between the European Union and its citizens, which dates back to at least the discussions that had taken place before the referenda about the Maastricht Treaty, has deepened since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe (2005a) and the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (2005b) were launched by the European Commission to improve the image of EU institutions and restore public confidence in the European project, as well as to help the emergence of a “European public sphere.” The “White Paper on a European Communication Policy,” published one year later, departed from the belief that there is a sense of alienation from Brussels. The limited, one-sided communication on the part of the Commission had not kept pace with the transformations taking place in the European Union, and as a result prevented citizens both from knowing what was going on and from participating fully in the decision-making process, something “essential to a healthy democracy” (European Commission 2006: 2, 7). The expected overall result of a new communication policy was the enhancement of the public debate in Europe to accelerate the formation of a pan-European political culture with pan-European political groups and foundations. The new approach foresaw the attempt to leave behind the one-way institution-centered communication and opt for a “reinforced” citizen-centered dialogue, moving from a centralized to a more decentralized approach. The new “human-centered” attitude came to the foreground through proposals to give Europe a “human face.” The idea was to put political information in a “human interest” frame to make sure that citizens understand that it is relevant to them personally,