Poles in Kaisers Army On the Front of the First World War. Ryszard Kaczmarek

Poles in Kaisers Army On the Front of the First World War - Ryszard Kaczmarek


Скачать книгу
language as official or even administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, mass-scale cases of irredentism were rare before 1914. The minorities behaved loyally even in the army of the multinational Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which is often perceived as the model of the decomposition of an eminent power due to accumulating problems of national disloyalty especially among the Slavic. Rok Stergar analyzes the attitude of Slavic countries toward Austrio-Hungarian universal conscription and interprets this phenomenon not as the result of blind legitimism but pragmatic conformity.67 This term recently grows in popularity in the context of civic attitudes the nineteenth- and twentienth-century Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the borderlands, which best reflects the matter of the complex Upper Silesian behaviors. There is no room for “Prussian nationalism” that stemmed from loyalism to the House of Hohenzollern; it was an adjustment to the existing conditions. The limit for such opportunism was the inviolability of the most important values of traditionalist communities: religion and language. Despite Kulturkampf, the army sought no conflict in this field so the idea of attachment to “one’s own” regiment survived in Upper Silesia. Men hanged portraits from the period of military duty with pride, combatant unions were popular, and many celebrated anniversaries of nineteenth-century battles; particularly the 1870 Battle of Sedan.

      A Prussian officer in the regiment primarily emphasized the training of his soldiers. He was inspired by the apotheosized Clausewitz, so the officer perceived his duty is to build a modern well-trained army, capable of participating in total war. In the opinion of Prussian officers, the Poles met those criteria not after the process of denationalization, but after the imposition of other civilizing norms. This was the real goal of the activities of German commanders: military training based on mutual understanding, impossible without learning the German language; self-reliance on the battlefield; trust for the superiors; and general education, increasing often required by modern military tactics, particularly among the non-commissioned officers.

      ←33 | 34→

      The activities that were part of the training of the Polish recruits also resulted from the modernization efforts; that is, the desire to create a modern society capable of waging a future total war with modern technology and military tactics by all the reservists. Although such behavior resulted in general alienation and the abandonment of army’s social functions (Kriegergesellschaft) – today often called “the Prussian soldatesque” – it also contributed to major civilizational ←34 | 35→changes, not necessarily motivated by ideological Pan-Germanism. What was a derivative of these activities was the mutual trust between subordinates and officers typical for a civic army. While analyzing this phenomenon, we must conclude to our astonishment that, before 1914, neither side noticed any contradiction between the German nationalism of a Prussian officer and the Polish language of the Upper Silesian recruit.


Скачать книгу