Understanding Contemporary Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism. Olexander Hryb
of my work of 1968—which, however Gellner overlooks. But even from this model we cannot explain why some individuals decided in favour of the new identity and embarked on national agitation. (Hroch 1998, 98, 105 n. 14)
Lack of knowledge about the reasons why individuals sacrifice their lives for an “imagined community” not only limits our understanding of national phenomena, but also makes it extremely difficult to predict what will motivate individuals to sacrifice their or others’ lives and what, therefore, can potentially be a security threat, e.g., Chechen suicide bombers in Russia or a Breivik-style attack in Norway.
Hroch explored the creation and development of new national movements in Europe during the nineteenth century and suggested the importance of considering the concept of “groups of patriots,” those most actively promoting a national project and who are not nationally known leaders. A “patriot” for Hroch is a person who consciously and continuously devotes his time and effort to the success of a national project. Self-sacrifice and even risk count as a measure of such patriotic activity rather than money or other forms of contribution. In this way Hroch includes in the category of patriots, not only the ideological leaders of national movements, but also those people who assist leaders and make their work possible. Hroch’s concept helps to direct research on early modern nationalism not only to known historical figures, but also to the collective identity encompassed by the term “patriotic.” Since scholars generally agree on the time frame of European nation building, it is possible to study the probable content of the national identity possessed by specific groups of “patriots” at a specific time. This time is defined not chronologically, but according to the phase of nation-building, defined at least with respect to the so-called “new” nations in Europe, when “patriots” are the main actors of new national projects and are ready to become “national activists” and the most enthusiastic adherents of a new national consciousness (Hroch 1985, 13).
For most of the “new” nations in Europe the first stage of national revival belongs to the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when little sociological data was available on collective identities. However, historical analogies enable us to investigate the national identity of “patriots” today in a nation experiencing the first stages of nation building. Hroch suggests that historical analogies can be applied both diachronically and synchronically (horizontally). He explains these comparisons as follows:
1 A diachronic comparison in the narrow sense of the word involves the comparison of different historical processes occurring in different countries at the same time.
2 A synchronic comparison according to analogous historical situations. If we can establish that the objects of comparison passed through the same stages of development, we can compare these analogous stages, even if from the standpoint of absolute chronology they occurred at different times. We can only apply this procedure if we are certain that the societies under comparison have passed through roughly equivalent periods of historical development (Hroch 1985, 14-15).
A synchronic comparison allows us to study contemporary identities of “newly” emerged political nations similar to those of early modern nationalisms.
Ukraine is often referred to as a “newcomer” nation-state. It has full achieved independence only with the collapse of the USSR and its political as well as national identity remains undecided. The “nowhere nation” or “unexpected nation,” as it has been labelled by some scholars (e.g., Wilson 2000), was characterized as having an incomplete national revival by both Western and Ukrainian historians in the early 1990s (Formuvannia ukrainskoii natsii…, von Hagen 1995). It was noted the, that all three phases of national revival (A—the period of scholarly interests; B—the period of patriotic agitation; C—the rise of mass national movement; Hroch 1985), overlapped in Ukraine subsequent to its achieving independence in 1991.
The empirical research described in Appendix 1 suggests that Ukrainian Cossack organizations that appeared after 1991 represent groups of patriots whose aim is to foster a national “revival” in Ukraine. National activists in Ukraine have chosen the name “Cossacks” because, in their opinion, it is Cossacks, free warriors of the steppe, who represent a positive image of the Ukrainian nation. To promote the Cossack idea and, if possible, to turn all the people of Ukraine into Cossacks is the project. The aim is to create ideal Ukrainians, and this is a typical discourse during Hroch’s Phase B of national revival. We have a unique chance to compare synchronically by sociological methods (such as participant observation or in-depth interviews) the national identity constructs of patriots with those of patriots who lived elsewhere two hundred years ago.
There is no satisfactory explanation in the sociological literature for the shift from simple national identification and group allegiance to the action-oriented national identification that typifies “patriots’ groups.” Identification theory suggests a possible explanation of why individuals might decide to join a “group of patriots.” It suggests that people seek positive group identification to obtain psychological security. This is the central argument of all “psychologically” oriented approaches (e.g. Billig 1995; Bloom 1990).
According to identification theory, human beings have a natural tendency to form groups with shared similarities and to distinguish themselves in this way from “the Other.” What remains unclear, in the case of Cossacks, is the relationship between psychological security based on positive group identification, and the readiness to engage in self-sacrifice. A plausible explanation could be based on the social identity theory of Henry Tajfel (1981). Tajfel argues that when exiting from a group or category is not possible and self-esteem cannot be protected in this way, a person may seek to induce social change. Such social change would involve the individual in efforts to influence the relative power and status of the group concerned. By achieving greatness for a group one cannot escape, one achieves a reflected grandeur for the self. Tajfel and others have suggested that this may be the spur to the creation of new militant subgroups, the development of new rhetoric, and various forms of social activities.
Glynis Breakwell argues that identity is “a dynamic social product,” residing in psychological processes, which “cannot be understood except in relation to their social context and historical perspective” (Breakwell 1986, 9, 36-39). Following her suggestion, our analysis focuses on:
1 Cossack identity over time (nationalist memories, myths, stereotypes—i.e., components of self-perception);
2 the identity processes and the principles of their operation (e.g., transition from pre-Cossack to Cossack and sometimes to a post-Cossack identity);
3 the social context of identity (Cossack revival, perception of Cossacks by their wider social communities);
4 the effects of social change upon identity (transformation of Cossack identity under pressure from other social actors and processes, such as alternative Cossack movements and/or state policies);
5 The relation of identity to action (relation between self-images and real actions).
Despite the official and unofficial support of political elites it is clear also that the Cossack revival is a “bottom-up” movement, i.e., it originates in local, regional initiatives that are supported, at a later stage, by officials. The empirical data also shows that there have often been economic interests directly involved in stimulating the growth of Cossack organizations. Cossack claims to revive “traditional” trades such as beekeeping or, indeed, military service suggest that economic factors form at least part of the explanation for the successful revival of Cossack nationalism. Although economic nationalism was developed as a category to be applied to inter-state relations (Burnell 1986; Hieronimi 1980; Johnson 1967), there is good reason to apply it to small-scale (inter-group) social interrelations if competition for limited resources is present in social discourse.
Research undertaken for this monograph shows that the new nationalist movements that constituted the Cossack revival have had two clear paths of development. The first path is toward the further elaboration of an ethnic model of Cossack and wider Russian (supra-)community, as is happening predominantly in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and North Caucasus; the second path has led to the reinvention of a civic model, as in mainstream Cossack organizations in Ukraine.