Lessons in the Art of War. Martina Sprague
Not until the early twentieth century did Western texts come to dominate military thought. The classic texts of ancient China (the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, including Sun Tzu’s Art of War) are fundamental doctrines of tactics and strategy and demonstrate a preference for aggressive measures in war, often for the purpose of restoring the accepted social and political order.5 Consider the harsh standards of discipline in the army as outlined in Wei Liao-Tzu: “If a drummer misses a beat he is executed.”6 Or according to The Methods of the Ssu-Ma: “What is the army’s law regarding those who arrive after the appointed time?” The reply: “They should be decapitated!”7 The underlying reason for this brutality was said to be the preservation of love and harmony among men. From an ethical viewpoint, if bringing peace to the people meant killing the enemy (or even one’s own who failed to uphold the standards of military service), then killing was permissible.8 In contrast to the Asian texts, Clausewitz held the view that “[g]rim severity and iron discipline may be able to preserve the military virtues of a unit, but it cannot create them.”9
Chinese military theory was further stimulated by battlefield requirements and political and individual philosophies. Although historical accounts can be used as pillars of strength for building military theories, soldiers from different parts of the world have relied on a wide array of combat systems, and have exercised tactics and strategy in whichever way they have deemed the most appropriate for the particular geopolitical situation. China fought wars in order to overcome its enemies, but did not consider military force the only means by which the state could accomplish its goals. Many of the historical Chinese sources also stress the importance of ruling with moral authority. If the ruler did not maintain the social order, he would forfeit “Heaven’s Mandate” and be considered unfit for holding authority through moral sanction.10
In contrast to the Western texts, which underscore the importance of aggressive action and scientific analysis, Asian philosophies further stress that studying, listening, and thinking are the keys to success. The long battlefield tradition of ancient China displays a strong relationship between the wu (military) and wen (civilian) spheres. Confucian philosophy promoted peace, yet military values shaped society’s inclination for war. While the literati strove to elevate wen, warrior epics and tales often celebrated wu and spoke of the importance of combat and individual heroism. Analogies were frequently used to illustrate a point, as described in T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings, “If you grasp a knife but do not cut anything, you will lose the moment for profits. If you hold an ax but do not attack, then bandits will come.”11
Sun Tzu’s Art of War has proven particularly popular in the West because it appears to uncover the wisdom of the Asian philosophers, with focus on flexibility and deception rather than pitched battle and force. For example, contrast practitioners of the Chinese internal martial art of hsing-i chuan, who yield to the opponent’s power and through a burst of energy use it against him, with Western wrestlers pitting strength against strength. Anecdotal stories and the paradoxical use of complementing opposites (yin and yang) further differentiate the Asian texts and martial arts from their Western counterparts.12 They are attractive because they provide specific steps for every conceivable battlefield situation (for example, “On encircled terrain, I obstruct any openings”). Sun Tzu offered suggestions for fighting on narrow roads, in wild expanses, in forests, and in the darkness of night. The Chinese classics seem particularly fond of lists, as in the “ten fatal terrains,” the “nine prohibitions,” or the “five factors” from which victory can be drawn. Note that The Methods of the Ssu-Ma takes a slightly different tack by beginning many of its statements with “In general,” thus leaving room for the variances of combat.
Although the Asian texts seem to offer a “cookbook” type approach to warfare through brief and precise statements, they are not meant to be read as “100 easy ways to win on the battlefield.” Individual judgment is crucial to the successful application of the advice.13 The fact that many of the historical sources have survived only in part, have not been translated, and contain popular story-telling and sectarian beliefs have complicated the Westerner’s understanding of Asian warfare.14 Furthermore, combat is neither simple nor simplistic; it is both scientific and artistic and requires the ability to grasp the essence of each unique situation.
Japan, including Okinawa where karate was used as a nonprofessional combat art, and Korea, faced different military and social environments than China. In Japan’s forested and mountainous terrain large infantry armies proved inefficient. The common regional threats relating to robbers and bandits were resolved easier through specialized military elite forces. The samurai class developed from the need for court nobles to maintain order and ensure a continuous flow of resources from the countryside to the capital.15 The samurai gained power in the provinces by assisting the state militarily and subduing rebellious uprisings. When the samurai were firmly established in the countryside, they developed their own networks which grew in size until the shogunate, a form of military government, was formed. It is debatable, however, whether or not service to the state was the primary goal of the samurai, as the strife to justify their continued existence even in times of peace is an indication of self-serving interests.
Korea was heavily influenced by the fighting arts of ancient China. However, it is worth noting that the tribal martial arts of Korea date to 2000-900 BCE.16 From the sixth century CE, the state was provided with elite fighters through the Hwarang organization, which prepared young men for war by instructing them in military strategy and philosophy. These elite warriors lacked the political influence enjoyed by the Japanese samurai class.17 There was also a growing need for the commoners to learn the combat arts. As late as the aftermath of the Korean War (1950-1953 CE), skill in taekwondo was viewed as a necessity for survival.18
The West likewise has a long battlefield tradition that can be traced to Classical Greece and Rome. The Greek historian Polybius expressed in the second century BCE that soldiers regarded “their one supreme duty not to flee or leave the ranks,” and were “expected never to surrender or be captured.”19 Technology, innovation, discipline, massed attack, free flow of information, and the right to question authority are elements that have been credited with the military successes of the West for nearly three millennia. Since the Greeks formed governments early in their history, they were also some of the first to organize an effective army. The states of ancient Greece and Rome were hostile toward one another, so naturally many battles were fought. All male citizens were expected to participate in warfare. But they also had a stake in the outcome; they did not fight only for their king or ruler but for personal freedom and the security of their family, farm, and civilian lifestyle. These ideals allowed them to develop effective armies that fought brutal and short wars using shock tactics, often resulting in severe casualties on both sides. Writers of the Classical World include such personalities as the Greek historian Thucydides, who authored The History of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BCE, and Roman military and political leader Julius Caesar, who wrote the history of Rome’s wars with Gaul in the first century BCE.
From the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the Middle Ages, social and economic reform resulted in new developments in military tactics and weaponry. A feudal system emerged where the king granted land to distinguished soldiers; it was essentially a mix between a military and social organization. The cavalry knightly class developed from this system because only rich noblemen could afford the expense associated with ownership of horses, armor, and weapons.20 By the time of Carl von Clausewitz, Europe had been through the Protestant Reformation, French Revolution, and Napoleonic Wars.
Based on his experiences of warfare, Clausewitz sought to write a book that identified “the permanent elements of war.”21 He emphasized that various “frictions” such as uncertainty, ignorance, confusion, and fatigue often interfere with one’s combat plan and prevents one from exercising full control over the enemy. He believed that a useful theory must include all elements that pertain to battle; not just those that are measurable such as distances, but also the intangibles of morale and common sense. He stated that “[a] critic should never use the results of theory as laws or standards but only—as the soldier does—as aids to judgment.”22 Having participated in combat and suffered the humiliating