Soldiering Against Subversion. Dan Harvey
90 minutes, killing 9 people and injuring 130. This intended ‘spectacular’ bombing operation backfired badly on the Provisional IRA, though, as the British army were unable to deal with the many bombs in so short a time. It was the worst day in Belfast since the German blitz of 1941.
If ‘Victory 1972’ was not achieved and the movement’s appeal was hurt badly by the bombings throughout the year, the Provisional IRA were relentless in maintaining their campaign, confident now of delivering ‘Victory 1974’. The curious blend of open and guerrilla warfare continued as PIRA activists ambushes at crossroads, shot at ‘opportunity targets’, and sniped at soldiers on the streets, across walls and around corners. Local units suddenly appeared, engaged the British army, and then just as quickly melted back into the housing estates.
The Provisional IRA continued to enjoy popular community support and were proving to be a ruthlessly efficient guerrilla force and militarily, the British army were still struggling to come to terms with them. How deeply threatened then was the Irish State by these actions? Was the integrity of the Irish State more vulnerable to the danger than British sovereignty in Northern Ireland? Even with the initial confusion between ‘the doves’ and ‘the hawks’ within the Irish Republic’s ruling party Fianna Fáil resolved, what kind of a security response could be mounted sufficient to match the violent vigour of the Provisional IRA? Curiously, the context south of the border was different, and while the Irish State had every reason to fear what the Irish Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, described as ‘the scourge of society’ (PIRA), there existed a residual memory within the republican movement of what had happened during the 1940s, when de Valera’s Fianna Fáil Government reacted strongly to the IRA threat. Six were executed and three left to die on hunger strike. Subsequently, in 1954, two years before ‘Operation Harvest’ or the IRA ‘Border Campaign’ (1956–62), the IRA introduced General Standing Order Number Eight as part of its operating policy:
Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any militant action against 26 County Forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this Order in present circumstances, especially in Border areas, cannot be over emphasised …. Volunteers arrested during training or in possession of arms will point out that the arms were for use against the British Forces of Occupation only.
In theory, PIRA were careful not to bring themselves into open conflict with the southern authorities, not out of concern for members of the southern security forces, rather to prevent any ‘anti-IRA’ sentiment from surging across the Republic and a reintroduction of the harsh measures used to deal with them. As it was, the Irish Government was already strengthening its arsenal of measures to deal with the IRA: using new legislation; the building up of the Defence Forces and the Gardaí; and the reintroduction of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) amongst them. However, the Provisional IRA was also building up its arsenal of measures, weapons most prominent amongst them.
On the outbreak of the Troubles, their previously dumped collection of guns and ammunition was unearthed from hides, taken from outbuildings or under grain in farmyard sheds and unwrapped from plastic bags, barrels and boxes. They were basic weapons but in good condition and capable of delivering the lethal effect they were designed and manufactured for: Lee-Enfield .303 (Mark 4) and US Garand .30 calibre semi-automatic rifles, Springfield carbines, Thompson and Sten sub-machine guns, shotguns, .22 rifles, .45 Webley revolvers and explosives stolen from quarries. The simplest bomb was sticks of gelignite taped together with a detonator and a length of fuse, but there was also a lot of information on explosives available in libraries, and IRA training manuals were updated and made available. Subsequently, homemade explosives were produced from readily available materials, much of it fertiliser-based. From very early on, the first consignment of modern ArmaLite rifles were delivered to the IRA and in September 1972 a huge shipment of RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers was successfully and secretively landed at Shannon Airport. Originally the plan was to land the shipment at Farranfore Airport in Co. Kerry but the runway was too short for the aircraft. These rocket launchers were used in a series of attacks along the border the following month.
With the Provisional IRA campaign going into overdrive in Northern Ireland, there was a constant need for weapons, and what could not be brought in could possibly be built. There were those in PIRA who were to prove highly proficient in producing prototypes and then perfecting them. At a more basic level, training camps were organised and established well away from the ‘war zone’: in Kerry, Mayo and other out-of-the-way locations. A five-day training camp model was developed where weapon and explosives familiarisation was conducted, as well as training participants in the characteristics and capabilities of the weapons available. Weapons would be disassembled, their working parts exposed and explained and then the weapon reassembled. This ‘stripping and assembling’ of a weapon demystified it and for many fed the fascination with guns that was an attraction in the first place. Safety precautions, cleaning, care and maintenance were next and then firing practise with live rounds. Any bad habits were corrected through instruction and the individual trainees for the most part reached a standard to be allowed to operate on the streets and in rural parts of Northern Ireland.
Security was an issue and keeping the exact location of the training camp hidden was always uppermost. Active measures were taken to avoid suspicion and discovery. Those attending camps departed from their homes by different routes and were collected at a central rendezvous from which they were transported in vans, minibuses with blacked-out windows and in the rear of cattle trucks. Products used at the camps – including food and drink – were made generic and any reference to locality on milk cartons, shopping bags etc. was removed. No local newspapers were permitted. If discovered, there were selected escape routes and rendezvous spots where the participants were to gather after the getaway was made. Sometimes specialised camps for explosive making or advanced weapons training were also held. Hundreds of trainees passed through the training camps and areas; all were prepared and most put what they had learned into action to perpetrate and continue the violence. Often, force was not only used for the furthering of the ‘Brits out’ aim, but also for its own sake. The constant continuum of thousands of small-scale attacks, shootings and bombings were of value to the Provisional IRA in keeping the low-intensity struggle contested, thereby maintaining morale amongst the active members by keeping them tirelessly committed. This also kept their focus and nurtured their ability – keeping it fit for purpose – and was an overt statement of prevailing strength to the community from which it drew its support.
Financing the campaign and the organisation was always a difficulty; by its own estimates the Provisional IRA cost £2 million a year to keep itself functioning. The funds required came from an assorted mix of sources; a levy on Belfast’s black taxis, gaming machines, drinking clubs, extortion, defrauding the tax and social welfare, smuggling operations along the border involving petrol, cattle, cigarettes and diesel, as well as funds raised abroad – particularly in the USA – and of course bank and wage robberies in the Republic. There was a lot of criminality associated with PIRA and the professionalisation of the Provisional IRA’s handling of its finances was to develop over the years regarding the administration and control of its earnings.
The production of money was one aspect of Provisional IRA activity; the production of fertiliser-based explosives was another. Ammonium nitrate was extracted from a process using Net Nitrate fertiliser mixed with gallons of water. When this was heated and the resultant residue mixed with diesel oil, this became the primary ingredient for PIRA bombs. This process produced a nauseating stench with sickening fumes, and together with the heat such facilities, often semi-derelict buildings in remote areas, were unpleasant places to work. The explosive material extract was collected regularly and transported to bomb factories to become the primary component in car bombs.
The Provisional IRA had the means, method and mentality to continue its armed struggle, taking the fight to the British on every occasion they could, convinced that victory was in their grasp. The military thinking of the Provisional IRA was to change over the years; the leadership became Northern-based, its structure was dramatically reorganised and its support base was broadened by blending the armed struggle with electoral politics. There were to be cessations, ceasefires, truces, campaign resumptions and decisive escalation of violence; more lives were lost in Northern Ireland, and the Irish State was required to go to great lengths to combat the real and sinister threat posed by the organisation.