Canadian Railways 2-Book Bundle. David R.P. Guay
years, all of the compound rails and forty-three miles of U rails had been replaced by fished T rails. The Hamilton-to-Toronto branch was laid with fished T rails throughout. Obviously, the Great Western had spent a great deal of money for rails while serving under quasi-experimental conditions as a pioneer Canadian railway.
Maintenance costs for locomotives and rolling stock were enormous, especially during the first winter of 1853–54. Owing to intense frosts, uneven track was the cause of many locomotive and rolling-stock breakdowns. The rough use of locomotives and rolling stock by contractors in building the road and in hurriedly ballasting it after it had opened for business led to frequent breakdowns as well. In the future, railways would demand that contractors provide their own locomotives and rolling stock during construction. As a result, motive power shortages were commonplace in the early days. For example, in July 1854, out of a total of thirty-four locomotives only twenty-six (not counting the eight locomotives assigned to ballast trains) were in working order.
At this time, locomotive cost per mile was one shilling and 3.5 pence, mileage was thirty-seven and a half miles per cord of wood (which increased by 1858 to forty-three and a half miles per cord), and locomotives averaged only a modest fifteen thousand miles annually. Rolling stock at this time comprised fifty passenger and 736 freight cars. Rough track and light construction of early rolling stock not only led to the need for heavy repairs but also rebuilding and strengthening of the original designs.
Weather contributed to high maintenance costs. The following extract from the directors’ report of June 30, 1857, provided a synopsis of the severe preceding winter and its consequences:
The locomotive expenses at a rate of one shilling and 7.5 pence per mile have been rendered heavy by the very severe winter weather during December and January. The breaking of wheels, tyres [tires], axles and various parts of the machinery, nearly all caused by the extreme cold have been of daily occurrence and far greater than during previous winters, the intense frost and quantity of snow on the ground prevented the engines from hauling their usual loads and caused extra consumption of fuel, viz–26,893 cords of wood against 20,969 of the last half year, the price also was 8 pence per cord more.
Compounding the difficulties of the Great Western in the late 1850s was the rise of unexpectedly severe competition. In the mid-1850s, the Grand Trunk Railway was rapidly pushing its way from Montreal into Ontario, reaching St. Marys by November 1856. Construction continued on segments from St. Marys to Sarnia and Port Huron to Detroit (the latter as the affiliated Chicago, Detroit and Canada Grand Trunk Junction Railway), both segments being completed and opened by 1859.
The Great Western had to recognize the Grand Trunk for what it was: a vigorous competitor for the trade of southwestern Ontario and through traffic between Chicago/Detroit and the eastern seaboard of the U.S. The only aspect of this rivalry that could not be clearly seen in 1856–57 was how completely ruinous it would be, especially for the Great Western.
It was with a view to becoming part of the Canadian trunk line — while remaining a link in the American one — that the Great Western undertook the construction of a branch line between Hamilton and Toronto. Although the line was technically built by a separate company, the directors of this Hamilton and Toronto Railway Company were virtually all Great Western directors as well. Its acts of incorporation made it eligible for benefits under the Guarantee Act because, even though it was less than seventy-five miles long, it was considered fundamentally to be a part of the Great Western. Details regarding this and other affiliated lines are provided in chapter 3.
The Grand Trunk had originally intended to use the Great Western as its western section. Why it abandoned this proposed mutually beneficial strategy is a complicated question.
Certainly there was little economic justification for constructing another through line west of Toronto. Negotiations for the amalgamation of the two companies failed, however, perhaps partly because of the influence of New York capital in the management of the Great Western … partly because the Grand Trunk directors had convinced themselves that they required their own independent connection with Detroit. The influence of Canadian contractors also may have been important.
— W.T. Easterbrook and H.G.J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: 1958).
The Great Western’s efforts to convince the government that the Grand Trunk was guilty of a breach of faith were to no avail.
Although the directors of the Great Western made many attempts to come to some sort of understanding with the directors of the Grand Trunk, the latter never showed any willingness to co-operate and adopted an aggressive attitude toward the Great Western that was maintained until amalgamation of the two lines in 1882.
By this time, it was clear that the Great Western would probably be challenged by rivals to the south. This was largely attributed to an unwise decision made by the Legislature of the Province of Canada regarding the five-foot-six-inch (or broad) gauge to be used by provincial railways. The American railways with which the Great Western would connect at both ends used a four-foot eight-and-a-half-inch (or standard) gauge (exception: Erie Railroad at the Niagara River used a gauge of six feet). It was natural that the Great Western should plan to use the same standard gauge and, indeed, all plans were drawn up with this in mind. Corning and Forbes had warned the company of the consequence of using a different gauge.
It is certain that the New York Railroad Companies, who are authorized by law to subscribe to your stock, and who at best will require urging on our part to induce them to do so, will positively refuse their aid if you cut them off from the western connection they are seeking, by adopting a different gauge.
— Letter to R.W. Harris, GWR president, dated June 26, 1851
In what proved to have a painfully negative impact on British North American railways and the Canadian economy, broad gauge was imposed upon the Province of Canada by selfish commercial interests and a provincial government duped by “glib talk.” The Great Western Railway of Canada, which had developed all of its plans with the standard gauge in mind, was forced to scrap these when it was forced against its will by the government to abandon this gauge. In addition, for a line designed as a “bridge line” for east-west continental U.S. traffic between the two dominantly standard-gauged transition points of Detroit and Niagara Falls/Buffalo, forced use of the broad gauge was a recipe for potential disaster. The slow, uneconomical break-bulk transshipments necessitated by the change in gauge proved almost fatal to the Great Western. The bitterness engendered in its allied American railways would, in a few years, take the form of transfer of their traffic and financial support to the standard gauge Canada Southern in Ontario and the standard gauge Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway south of Lake Erie. In any case, the use of the broad gauge and eventual conversion to standard gauge led to economic pressures which severely weakened the Great Western and probably hastened amalgamation with the Grand Trunk.
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Great Western Labour Pool
When the Great Western commenced operations in the 1850s there was no pool of experienced railway workers in Ontario. The company had to either import a labour force or create one. It did both. Managers, superintendents, and foremen were recruited from U.K. railways as were skilled tradesmen such as engineers (engine drivers), fitters, boiler-makers, and other shop crafts. Central office clerks were also recruited from the U.K. as were several of the original stationmasters.
Innovation by the Great Western in locomotive and rolling stock development was due, in large part, to the importation, from the U.K., of gifted and skilled men such as Richard Eaton, Samuel Sharp, foreman Joe Marks, and many of the mechanics. This set the stage for numerous improvements and modifications in engine building and fuel economy.
Jobs requiring commercial skills or local knowledge without technical expertise — conductors, baggagemen, and freight clerks — were more often filled locally. Less-skilled manual workers and trainees for skilled jobs were also hired locally: brakemen, yardmen, engine cleaners/wipers, car repairers, switchmen, watchmen, porters, trackmen, shop helpers, and apprentices. Although the Great Western would look more locally during the 1860s and 1870s, it would still look to U.K. railways for some of its skilled mechanics. For example, in 1873 the London Board sent out five locomotive fitters