Canadian Railways 2-Book Bundle. David R.P. Guay
a full stop before proceeding over the bridge, it is quite likely that the Desjardins Bridge disaster claiming the lives of Zimmerman and fifty-nine others would never have occurred.
The final chapter in the Zimmerman railway saga would also haunt the Great Western for years, through the creation of a competitor across southern Ontario known as the Canada Southern Railway, this railway lasting well beyond the Great Western itself. Zimmerman, anxious to expand commercial development in the Niagara region where he was an extensive landholder, had acquired two local businesses: the Erie and Ontario Railway and the Niagara Harbour and Docks Company. The former was one of the earliest railways in Upper Canada, originally being a horse-powered portage railway around Niagara Falls. The latter was established below Queenston (i.e., north of the falls). As early as 1853, Zimmerman had attempted to entice the Great Western to purchase these assets. Had the Great Western done so, Zimmerman would have amassed a great deal of money on heavy construction contracts in the Falls area. If the railway refused to buy, Zimmerman threatened to include the Erie and Ontario right-of-way as the initial section of a railway built south of the Great Western main line, providing a substantially shorter route between Detroit and Buffalo, New York. It would also tap the regional traffic that the Great Western desired.
Zimmerman “convinced” then-managing director of the Great Western, Charles John Brydges, of the benefits of purchasing the Zimmerman assets, subject to board approval. The battle surrounding this issue forever soured the relationship between Brydges and Sir Allan MacNab, resulting in MacNab’s eventual dismissal from the board. Fortunately, MacNab’s counsel to disapprove prevailed. He happened to know that the purchase and selling prices for the dock company were £9,000 ($43,830 U.S.) and £179,000 ($871,730 U.S.), respectively. Further, he believed that whether or not the Great Western purchased Zimmerman’s companies, there would be a southern competitor built sooner or later. This view persuaded the board. The Brydges agreement was abrogated and the Zimmerman offer was refused.
As expected, Zimmerman began to promote the threatened new independent southern route. Two projected railways would constitute the major portion of the road: the Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway and Harbour Company and the Amherstburg and St. Thomas Railway. By 1857 the contract for the former was already in hand and his associates formed the majority of the board. The latter line was somewhat of a problem as both the Great Western and Zimmerman had oversubscribed the capital. Citing irregularities in the conduct of the Great Western, Zimmerman held a parallel organizational meeting in an Amherstburg hotel on August 7, 1856. At precisely the same time, the Great Western group held their meeting in the Amherstburg town hall! Two boards and two presidents. Although Zimmerman was to play no role in it, the Canada Southern Railway was destined to play a major role in rail transportation in southern Ontario.
Given the unsatisfactory nature of the work performed by Zimmerman’s firm, it might be reasonable to assume that his company would have to compensate the railway or make extensive and expensive repairs and even lose money on the contract. In fact, the opposite occurred. Why? The work had been done “according to contract” — that is, in a manner to meet legally the minimum standards of performance set out, but also according to a contract mutually agreed upon in advance by the engineer and the contractor, approved by a board of directors composed partly of inexperienced local and/or non-local businessmen and usually also including some of the contractor’s “friends.” According to contract the contractor, on the approval of the engineer, imposed additional unforeseen charges pushing costs well above initial estimates. According to contract the contractor was paid when his work was completed. If not, he would refuse to turn over the tracks, locomotives, and rolling stock until he was paid. Frequently, railway companies would start operations without funds since the money raised by municipalities would go to the contractor. In addition, contractors frequently were paid in a combination of company bonds (50 percent) and cash (50 percent). It should be remembered that the process just described applied to the majority of contractors of early Canadian railways, not just to Samuel Zimmerman.
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Even with only the brief background presented herein, the reader should come away with the sense that pioneer railway travel in the 1850s through 1870s was in a somewhat chaotic state. It was somewhat akin to the Wild West. These early years were the era of link-and-pin couplers, hand brakes, no effective means of communication between stations, wood fuel, and no signalling equipment. It was an era of a virtual absence of governmental oversight over the railways, even with respect to safety. And it was an era with a broad lack of financial oversight by government and the companies themselves.
However, slowly but surely things got better. Link-and-pin couplers would be replaced by safer couplers. Hand brakes would give way to air brakes, and the telegraph and signals would improve communication dramatically, improving safety as well. Government would step in and begin to regulate critical aspects of railway life, introducing inspectors and the Board of Railway Commissioners. And, although the Great Western would start out “with wobbly knees,” things would improve for the Great Western as well.
Chapter 1
Early Years
January 9, 1834, was an historic day upon which a select committee of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada enthusiastically recommended approval of a petition under consideration. This petition called for the granting of a charter to construct a railway from the town of London to the head of Lake Ontario. Supporters of the petition included many progressive and influential citizens of London, Hamilton, and all points between, including Allan Napier MacNab, Edward Allen Talbot, Colin C. Ferrie, James Belle Ewart, James Hamilton, Mahlon Burwell, James Ingersoll, George J. Goodhue, and Jasper T. Gilkison. In fact, seventy-six sponsors affixed their names to the petition, including one man who was member of Parliament for the London district and chairperson of the select committee that approved the petition: Mahlon Burwell!
The result was the incorporation of the London and Gore Railroad Company on March 6, 1834, “for the purpose of constructing a single or double track wooden or iron railway or way commencing at the town of London and extending to the harbour in Burlington Bay at the head of Lake Ontario … and also the navigable waters of the Thames River [Ed. note: up to Chatham] and Lake Huron.” The inclusion of a clause authorizing the use “of steam or the power of animals, or any mechanical or other power” indicated that railways were still in their infancy at this time and that steam locomotives had yet to prove their superiority. Naturally, the railway was allowed to cross any watercourse or road, provided that the watercourse or road was restored to its original state, and usefulness was not impaired. This was especially emphasized for the Grand and Thames Rivers. As will be seen in the next chapter, the successor Great Western Railway did not always behave in this prescribed manner. Capital stock was established at £100,000 ($487,000 U.S.) with a proviso that it could be increased to £200,000 ($975,000 U.S.) in the event of extending the works to the Thames River or Lake Huron. Construction was to be commenced within two years of passage of the act and was to be completed between London and Burlington Bay within ten years and from London to the Thames River and Lake Huron within twelve years of passage of the act (Upper Canada Statutes, 4 William IV, chapter 29, assent date March 6, 1834).
Promoters of the new company immediately set to work, with the Montreal Gazette (May 3, 1834) reporting:
We perceive by the True Patriot that the first meeting of the friends of the London and Gore Railroad was held in London on Monday, April 7 [1834]; and we rejoice to find that stock on the amount of four or five hundred shares [£10,000–12,500] was taken up before the meeting adjourned…. When it is considered that every landholder within ten miles of the intended road must be greatly benefitted by its completion, and that the produce of the finest and most fertile country in America must in a few years be of little value, unless some such improvement is effected, we are not at all surprised to hear that the farmers are coming forward to take up stock….
Unfortunately, the promoters found themselves unable to attract necessary capital, despite a modest objective of £100,000. Despite a lack of capital, enthusiasm continued unabated. In 1836 Elisha Johnson, civil engineer, was engaged to conduct a preliminary survey of the route and report to the directors.
In his “Report of the Engineer upon the Preliminary Surveys for the London and