The Real Trump Deal. Martin E. Latz

The Real Trump Deal - Martin E. Latz


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and there’s a squib in the papers. I hire a coach for a football team and there are sixty to seventy reporters calling to interview me.” 32

      His ownership also led to his first national TV interviews. Win #1—publicity for the Trump brand. Trump also felt this publicity was good for the USFL. Some owners disagreed.

      The USFL’s economic plan had been to “keep salaries low, minimize superstar acquisitions, and slowly build the league.”33 Trump’s public spending spree caused tensions with other USFL owners.

      Myles Tannenbaum, one of the league’s founders and owner of the Philadelphia Stars, confronted Donald about the spending spree in mid-December. “I’m in the media capital of this country,” Donald replied. “When you’re in New York, you have to win.”

      “Donald, in Philadelphia you have to win, too,” Tannenbaum retorted. “You have to win everyplace.”

      “I need to win more,” Trump insisted.34

      Another USFL owner Ted Taube wrote at the time, “It may be in Don Trump’s best interests to pursue [this] strategy…. But Don’s best strategy for the Generals could be [financially] devastating for the USFL as a whole.”35

      But Trump didn’t much care about this cost, as it would be borne by the other owners when their players’ salaries skyrocketed. We know this as Trump shortly thereafter signed All-Pro New York Giants’ linebacker Lawrence Taylor, the NFL’s top defensive player.

      Trump signed Taylor even though the USFL’s Philadelphia Stars had the exclusive right to sign Taylor under USFL rules. Ironically, the Giants still had the right to keep Taylor, and they promptly gave him a big raise and paid off Trump (who made a quick profit and a lot of publicity).36 Trump wins. USFL and the other owners lose.

      Of course, some owners supported Trump and viewed his publicity as a net plus for the league.

      Another example of Trump wanting only to win and not caring about the rules occurred when he signed Heisman Trophy–winning quarterback Doug Flutie to a five-year deal worth up to $7 million. But the USFL had a $2 million salary cap.37 Trump didn’t care. Trump “won” again.

      Interestingly, Trump later agreed he “overspent” on Flutie when he didn’t perform well.38

       Trump Needed the USFL to Compete with the NFL in the Fall

      Trump’s aggressive push to get into the NFL also reflected his win–lose mindset.

      Trump wanted to own an NFL franchise and build a New York stadium to house it. This could happen if he either a) bought an NFL team (from 1981 to 1983 he tried buying the Baltimore Colts, but they couldn’t agree on the price, and he also considered buying the Dallas Cowboys in 1983.) or b) bought a USFL team and merged with the NFL.39

      But the NFL wasn’t interested in 1984 in merging with the brand-new league. What did Trump do? He convinced his fellow USFL owners to change their go-slow-and-grow strategy by promising either:

       A network TV contract for a fall season despite the USFL being in the midst of a multi-year $14 million annual ABC contract for the next few spring seasons. The idea? Head-to-head competition with the NFL in the fall would convince it to merge with the USFL. Or;

       A lawsuit against the NFL for antitrust violations for preventing a fall USFL schedule and get a massive judgment forcing a merger.

      Trump’s language at the January 1984 USFL owners’ meeting, according to the owners’ meeting notes, reflects Trump’s win–lose mindset:

      I guarantee you folks in this room that I will produce CBS and I will produce NBC and that I will produce ABC, guaranteed, and for a hell of a lot more money than the horseshit you’re getting right now…. I don’t want to be a loser. I’ve never been a loser before, and if we’re losers in this, fellows, I tell you what, it’s going to haunt us…. Every time there’s an article written about you, it’s going to be that you owned this goddamn team which failed… and I’m not going to be a failure.40

      Trump convinced the owners in August 1984 to switch, starting fall of 1986. Unfortunately for the owners, though, it took place after an aggressive media campaign highlighted a nasty personal war between Trump on one side and USFL Commissioner Chet Simmons and Tampa Bay Bandits owner John Bassett on the other.

      A Bassett letter to Trump illustrates how Trump interacted with the other owners—his seeming partners with common interests. Bassett, who originally liked Trump, opposed Trump’s strategy but shared interests with him in an ultimate merger with the NFL.

      Dear Donald:… I have listened with astonishment at your personal abuse of the commissioner and various of your partners if they did not happen to espouse one of your causes or agree with one of your arguments…. You are bigger, younger and stronger than I, which means I’ll have no regrets whatsoever punching you right in the mouth the next time an instance occurs where you personally scorn me, or anyone else, who does not happen to salute and dance to your tune.41

      Trump’s attitude was win–lose, even with his partners.

      The owners interestingly voted to move to a fall schedule despite having commissioned an independent study from McKinsey consulting which found Trump’s strategy assumed events it deemed highly unlikely, including any new TV contract for the fall of 1986. This was because:

       NBC said it had no interest in televising the USFL in the fall;

       CBS said it wouldn’t be interested for the fall of 1986, but might for 1987 if the USFL’s ratings improved; and

       ABC’s contract with the USFL would be breached if the USFL moved to the fall of 1986.

      McKinsey’s recommendation? Cut costs, stay in the spring for 1986, launch an ad campaign to drive up attendance and revenue, and consider moving to the fall of 1987 when ABC and CBS might be interested.42

      What happened after the owners decided to move to the fall of 1986?

      ABC, the only network possibly interested for the fall of 1986, was upset the USFL intended to breach its spring 1986 contract. It thus refused to sign a deal to broadcast any fall 1986 USFL games. CBS and NBC also confirmed their disinterest in televising the USFL’s fall 1986 games.

      “Winning” the battle to go to a fall 1986 season also meant that Trump and the USFL would lose their contractually solid deal with ABC to broadcast USFL spring games in 1986.

      No television contract for the fall of 1986 basically spelled the end of the USFL, except for a possible antitrust lawsuit against the NFL.43

      “Wait,” you might say. “It’s obvious the USFL should have just followed McKinsey’s recommendations and waited to go to a fall 1987 season. Why did these owners vote for Trump’s move for 1986?”

      Three reasons. First, the owners were desperate financially. Many might not have even made it to a fall 1987 season. Even Ted Taube, who penned that early letter indicating “Don’s best strategy for the Generals could be devastating for the USFL as a whole,” came around, noting that the USFL had “no other financially viable alternative.”

      Second, Trump negotiates and communicates in clear and definitive language with an air of invincibility. He “guaranteed” the TV contracts. Clarity and certainty can be persuasive and convincing. The owners wanted to believe him too.

      And third, Trump threatened that if the USFL did not move to the fall, it might find itself playing without him. Since Trump was then practically the face of the USFL, this might spell its doom sooner rather than later.

      Trump tactically and smartly negotiated with the other owners to get them to vote for the move, despite their internal strife. All along he demonstrated his win–lose mindset.

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