America's Israel. Kenneth Kolander
planes “to deter the Arab States and their Russian masters from starting hostilities.”160
The State of Israel and pro-Israel forces in the United States undertook efforts to pressure Johnson into selling the Phantoms. Israel sent Yitzhak Rabin, former chief of staff (and future prime minister), as ambassador to Washington to advance the Israeli position with American officials. According to Spiegel, “In the Jewish community, every major organization stressed the importance of the jets in its political or educational activities (depending on the nature of the group).”161 Non-Jewish organizations, like the AFL-CIO, Democratic Action, and the American Legion, also endorsed the sale.162 But according to Bard, Johnson was especially irritated by pro-Israel lobbyists who pushed for weapons sales to Israel but failed to support the administration on Vietnam, which made him less inclined to sell the Phantoms.163
Congress tried to force the sale of Phantoms through legislation. In April, Rep. Bertram Podell (D-NY), in coordination with AIPAC, introduced a “sense of the House” resolution favoring the sale.164 While not a binding piece of legislation, a sense of the House seeks to demonstrate general support for a certain measure. Ultimately, more than one hundred representatives and a few senators either signed or voiced support for the resolution.165 In June, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) “threatened to kill the military sales bill if the president did not deliver the Phantoms,” though Symington’s motivation for the sale was likely due to the fact that they would be built in his home state.166 The following month, Representative Wolff offered an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 that ordered the president to sell fifty Phantoms to Israel and replace losses suffered in the 1967 war. The Wolff amendment, after numerous representatives rose in support, cleared the House as part of the Foreign Aid Bill of 1968.167
Unlike Podell’s resolution from April, Wolff’s amendment did not have the backing of AIPAC because the legislation would have intruded too much on the president’s right to conduct foreign relations. I. L. Kenen, head of AIPAC, informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a resolution like Podell’s that expressed the “sense of the Congress” would be sufficient.168 According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “AIPAC generally followed ‘Kenen’s Rules’ to advance Israel’s cause. Rule No. 1 was: ‘Get behind legislation; don’t step out in front of it (that is, keep a low profile).’”169 Senator Church offered a substitute amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill that indicated congressional support for sale of the Phantoms, which passed the Senate on July 31.170 Senator Javits urged President Johnson to take note of the section of the bill that called for immediate negotiations for the sale of supersonic jets to Israel as a deterrent force against future aggression.171
The Phantoms became an issue leading up to the 1968 presidential election. AIPAC, more commonly associated with lobbying the legislative branch than the executive branch, secured statements of support for the sale from the major presidential candidates and worked to get favorable planks at each party convention in 1968.172 Presidential hopefuls Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey trumpeted their support for the sale while speaking at the B’nai B’rith convention in Washington on September 8. President Johnson spoke after the two candidates and shifted the discussion to the need for an arms-limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. The next day both Nixon and Humphrey reasserted their positions, and Humphrey claimed the sale of Phantoms was “now a necessity.”173
Congress displayed strong, bipartisan support for the sale.174 After rumor spread that the administration was leaning against it, Hugh Scott (R-PA) read on the Senate floor part of a letter he had just sent President Johnson that restated his repeated calls for the sale of the Phantoms. Scott also suggested his close relationship with AIPAC when he claimed to be “responsible in large measure for the language in the 1968 Republican platform which urged that the United States provide supersonic jets to Israel.”175 Rep. Jacob Gilbert (D-NY) called for the sale of fifty Phantoms to Israel to restore the balance of power; Rep. Ovie Clark “O. C.” Fisher (D-TX) wanted the U.S. government “to provide Israel with the arms that it needs for its own defense”; and Representative Blackburn went so far as to write a letter to Johnson to explain that even though he voted against the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, he still wanted Johnson to sell the planes to Israel.176 Representative Podell criticized the State Department for not recommending the sale and pointed out, “Both Houses of Congress believe that Phantom jets should be sold to Israel. The major party candidates for President are in full agreement on this policy. The failure to agree to this sale brings joy only to the Arab States and to the Soviet Union.”177 Additional remarks in support of the bill came from Representatives Pelly, Bell Jr., Richard McCarthy (D-NY), and Senator Javits.178
Opposition to the sale from within the administration started to soften due to Soviet aggression and congressional assertiveness. Previously, bureaucratic officials believed that Israel’s forces were already superior; that selling the Phantoms would harm diplomatic relations with Arab states; that the sale would undermine Jarring’s peace efforts; and that Israel should agree to nuclear nonproliferation as a precondition.179 But ongoing efforts to reach an arms-control agreement with Moscow again came to naught.180 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August signaled Moscow’s willingness to employ its military power, and the failure to reach an arms agreement in the Middle East compounded American concerns about Soviet machinations. Secretary of State Rusk ultimately concluded that the Phantom deal “is the most we can get away with in the light of the action of the Congress.”181
The congressional message to the president was received. When Johnson signed the Foreign Assistance Act in October, he “announced that he had taken note of the section concerning the sale of airplanes to Israel, and was asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with Israel.”182 Legislators happily noted the cooperation of the two branches in foreign policy decision-making. Sen. Clifford Case (R-NJ) applauded Johnson’s “prompt response to the request by Congress,” while Rep. Bill Roth (R-DE) noted with satisfaction how the president had responded to “Congress’ mandate” and started negotiations with Israel. Farbstein congratulated the president and stated his belief that “the action of the Congress in recommending the sale of Phantom jets to Israel carried great weight with President Johnson in coming to his conclusion.”183 While congressional insistence likely influenced the president’s decision to agree to the sale, Johnson, a consummate politician, undoubtedly recognized that the announcement of the sale of Phantoms would help Vice President Humphrey in the upcoming presidential election.184
Johnson agreed to sell fifty Phantoms in December 1968, with sixteen to be delivered in late 1969 and another thirty-four in 1970.185 President-elect Nixon was left with the task of delivering the Phantoms to Israel, as well as dealing with more Israeli requests for additional weapons sales, supported by an increasingly combative Congress. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke observed, “We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel’s security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States.”186 After the Phantom sale, the Soviet Union began delivering two hundred MiG 23s to Egypt, which escalated the arms race in the Middle East.187
Conclusion
The June war concretized the U.S.-Israel special relationship, strained American relations with the Arab world, and redefined the nature of the conflict and peace process. Johnson felt a strong cultural connection to Israel, but he did not want to develop a strategic partnership with Israel, either. As in later years, congressional insistence on weapons sales to Israel beyond the desires of the president worked to undercut peace initiatives by placing the United States more squarely on the side of Israel, and by empowering Israel to the point at which there was less incentive to compromise in peace negotiations. While Jarring’s efforts to reach peace probably would have failed regardless of U.S. arms to Israel, the sale of the sophisticated Phantoms only further militarized the region. Over time, Israel developed such a military advantage, thanks largely to the United States, that it severely hampered the peace process. The United States shifted its policy from territorial integrity in the Middle East to support for Israeli occupation