Language Policy and Identity in Mauritania. El Hacen Moulaye Ahmed
that period. This is because Arabic was introduced to Mauritanians with the Islamization process, which was led by the Almoravids in 1039.
The fifth, and final, chapter is devoted to discussing the obtained results. The elicited information is presented, and the hypotheses are tested and discussed. The study ends with representing the findings and suggesting some recommendations, which might solve the issue of language policy and identity in Mauritania.
General Issues in Language Policy and Identity
Introduction
Over the ages, language policy and identity has been a source of a particular interest to scholars and researchers across disciplines. With the rise of the new nation-state systems, this interest turned into an explosion of conceptual and theoretical innovations that have breathed new life into the subarea. The chapter, thereby, is concerned with a variety of miscellaneous matters centered around the issue of language policy and identity which has been discussed in the literature. In so doing and through surveying several articles and books that have dealt with this issue, the chapter treats each component of the constructs that make up the title of the chapter separately as to cover the topic more thoroughly. Under each construct, small, medium and large parts are discussed. For example, under the constructs of “language policy,” the term “language” is defined. Additionally, entrenched myths and misconceptions about language are demolished. Furthermore, the phrase “language policy” is defined and distinguished from language planning with which some writers use interchangeably. Besides, theories, types, and factors that affect language policy are discussed.
In addition, the debate over the definition of identity is outlined. It is shown that the debate not only is about bickering over the terminology in the ivory tower of academia but also concerned with the theories of identity. This is because the term “identity” has become ubiquitous within social sciences and cuts across various disciplines from political science, sociology, and psychoanalysis to sociolinguistics. As such, each discipline or, say, even scholar has had his or her own understanding of identity. For example, whereas some scholars viewed identity as essential and fixed, others regarded it as dynamic and changing. Moreover, amid the controversy over the nature of identity emerged the issue of typology. The issue is discussed in the chapter beside the different markers which affect identity.
Language Policy
Defining Language
Whatever else people do when they come into contact, whether they communicate thoughts, beliefs, emotions, promises, threats, or the like, they talk. However, the term “communicate” is not a human property alone since nonhuman species also communicate information, declarations, threats, feelings, and the like. Yet, even though they communicate, nonhuman species do not have a system of communication that resembles that of human beings, for their system of communication is primarily nonlinguistic. For example, as cited in the article “What is Language?” nonhuman species communicate with nonlinguistic means
resembling our smiling, laughing, yelling, clenching of fists, and raising of eyebrows. Chimpanzees, gorillas, and or an [sic] gutangs can exchange different kinds of information by emitting different kinds of shrieks, composing their faces in numerous ways, and moving their hands or arms in different gestures, but they do not have words and sentences. By moving in certain patters, bees are apparently able to tell their fellow workers where to find honey, but apparently not very much else. (“What is Language?” n.d., p. 2)
The above citation goes in line with the Chomsky’s view about the fact that language is an exclusively human property. He stated that “when we study human language, we are approaching what some might call the ‘human essence,’ the distinctive qualities of mind that are, so far as we know, unique to man” (Chomsky, 2006, p. 88). Extending such statement, Fromkin, Rodman, and Hyams (2014) argued that the possession of language, perhaps more than any other attribute, sets apart human beings from other species. For example, “to some people of Africa, a newborn child is called kintu, a ‘thing,’ not yet a muntu, a ‘person.’ It is only by the act of learning language that the child becomes a human being” (p. 1). The arguments above answered one of the main intriguing questions of the philosophy of linguistics: Is language only possible among human beings? Yet, whether they were intended as definitions or not, they raise one or more points of the definitions of language as will be revealed later.
As any other concept, definitions of language are many and effortlessly available, for we no longer suffer from the weight of history, as Marx suggested, but from the burden of an ever-increasing density of information (Rutsky & Cohen, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, with the tremendous quantity of data that saturates today’s society, we can get answers to almost all questions in nanoseconds no matter where we are (Mackall, 2004, p. 9). However, the following definitions of language were chosen because of their significance. The first definitions of language are proffered by Webster International Dictionary: “Language is audible, articulate human speech as produced by the action of the tongue and adjacent vocal organs.” Webster also gave a second definition of language as “any means, vocal or otherwise, of expressing or communicating feeling or thought” (Webster cited in Dash & Dash, 2007, p. 1). The first definition is very limiting since it limits language to speech and excludes the other main building block of language which is writing. The second definition is also general since nonlinguistic means such as clenching of fists and raising of eyebrows can fall under the loose terms “any means, vocal or otherwise” used in the definition. That is to say animals do use their means of communication; however, their means of communication as discussed earlier are not counted as language.
An alternative definition came from Sweet (2014), an English phonetician and linguist scholar, who defines language as “the expression of ideas by means of speech-sounds combined into words. Words are combined into sentences, this combination answering to that of ideas into thoughts” (p. 6). In this definition, Sweet overemphasizes the role of words to the extent that it seems that he reduces language to words when this is not true. Indeed, as Everett (2012) stated, “all words are ‘signs’ (a meaning paired with a form), but not all signs are words or sentences (stop signs, ‘thumbs up,’ and other gestures come to mind)” (p. 33). Furthermore, according to Robins (1964), language is “symbol systems . . . almost wholly based on pure or arbitrary conventions . . . infinitely extendable and modifiable according to the changing needs and conditions of the speakers” (pp. 13–14). The constructs deployed in this definition are loose. There is no further elaboration after the terms “symbol systems” that would show the nature of these symbol systems.
Moreover, Sapir (1921) suggested that language should be looked at “as a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols . . . [which] are, in the first instance, auditory” (p. 7). In this definition, Sapir neglects written language. In fact, his attention was on the oral communicative function of language coupled with the distinction of language as human property. Nevertheless, the communicative function he mentioned suffered from several defects. For example, his choice of the constructs “ideas,” “emotions,” and “desires” was limiting, for people communicate threats, promises, and the list is large. His choice also of the construct “idea” was imprecise.
In addition, the American linguists, Block and Trager, as cited in Bynon and Palmer (1986), stated that a language is “a system of arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which a social group cooperates” (p. 260). Furthermore, according to Wardaugh, a language is “a system of arbitrary vocal symbols used for human communication” (Wardaugh, cited in Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert, & Leap, 2009, p. 1). Block and Trager’s definition coupled with Wardaugh’s prominently point out that language is a means of communication. In this sense, they did not pay attention to the argument that language is human property since animals do also have their system of communication.
Finally, a definition of language by one of the most influential linguists, Chomsky, should not be neglected. For Chomsky, language is “a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed