Reconsidering Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Christopher Peys
A Conversation with Megan Phelps-Roper,” Making Sense, July 3, 2015, https://samharris.org/podcasts/leaving-the-church/.
27. It is in the book of Genesis that we find the story of Esau and Jacob, the fraternal twins of Isaac and Rebekah.
28. Phelps-Roper, Unfollow, 8.
29. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26.
30. Arendt, Men in Dark Times. This is a phrase she appropriates from Bertolt Brecht’s poem, “To Posterity,” or “To Those Who Follow in Our Wake” (1939). Bertolt Brecht, Bertolt Brecht: Plays, Poetry and Prose, eds. John Willett and Ralph Manheim (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976), 318–20.
31. Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 201. Original emphasis.
32. Ibid., 201–2.
33. Arendt, The Human Condition, 248–56.
34. Arendt, Men in Dark Times, ix.
35. Arendt, “‘What Remains? The Language Remains,’” 20.
36. George Kateb, “Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 5, no. 2 (1977): 143.
37. Arendt, The Human Condition, 251.
38. Ibid., 22.
39. Hannah Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), 403.
40. Douglas B. Klusmeyer, “Hannah Arendt on Authority and Tradition,” in Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts, ed. Patrick Hayden (Durham, UK: Acumen Publishing, 2014), 138.
41. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 26–27.
42. Ibid., 28.
43. Ibid., 95.
44. Norman Jewison, Fiddler on the Roof (United States: United Artists, 1971).
45. Arendt, Between Past and Future, 95.
46. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harvest Book, 1968), ix.
47. Jacques Derrida and Elizabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . . (A Dialogue), trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 8.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Arendt, Between Past and Future, 26.
51. Hannah Arendt, “Introduction: Walter Benjamin, 1892–1940,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 54.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. In terms of such attempts, we need only to recall the so-called Hannah Arendt scandal that sprang up after the publication of Elżbieta Ettinger’s book, Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), and the ways in which its controversial claims were embraced by scholars critical of Arendt’s work (such as Richard Wolin). Though I am unable here to rehash the details of this “scandal,” which was not really a scandal at all (given the findings of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s biography of Arendt), other scholars have written extensively about both the personal and scholastic relationship between Heidegger and Arendt. See, in particular: Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 61–86.
55. Derrida and Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . . (A Dialogue), 13.
56. Because this book shares an interest in the notion of “care” with the approach to moral theory known as the Ethics of Care, or Care Ethics, it is inevitable that there is conceptual crossover between my work and that of scholars like Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, Sara Ruddick, Eva Feder Kittay, and Joan Tronto. Where care ethicists—to speak in (very) broad terms—develop their moral universe in terms of the dynamics of giving and receiving care, as well as the ways in which relations of dependency have historically been constructed along gendered lines, I understand the notion of “care” in decidedly Arendtian terms. In this sense, rather than find my feet in this body of feminist relational theory, I have situated myself in the Continental tradition of philosophic and political thought, doing so specifically in relation to the notion of Sorge developed by Heidegger; as has been discussed, I have built my theory of care in contrast to the Heideggerian approach. This being said, in terms of my investigation of “caring for the world,” I would be remiss in failing to recognize how Tronto’s work has nevertheless colored my thinking about “care” as a public, political form of worldly practice. Her definition of “care,” in particular, has helped give structure to aspects of my own understanding: “[C]aring [should] be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.” [Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring,” in Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives, eds. Emily K. Abel and Margaret K. Nelson (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 40; Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993), 103. Original emphasis.]
57. Hannah Arendt, “What Is Existential Philosophy?” in Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), 179.
58. Joshua D. Broggi, Sacred Language, Sacred World: The Unity of Scriptural and Philosophical Hermeneutics (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 31.
59. Ibid. Original emphasis.
60. William Shakespeare, “The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,” in The New Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, Modern Critical Edition, ed. Gary Taylor et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2040.
61. Martin Heidegger, Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 2011), 3.
62. Arendt, “What Is Existential Philosophy?” 179. Here, Arendt references Heidegger: “The question of the ‘who’ of Dasein has been answered with the expression of ‘Self.’” [Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962), 312.]
63. Arendt, “What Is Existential Philosophy?” 179.
64. Heidegger, Being and Time, 313.
65. Ibid., 313 and 354.
66. Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), 20E–21E.
67. Heidegger, Being and Time, 416. Original emphasis.
68. Ibid. Original emphasis.
69. Arendt, “What Is Existential Philosophy?” 179.
70. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, “Rediscovering Hannah Arendt,” in Love and Saint Augustine, eds. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 124.
71. Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, eds. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 51.
72. Scott and Stark, “Rediscovering Hannah Arendt,” 181. See also: Kattago, “Why the World Matters,” 172.
73. Scott and Stark, “Rediscovering Hannah Arendt,” 181.
74. Arendt, The Human Condition, 179. Emphasis added.
75. Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture,” 208. Emphasis added.
76. Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism,” 358.
77.