Uncertain Democracy. Lincoln A. Mitchell
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The years in Table 1 span the beginning of Georgian independence to the last years of Shevardnadze’s presidency. The data show that during the early years of independence, under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia was less free than most former Soviet republics, even when the Baltic states are excluded. This changed in the mid-1990s with the election of Shevardnadze to a full term as president and the liberalization of Georgia. Beginning in 1996, Georgia’s scores were lower than the mean for the region (significantly lower when the Baltic states are excluded). The only countries with comparable scores for this period are Armenia (slightly higher), Ukraine (virtually identical), and Moldova (slightly lower).
Although Georgia was significantly freer than many of the countries of the former Soviet Union, it was not a democracy. Elections were not free; the rule of law was not strong; democratic institution such as functioning bureaucracies did not exist; and corruption was ubiquitous. Moreover, the state, while stronger than during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, was still extremely weak. In many parts of the country, legislation and regulations were of only peripheral import as local governors appointed by the president, powerful and corrupt businesspeople, or gangsters capriciously exercised the real power. In other areas there was no real authority at all.
The exception was the southwestern province of Ajara, where Aslan Abashidze had consolidated a dictatorship through which he strictly controlled the region and its population of roughly 120,000 and enjoyed semi-autonomy from Tbilisi. In Ajara there were almost no civic organizations, fundamental freedoms, or political opposition. Abashidze’s regime was involved deeply in organized crime, allegedly including smuggling drugs, stolen goods, and weapons. He personally enriched himself tremendously through this activity.
The regime was characterized not only by widespread ties to organized crime and a lack of freedom unlike anywhere else in Georgia but also by a cult of personality around the very eccentric Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze cultivated a kind, grandfatherly image for himself. He was known throughout Ajara as babu, Georgian for grandfather. His tranquil face shone out from billboards and posters throughout the region in which he was frequently pictured with his own grandchildren or groups of Ajaran children. Visitors to his palace in Batumi, the capital, were often treated to a monologue that lasted several hours, during which Abashidze would explain his family’s history over the last several centuries, the artistic and cultural achievements of Ajara, and the superiority of his regime to that in the rest of Georgia. Abashidze wore only black, gray, or white clothing and lived and worked in a palace with high ceilings and almost no decorations on the white interior walls other than numerous flat-screen television sets.
Thus, by the late 1990s, Georgia had evolved into a semidemocratic hybrid in which the governing regime was neither strong nor authoritarian, but processes were fundamentally unfair and government decisions were not made in a way that could be called democratic. The parliamentary elections of 1995 and 1999, as well as the presidential election of 2000 in which Shevardnadze was reelected, were viewed as flawed by foreign and domestic observers. The government during this period was also working more closely with corrupt business interests. But the strong civic life, relatively functional legislature, and the president’s ambiguous attitude toward democratic reform made Georgia an intriguing country with regard to democratic potential.
One of Shevardnadze’s first acts as president was to create a political party, the Citizens Union of Georgia. The CUG quickly grew to dominate Georgian politics, with the president, most of the legislature, the bureaucracy, and other government leaders members or supporters of the party. There were several opposition parties such as the People’s Party, Traditionalist Party, Labor Party, and Industrialists, but none of them played a central role in the government. The exception was the Revival Party, the dominant party in Ajara.
Shevardnadze sought to bring a broad swath of Georgia’s political and social leadership into the CUG as a way to help bring the country together after the chaos of the Gamsakhurdia years. While this effort was partially successful, the result was that by the late 1990s Georgians were living under their third one-party rule in a ten-year period. It was not to be their last. The CUG rule was relatively benign, but it severely stunted democratic growth in Georgia and made it difficult for groups to compete through democratic structures such as elections. As in all one-party systems, struggles for power within the party and disputes over party policy were much more important than elections and parliamentary processes, the way such issues are usually resolved in democratic countries. Thus, while the parliament was a place of vibrant debate, most of this occurred entirely among members of the governing CUG.
The CUG was far from unified; its leadership included reformers, corrupt business people, former communist elites, and others. The reform wing was led by Zurab Zhvania, a charming and brilliant Shevardnadze protégé who had been brought into the CUG from the Georgian Green party. Zhvania possessed an understanding of, and commitment to, democracy not often seen in post-Soviet political leaders. Fluent in English, well connected in foreign policy circles throughout Europe and the United States, and possessing a brilliant political mind and a deep understanding of how government works and how to get things done in a country like Georgia, Zhvania seemed like precisely the kind of leader Georgia would need after Shevardnadze. Zhvania was an extraordinary raconteur with a good sense of humor who could make anybody feel comfortable in his presence. He had the valuable political gift of making whomever he was speaking with feel they were the most important person in his world. During these years, Shevardnadze supported Zhvania, promoting him to Western leaders as the best hope for Georgia’s future and using him to indirectly demonstrate his own commitment to democracy and reform.
Zhvania was not the only reformer in the CUG. Throughout the 1990s he drew into his circle other reformers, often but not always young, generally English speaking, and partly trained in the West. They included people like Gia Baramidze, Zurab Noghaideli, and Misha Machavariani. By the late 1990s, the team Zhvania had assembled looked like the next generation of CUG leaders, who would be able to lead the reform efforts in Georgia. They were seen as in the ascendancy within the CUG and as enjoying the favor of President Shevardnadze, who usually drew attention to these reformers in his discussions with foreigners.
These young reform-oriented politicians did not form the majority in the CUG, which was dominated by corrupt and inefficient elements. The question why these reform oriented leaders stayed in the CUG as long as they did is critical. There are several likely reasons. First, none of the other parties in the 1990s were a good fit for them either. Abashidze’s Revival Party was dominated by corrupt and criminal forces, and most of the other parties were either also corrupt or irrelevant. Second, Shevardnadze regularly indicated to the reformers themselves and outside the party that the reformers were the next generation of party leadership and all they needed to do was to wait a few more years. Last, many of these reformers probably felt that in a de facto one-party system, they could only make a real difference from within the party.
The most visible, talented, and important reformer Zhvania would bring into his circle was a young Georgian lawyer, Mikheil Saakashvili, who upon completing his LLM through a Muskie fellowship at Columbia University had gone to work at the “white shoe” Manhattan law firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler. Zhvania lured Saakashvili away from a promising and lucrative legal career to return to Georgia and serve first as an MP and then as justice minister. Saakashvili quickly developed into an enormously talented and energetic politician.
In addition to his studies in the United States, Saakashvili had studied in Ukraine during the Soviet period. He was fluent in English, Ukrainian, French, Dutch, and Russian. Although he had been born into an elite Tbilisi family, Saakashvili possessed an extraordinary ability to communicate with ordinary Georgians. He was also quite young when he returned to Georgia. Born in December 1967, he had not yet reached his thirtieth birthday when Zhvania urged him to return to help rebuild his country.
The Last Years of Shevardnadze’s Georgia
After the 2000 election, when Shevardnadze was reelected handily in an election viewed as deeply flawed—poorly prepared voter lists, voters casting ballots more than once and other forms of