Uncertain Democracy. Lincoln A. Mitchell
Revolution was unusual among political transitions in that demonstrators waved American flags—and even a few Israeli flags—while calling for the end of the corrupt Shevardnadze regime. This occurred even though there was a history of U.S. support for Shevardnadze. Within weeks of Shevarnadze’s resignation a billboard was erected in downtown Tbilisi displaying the words “Thank You U.S.A.” Georgians, like many others around the world, often see democracy as an idea from the outside, specifically from the West, but, in contrast to many other countries, in Georgia there is no negative sentiment attached to that view.
In Georgia, no ideology seriously competes with the Western democratic model. There is little nostalgia for the Soviet Union; no fundamentalist religious model has any support in Georgia; and Asian or corporatist development models have no traction at all. Western democracy is the only political path that has support in virtually any area of Georgian society. Georgia’s difficult relationship with Russia, its neighbor to the north, serves to reinforce the country’s pro-Western orientation because Europe and the United States are viewed as counterbalances to Russia.
Georgia’s pro-Western outlook is buoyed by its leadership. Many of Georgia’s new leaders, beginning with President Mikheil Saakashvili, were educated in Western universities and have a strong understanding of how politics works in the West, particularly the United States. Many cabinet members, MPs, and other key leaders of the new government were at least partly trained in the West. Some returned specifically to help build the new Georgia after Saakashvili made an appeal when he became president. Few if any countries in the democratizing world boast a group of leaders who have as much Western education and training as those in Georgia.
Moreover, this leadership has been explicit with domestic and particularly with international audiences that its goal is to make Georgia a modern democratic state. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia’s leadership has maintained that it is committed to building a democratic Georgia even when its actions have suggested otherwise. This is a promise Saakashvili and his team have made to everyone—from farmers in rural Georgia to President Bush. The government cannot easily move away from this commitment and may find its ability to democratize at least a partial component of how its success is measured.
Georgia enjoys other advantages that would seem to predispose it to a smooth democratic transition. The country is relatively ethnically homogeneous. Over 85 percent of the population are ethnic Georgian, with the two biggest minorities being ethnic Azeris and Armenians. While tension certainly exists between these groups and the ethnic Georgian majority, it is not a driving force in Georgia’s political life. It continues to be difficult for the government to fully incorporate these groups into the country’s cultural, economic, and political life, but there is no violent conflict between groups, as is the case in many democratizing countries.
Georgia is also overwhelmingly Christian, with a small Muslim and a tiny Jewish minority. Georgians see themselves as part of the extended European community—a community that considers democracy absolutely essential. Georgian Christianity is Orthodox, so European and Georgian Christianity do not overlap entirely, but there certainly are Orthodox Christian countries, most notably Greece, that have adapted well to democracy. Huntington (1991) argued that there is a strong link between the spread of Western Christianity and democracy. Western Christianity is not growing very quickly in Georgia, but Christianity, even in its Eastern form, strongly reinforces the country’s Western orientation.
Because Georgia lacks valuable minerals, oil, or natural gas, the “resource curse” will not impede democratic development either.9 Its economy has traditionally been primarily agricultural and remains so today. Economic growth relies on increasing trade, tourism, and foreign investment. For this reason, Georgia’s economic future will greatly benefit from strengthening democratic institutions, such as rule of law and an open society.
From this cursory glance it would seem that Georgia is poised to consolidate its democratic gains. However, the challenges are strong. Joblessness and an economy growing too slowly for many Georgians, underdeveloped democratic institutions, and the devastating Soviet legacy demonstrate that even when preconditions for twenty-first-century democratization are as strong as possible, there are still barriers to the American democracy promotion project.
Other countries in the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world enjoy similarly positive positions from which to consolidate their democracy. Ukraine since the Orange Revolution of 2004 is especially relevant. Yet even Ukraine—like Georgia a major recipient of European and American assistance since the democratic breakthrough—finds itself in a more difficult situation than Georgia in terms of consolidating democratization. Ukraine does not enjoy such an unambiguously pro-Western orientation as Georgia, since its relationship with Russia remains very close even after the Orange Revolution. The divisions between a Russia-leaning east and a more independent-minded western half of the country are much stronger in Ukraine than any comparable division in Georgia. Moreover, the Orange Revolution has stalled more than once because of the continuing strength of Victor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions, the candidate who sought to steal the 2004 election from Viktor Yushchenko. Yanukovitch became Ukraine’s prime minister in 2006, prompting a difficult period of power sharing with Yushchenko and early elections in 2007.10
A Note on Russia
It is not possible to fully understand Georgia, the dominant concerns of the Georgian government and people, and Georgia’s behavior in international affairs without looking closely at the relationship between Georgia and Russia. Issues of territorial integrity, particularly in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, energy policy and security, the presence of foreign troops on Georgia soil, the opportunity for export and economic development, indeed, the existence of Georgia as an independent state, are all part of the complex relationship between Georgia and Russia. Russian hostility toward post-Rose Revolution Georgia in particular has represented a major threat and obstacle. Russian efforts to weaken the economy by boycotting Georgian wine and mineral water, intransigence with regard to the disputed territories of Abkhazia and Ossetia, and expulsion of Georgian citizens working in Russia in 2006 are only some of the ways this hostility has made life difficult for Georgia.
Georgia’s fate has been closely tied to Russia for several centuries. For over a century, Georgia was the southernmost outpost of the czarist empire, and for more than half a century after that it was part of the far-flung Soviet empire. A central challenge of any government of independent Georgia is to develop a relationship with Russia that guarantees Georgia’s independence, resolves frozen conflicts between the two countries, and allows for fruitful cooperation on issues of trade, energy, and the like. This would be an extremely difficult task for any Georgian government.
Georgia’s relationship with Russia has been addressed elsewhere.11 The focus in this volume will be more narrowly on issues of democratization in Georgia. The Georgian-Russian relationship will be discussed where it has bearing upon democratic development in Georgia, but it will not be a central theme in the chapters that follow.
Democracy Assistance and American Foreign Policy
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of Georgia and democracy promotion, it is useful to spend some time on a brief look at the history, theory and practice of promotion of democracy as part of American foreign policy. For decades democracy promotion has been, in one form or another, part of American foreign policy. It was central to President Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War I vision of how to organize relationships between states. World War II was at times framed as a battle to protect freedom and democracy. The Cold War era was often similarly framed as a conflict between the democratic West and authoritarian communism, but during this period anti-communism in practice trumped democracy promotion among policymakers and scholars. This meant there was little U.S.-backed effort to support democratization in authoritarian noncommunist regimes. However, late in the Cold War democracy promotion began to reemerge, initially in the guise of Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights during his presidency in the late 1970s.
As democracy promotion has been given a more central role in foreign policy, the foundations underlying it have evolved and changed. Not surprisingly, the policy has also come under substantial criticism. For President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I, democracy promotion rested on the notion