Engineering Revolution. Marlene Spoerri
Of these, only the DSS succeeded in entering parliament on its own, having received 5 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of December 1993. The rest, given their paltry membership base and meager public support, were forced to rely on electoral coalitions to win seats in parliament.
Polarized Party Politics
The polarization of Serbia’s political scene—divided as it was by those for and against Milošević—ensured that the country’s politics were deeply divisive for most of the 1990s. Far from embodying a unified Serbian electorate, Milošević oversaw a Serbia that was awash in protest and opposition. Mass rallies frequently brought tens of thousands of protesters to the streets of Serbia’s capital. Opposition political parties and their leaders frequently claimed a vocal role within such protests—whether it was by calling for people to take to the streets or by joining protesters’ calls for peace and democracy.
The first major protest emerged in the winter of 1991. In February, Milošević’s increasingly blatant encroachment on free and independent media led Drašković to call for a protest rally. On 9 March, tens of thousands took to the streets demanding the liberalization of Serbia’s media and the resignations of the head of Radio-Television Belgrade and the sitting minister of Interior. The peaceful protests were met by extreme force. An attack by the riot police left two dead; when this did not suffice in quelling the protest, the Yugoslav National Army finished the job by arresting Drašković and putting tanks on the streets.
In the days that followed, some 500,000 people, including high-ranking members of the DS, gathered in Belgrade’s central square to voice their discontent. Cities and towns across Serbia came out in support of the protestors’ efforts. But when only days later Milošević agreed to a series of moderate concessions, the first major opportunity to topple Milošević came and went.
The second large-scale protest took place in the spring of 1992, when tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets of Serbia’s capital. Protestors called not only for an end to the war in Bosnia but also for the immediate cessation of Milošević’s anti-democratic rule. At the helm of these protests was Drašković, who was joined by leading members of the DS and Serbian Liberal Party (SLS). All three parties complained of the speed with which the country’s new constitution had been adopted and the regime’s monopoly of the media. But it was Drašković who stole the show, calling on protesters to “liberate Serbia” from the stranglehold of Milošević’s rule. “Serbia’s enemies,” he said, “are not in London, New York, Paris, or Moscow” but “right here in Belgrade.”6 In the days following the protests, the New York Times reported that the city was “awash with rumors” of Milošević’s imminent resignation.7
The third large-scale protest took place in the aftermath of a violent assault on an opposition member of parliament. On 1 June 1993, Mihailo Markovic, a representative of the SPO, was beaten unconscious in the halls of the Yugoslav parliament by a member of the SRS. SPO supporters responded with a peaceful protest that took a violent turn with the arrival of the regime’s special police forces. Drašković and his wife were arrested and beaten. With Drašković in prison, opposition parties, including the GSS and SLS, organized protests calling for Draškovićs release, which Milošević finally conceded to on 9 July.
The fourth—and most impressive—display of anti-regime protests was that spawned by Zajedno,8 an alliance led by three of Serbia’s leading democratic parties: the SPO, DS, and GSS. After having their municipal-level electoral victories overturned by the Milošević regime in November 1996, Zajedno oversaw the largest wave of anti-regime protests in Serbian history. For three months, Zajedno’s three major opposition parties spearheaded mass demonstrations in cities across Serbia.
Zajedno’s protests were not the first to bring together a wide array of opposition parties intent on unseating the regime and securing democracy. From 1990 through 1996, opposition parties formed or attempted to form a total of seven pro-democratic coalitions and electoral alliances (Table 7). This included the Associated Opposition of Serbia (AOS), whose goal it was to secure multiparty elections, a new democratic constitution, and an extended campaign period in the run-up to Serbia’s first postcommunist elections. It also included the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS), a union of five opposition parties small and large that spoke out against the regime’s electoral abuses and anti-democratic policies. Most significant, it included Zajedno, an alliance that brought all of Serbia’s main opposition parties together for the first time.
An Imperfect Opposition
Despite their numerous efforts to upend Serbian politics, parties’ opposition to Milošević was often superseded by interparty strife and rivalries, as well as direct efforts on the part of the regime to co-opt and de-legitimize opposition forces. As a result, political analysts have long been wary of ascribing too much importance to Serbia’s troubled opposition. Pavlović (2001: 1), for example, calls Serbia’s opposition in the 1990s “the worst in Europe.” Similarly, Goati (2001: 52) laments that “Serbia’s opposition acted in a disunited manner, expending more energy in mutual conflicts than in the struggle against the SPS and the ruling order.”
Table 7. Coalitions Attempted in Serbia from 1990 Through 1996
Source: Adapted from Spoerri 2008: 75.
a Associated Opposition of Serbia (AOS), Democratic Alternative (DA), Democratic Coalition (DEKO), Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS), Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), United Serbian Democratic Opposition (USO), Zajedno (Together).
b Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Democratic Forum (DF), Democratic Party (DS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Liberal Party (LP), National Radical Party (NRP), New Democracy (ND), New Democracy–Movement for Serbia (ND–MS), Serbian Congressional Party (SNS), Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Serbian St. Sava Party (SSP), Serbian Peasant’s Party (SSS).
The foremost reason parties were susceptible to such conflicts lay in the personalized nature of Serbian politics. When Serbia’s party system came to fruition in 1990, many parties distinguished themselves not by their programmatic profiles but by the personalities of their leaders. Charisma and personal ambition often took precedence over policy and substance. Serbia’s parties were also institutionally weak—low on active members as well as loyal voters. While the SPS boasted a republic-wide infrastructure, the opposition’s reach was overwhelmingly confined to Serbia’s capital and major city centers.9 Parties’ institutional and organizational underdevelopment further reinforced their dependence on their leaders, who determined everything from the formation of electoral alliances to positions on Serbia’s national question and attitudes toward the Milošević regime.
One of the most damaging repercussions of Serbia’s personalized politics was parties’ inability to develop and hone their own party cadre. Rather than capitalize on building talent within the party, “leaders used and discarded individuals based almost exclusively on loyalty to themselves” (Kesić 2005: 101). This offered ambitious party members one of two options: to oust a sitting leader by way of an intraparty coup or to start their own parties. Because the former was exceedingly difficult,10 almost all of Serbia’s opposition parties fractured during the period from 1990 to 1996 (Table 8).
Personalized politics affected more than parties’ internal makeup, however. It also influenced their ability to form and maintain a united front against the regime. All too often, vanity, rather than substance, lay at the heart of interparty strife. Personal jealousies, vendettas, and rivalry often made cooperation among the various opposition parties unattainable or tenuous, which invariably worked to Milošević’s advantage. Though Milošević’s Machiavellian maneuverings no doubt contributed to parties’ infighting,11 party leaders’ own inability to overcome their personal differences left parties unable to mount a credible threat to the SPS and reflected poorly on the alternative they offered voters. The state-run