Engineering Revolution. Marlene Spoerri

Engineering Revolution - Marlene Spoerri


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      Political parties may also be critical for nondemocracies. Throughout the twentieth century, parties served a wide variety of purposes not only in democratic contexts but in authoritarian ones as well. Totalitarian regimes like those of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Benito Mussolini’s Italy, for example, relied on political parties to consolidate their power bases, build loyalties, and eliminate opponents. One-party states were the hallmark of totalitarianism leading to and following World War II. But nondemocratic regimes have also relied on multiple political parties—including ostensible opposition parties—to maintain their authority. Geddes (2008: 2) estimates that as many as two-thirds of authoritarian regimes make at least some use of political parties. That political parties persist where democracy does not has much to do with the functions that parties serve within these nondemocratic contexts.

Function 1: Link Citizens to Government
Represent the public’s demands and interests.
Aggregate interests into political platforms.
Articulate interests and demands.
Integrate voters into political life.
Function 2: Organize Political Life
Nominate candidates.
Recruit and train political representatives.
Organize political opposition.
Organize electoral competition.
Mobilize supporters.
Function 3: Link Government to Citizens
Make government accountable to citizens.
Set policy-making agenda.
Develop policy alternatives.
Devise and pass laws.

      Source: Adapted from Randall and Svåsand 2002.

      Among these functions, political parties provide a vehicle through which authoritarian leaders can consolidate their rule, most notably by assuaging potential rivals and managing inter-elite conflict. Much like they do in democratic regimes, political parties in nondemocratic regimes help organize political life. They provide the structure through which to recruit and train political figures, as well as to build loyalty to the regime and the nation. China’s one-party state, for example, relies on the Communist Party to groom candidates for public office. Party congresses provide the stepping-stones for China’s ambitious politicians to work their way up the political ladder. The assignments awarded by China’s one-party state enable politicians to accrue decades’ worth of knowledge and managerial experience and ultimately inculcate a high degree of loyalty to the regime.

      Political parties also provide authoritarian regimes with a veneer of legitimacy. In one-party states, large political parties offer the semblance of a transparent political process in which one can rise through the ranks of politics and perform public service. In authoritarian states that allow for multiple political parties, these organizations offer a symbol of political choice and competition. Although in many instances this “choice” is more pretense than substance, the very appearance of multiple political parties lends credence to dictators’ claims to democratic legitimacy.

      Political parties can serve as an indispensable tool for authoritarian regimes that institute an electoral process. In Russia, for example, political parties offer a structured network through which ruling authorities can mobilize supporters and secure victory at the ballot box. In Russia and other countries where parties of the regime enjoy unparalleled access to state infrastructure and national resources, political parties provide an ideal means through which to rally further support around their rule.

      Of course, political parties do not only sustain dictators. They can also help bring them down. Perhaps the greatest indicator of political parties’ role in the onset of democracy is found within the expanding literature on “electoral revolutions” (see Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Kuzio 2006; McFaul 2005; Petrova 2010; Schedler 2002; Wahman 2011). Starting in Bulgaria and Romania in 1996, moving on to Slovakia in 1998, Croatia and Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and then finally Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, political parties and independent NGOs forged anti-regime coalitions that led to mass public protests and the eventual unseating of dictators.

      Among the handful of elements deemed critical for these instances of regime change stood the unity of opposition political parties.5 Political parties’ ability to forge united coalitions and, in some cases, to back a common candidate for presidential elections, was thought to be critically important for the ousting of a dictator—thus suggesting that parties’ “heroic moment” may in fact precede the actual onset of democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 57). As Table 2 explains, there are several ways in which parties may contribute to transitions to democracy.

      The first of these is by helping foster liberal outcomes. In this initial phase of democratization, (opposition) political parties can help to spur fledgling processes of liberalization within otherwise nondemocratic regimes through the development of progressive pro-democratic platforms and the advocacy of pro-democratic policies. They can also help to encourage authoritarian leaders to redefine and extend rights and civil liberties. Similarly, by organizing mass protests in the wake of regime-sponsored brutality, political parties can undermine the legitimacy of the regime and levy pressure for substantive policy changes capable of protecting individuals and social groups from state-backed oppression. Political parties can also play an active role in inciting the birth of democratic rule in those settings where pluralism predates democracy.

Function 1: Fostering Liberal Outcomes
Develop pro-democratic platforms.
Advocate pro-democratic policies.
Organize mass protests.
Function 2: Enabling Regime Change
Make pacts and negotiate transition.
Support unity of opposition during key electoral moments.
Mobilize citizenry.
Function 3: Deepening Democratic Gains
Mediate conflicting interests.
Bind social groups.
Educate public on “rules of the game.”
Instill democratic attitudes and expectations.
Provide stability and legitimacy.
Organize nation’s first free and fair elections.
Institute democratic rules of the game.
Oversee processes of lustration.
Channel energy of civil society into official institutions.

      Linz and Stepan (1996), for example, argue that negotiations and pacts drawn between key elites—the leaders of opposition political parties among them—and regime officials facilitate democratic transition. Using case studies drawn from Latin America and Southern Europe, the authors argue that agreements between state authorities and rival parties enabled the emergence of democracy in these regions throughout the mid-twentieth century. Authors such as Scheddler (2002), McFaul (2005), Bunce and Wolchik (2006), and Howard and Roessler (2006) have since argued that confrontation, rather than agreement,


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