Fateful Transitions. Daniel M. Kliman
but the masses Anglophobe. This approach was impossible to carry out in Germany, where the constitution stripped the Reichstag of any role in foreign affairs. With the kaiser and his advisers unfriendly, the British government had nowhere else to turn for access.
Great Britain Embraces Containment
During the first decade of the twentieth century, a rising Germany was prickly and assertive yet unwilling to press international disputes to the brink of war. In 1905, the diplomatic crisis Germany triggered over Morocco worried British elites but did not fundamentally shake their faith in the utility of integration. After 1910, however, frequent conflict accompanied Germany’s rise. The British became disillusioned with integration and increasingly convinced of Germany’s unremitting antagonism, and steadily shifted to containment.
The Second Moroccan Crisis
In July 1911, Germany sparked a crisis that raised the specter of the first large-scale European war in forty years. The epicenter of the crisis was Morocco. Eager to receive compensation for what appeared to be an impending partition of Morocco, Germany dispatched the gunboat SMS Panther to Agadir. The Panther’s presence was intended to convince France and Great Britain that Germany ought to receive concessions for any changes in Morocco’s status. Moreover, the German government hoped that pressing its claim to compensation might bring about tensions that would weaken or even fracture the Anglo-French entente.101 But Great Britain and France remained united. The crisis escalated, and foreshadowing the events of August 1914, Germany deployed troops to the Belgian border. Ultimately, all parties stepped back from the precipice and reached a settlement whereby France occupied all of Morocco and Germany received territories previously part of the French Congo.
For Great Britain, the second Moroccan crisis was a watershed moment. It compelled the civilian leadership in London to become intimately involved in war planning against Germany. While still at the Home Office, Churchill pressed for information concerning the army’s strength and mobilization time frame. Foreign Secretary Grey urged the Admiralty to go on heightened alert. Richard Haldane, the civilian head of the War Office, cancelled military exercises scheduled for September because British troops might soon be needed in Europe.102 Most important, Asquith convened a meeting of the Committee on Imperial Defence to examine “actions to be taken in the event of intervention” in a Franco-German conflict. Adjudicating between plans put forward by the Admiralty and the War Office, this select group fatefully chose sending troops to France over naval attacks against the German coast. Never before had British leaders confronted the possibility of war with Germany in such a tangible way.103 Their faith in integration as a tool for moderating German behavior was badly shaken.
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