Visas and Walls. Nazli Avdan
Previous studies have not adequately analyzed the trade-offs between trade and security with borders while also accounting for the differences in policy options for border control. My work is the first to do both of these things at the same time and evaluate hypotheses based on this framework on a grand scale. Migration policy remains woefully undertheorized in international relations (IR) scholarship. Where theoretical accounts exist, the bulk of the literature studies migration flows rather than policies. When scholars have turned attention to migration policies, they have analyzed the policies of single countries rather than adopting a comprehensive framework. Existing work employs a case study design, engages in discourse analysis, or is normative in orientation. Discourse analysis provides an incomplete picture insofar as there is a gap between rhetoric and practice. The prevailing approaches to migration policy form a comparativist lens, highlighting its domestic underpinnings. A cursory survey of the literature shows that economic and cultural arguments dominate scholarship.
Comparative political economy informs us that firms generally support open migration policies while labor does not. Domestic coalitions on both sides form in response to the fiscal and distributional economic effects of migration. A popular perspective draws on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework to argue that the owners of scarce resources stand to lose from open policies and thus will trumpet protectionism (Hiscox 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). A related perspective refines the factor endowment model to maintain that owners of mobile resources will advocate economic openness. At the center of both perspectives is the view that commerce bifurcates society, simultaneously creating protectionist and liberal stakeholders (Hollifield 2000). Liberal lobbies anticipate revenue loss in the event of retaliation by trade and financial partners. Accordingly, winners from economic liberalization champion sustained liberalization and open-border policies. Migration policy may be conceived as client politics whereby the openness of migration policy depends on the relative strength of these lobbies (Freeman 2001). Liberal lobbies have an organizational advantage because the benefits of open migration are concentrated, but the costs are diffuse. In contrast, opposition to migration is omnipresent, yet poorly organized. Additionally, to the extent that trade and migration are complementary (Rudolph 2008), we would expect pro-trade lobbies to join forces with those in favor of open migration policies. As such, anti-immigration lobbies find it more difficult to mobilize and pressure the state to maintain protectionism (Freeman 1995). Insofar as liberal lobbies carry the day, we would expect the domestic-level mechanisms to support the state-level argument.
The economic perspective is strictly premised on labor market effects of migration and ignores that unlike other factors of production, labor comes with sociopolitical consequences (Zolberg 1987). This insight has inspired a separate strain of comparative literature, which draws on the cultural effects of migration to explain policies. Migration may stoke cultural insecurities by undermining societal cohesion and challenging the boundaries of what defines a nation (Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995; Waever et al. 1993). Particularly if migrants carry starkly different normative templates, their codes of conduct, belief systems, and self-identities may clash with the host state’s way of life (Collier 2013). Homogeneous host societies find accommodating cultural diversity particularly challenging, also because for these countries, the concept of nationhood is ethnic rather than civic. Such societies are hermetic, inflexible, and predisposed to opposing cultural diversity. In contrast, settler states built on significant waves of immigration at historical junctures—such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia—base citizenship on civic principles and hence have an easier time reckoning with dissimilar migration (Brubaker 1992). The cultural perspective thus expects countries to pursue restrictive policies in an effort to preserve a coherent sense of nationhood or, more generally, to buoy cultural security. It also maintains that states that are more ethnically homogeneous and states that lack a tradition of migration are inclined toward stricter migration and border controls.
Arguments drawing on comparative politics to explain why states pursue open or closed migration and border-control policies illuminate the domestic underpinnings of policies. However, they cannot tell us much about how interstate dynamics affect migration policies. For example, we know from comparative political economy which actors forge pro- and antimigration lobbies. But we do not know if these actors compel governments to attune liberalization toward economic partners. This is where theories about bilateral trade and commercial dependence have merit. From a comparative economic perspective, closed migration policies are rooted in the domestic economic consequences of labor flows. This perspective does not shed light on how economic factors interact with other facets of state grand strategy. As part of its grand strategy, a state conjointly seeks economic, geopolitical, and cultural security (Rudolph 2005). The cultural perspective tells us that nativist lobbies exploit ethnocentric sentiment to fuel cultural insecurities and galvanize people against open migration policies. But we know less about whether the economic ties between states temper domestic cultural insecurities. Moreover, the subfield of IR has rich scholarship on territoriality and borders and a wealth of theories to draw upon in tying interstate dynamics to migration policies. Yet it has not adequately leveraged this literature (Gavrilis 2008a; Rudolph 2003). IR scholars’ oversight is surprising in light of the fact that international migration has assumed center stage in policy debates in the past few years. As Adamson stresses, “International scholars and policy makers are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the relationship between migration and security in a highly interconnected world defined by globalization processes” (2006, 165–167). Hence, the topic of migration control provides fertile ground for theorizing from the international relations lens.
There are a handful of scholars who have recognized the scholarly void and taken a comprehensive perspective. Rudolph (2003) argues that trading states’ migration policies tend to be more liberal given external geopolitical threats, as was the case during both world wars. The relationship reverses in the absence of external threats, where the absence of a common enemy means states can afford tougher policies. Rudolph’s work offers one perspective on when economic interests matter the most: when geopolitical threats compel states to value economic security and trigger a rally effect, thereby overriding concerns over cultural insecurity. Peters (2017) offers another perspective. She argues that globalization initially predicted open migration policies because of strong pro-migration lobbies. Deindustrialization and offshore mobility of firms shrank the pro-Immigration lobby. She maintains that these factors are why globalized states now pursue strict migration policies. Both perspectives highlight that material considerations matter. For Peters, the current wave of globalization fails to exert a liberalizing force on migration policies because the domestic pro-migration lobby shrank as states moved production offshore and technological development blunted the demand for foreign labor. For Rudolph, globalization may fail to produce open policies in times of relative peace—absent an external common aggressor. In this scenario, threat perceptions turn inward and host states become preoccupied with cultural rather than economic insecurity.
Rudolph and Peters show that globalizing has varied effects on states’ migration policies. But neither work tells us much about how non-state threats—and informal violence wielded by these actors—influence migration-control policies. My argument points to a different reason why economic incentives may have limited impact on open-migration policies. Economic models stipulate that states engage in cost-benefit analysis when deciding how open borders should be. Fears affect policy through an appeal to emotion rather than strict cost-benefit analysis. This suggests that states deviate from strict cost-benefit analysis when policies then reflect these fears (Friedman 2011; Mueller 2005). Coupled with weak lobbies, emotional decision making should further winnow support for open migration.
Theoretical Anchor
My book speaks to debates about the role of borders and territoriality in states’ pursuit of sovereignty. Territoriality and borders occupy a venerable and important role in IR scholarship; this lends a solid theoretical foundation when generating empirical implications about borders. Nonetheless, when IR scholars have studied borders, they have done so by looking at the role of borders in conflict (Huth 1996) or cooperation (Simmons 2005). Conflict scholars examine why states clash over the location of borders. Cooperation scholars explore how borders can function as effective institutions facilitating cross-border trade. Neither perspective tells us much about how states