Available Means of Persuasion, The. David M. Sheridan

      1 Kairos and the Public Sphere

      In this preliminary chapter, we explore kairos and the public sphere—two theoretical concepts that will inform discussion throughout the book. Tracing the ways these terms have been discussed in both historical and contemporary contexts helps demonstrate their usefulness for a theory of multimodal public rhetoric. Ultimately, we argue that both kairos and public sphere need to be reconfigured if they are to serve multimodal public rhetors effectively.

      Definitions of Kairos

      Virtually all sustained discussions of kairos begin by observing, as James L. Kinneavy does, that “kairos is a complex concept, not easily reduced to a simple formula” (“A Neglected” 85). In his introduction to Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, Phillip Sipiora observes that

      kairos is typically thought of as “timing” or “the right time,” although its use went far beyond temporal reference. . . . A fundamental notion in ancient Greece, kairos carried a number of meanings in classical rhetorical theory and history, including “symmetry,” “propriety,” “occasion,” “due measure,” “fitness,” “tact,” “decorum,” “convenience,” “proportion,” “fruit,” “profit,” and “wise moderation.” (1)

      Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard (292) and Jane Sutton (413) each provide lists that are similarly various and copious. Kinneavy notes that to appreciate the full relevance of kairos for rhetoric, we need to take into account the “ethical, educational, epistemological, and aesthetic levels [of kairos], all of which are linked to each other” (“A Neglected” 87). In their explorations of kairos, rhetorical scholars have linked the concept to Sophistic, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Ciceronian traditions (Hughes; Kinneavy, “A Neglected”; McComiskey, “Dissassembling”; Sipiora and Baumlin; Sutton). Kairos is a complex and richly generative concept that stubbornly resists simple definitions.

      Many theorists emphasize that kairos includes both temporal and spatial dimensions, beginning with the original metaphors that inform the concept. Kinneavy asserts, “a second meaning of kairos was ‘the right place’ in addition to the right time” (“Revisited” 83; see also, Miller, “Kairos”; Sheard). Eric Charles White usefully addresses the various temporal and spatial metaphors that merge in the concept:

      Kairos is an ancient Greek word that means “the right moment” or “the opportune.” The two meanings of the word apparently come from two different sources. In archery, it refers to an opening, or “opportunity” or, more precisely, a long tunnel-like aperture through which the archer’s arrow has to pass. Successful passage of a kairos requires, therefore, that the archer’s arrow be fired not only accurately but with enough power for it to penetrate. The second meaning of kairos traces to the art of weaving. There it is “the critical time” when the weaver must draw the yarn through a gap that momentarily opens in the warp of the cloth being woven. (13)

      Richard Broxton Onians similarly explores the roots of kairos in weaving and in archery, noting that “Euripides refers to a part of the body where a weapon can penetrate to the life within” (343). White, Onians, and others establish that in addition to “the opportune moment,” kairos is the opening or gap that allows passage to a goal or desired destination.

      Most contemporary accounts of kairos are explicitly informed by ongoing discussions of the rhetorical situation (see Bazerman; Miller, “Kairos”; Sutton). Kinneavy flatly asserts that “the concept of situational context” is “a modern term for kairos” (“A Neglected” 83). Many of these accounts draw specifically on the conversation about the rhetorical situation begun by Lloyd Bitzer in the inaugural issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric. Indeed, this debate has become so codified that Charles Bazerman refers to it as the “Bitzer-Vatz-Consigny debate” (174). Other theorists link kairos to rhetorical context via Kenneth Burke’s concept of scene and the pentad (e.g., Sheard; Herndl and Licona). After citing the work of Bitzer, Burke, and others, Kinneavy concludes: “All of these voices saying ultimately the same thing ought to convince us that some consideration in any rhetorical theory must be given to the issue raised by the concept of kairos—the appropriateness of the discourse to the particular circumstances of the time, place, speaker, and audience involved” (“A Neglected” 85). Sheard offers a concise encapsulation of many of these concerns in her summary of the concept:

      Kairos is the ancient term for the sum total of “contexts,” both spatial (e.g., formal) and temporal (e.g., epistemic), that influence the translation of thought into language and meaning in any rhetorical situation. Kairos encompasses the occasion itself, the historical circumstances that brought it about, the generic conventions of the form (oral or written) required by that occasion, the manner of delivery the audience expects at that time and place, their attitudes toward the speaker (or writer) and the occasion, even their assumptions about the world around them, and so on. (291–92)

      Kairos, then, provides a way of exploring how rhetors shape their actions in response to a number of factors. As we expand the scope of kairos to account for multimodality, new factors come into play, introducing new layers of complexity. Many kairotic determinants are beyond the rhetor’s control, a reality that complicates models of rhetorical agency. Indeed, the delicate nature of rhetorical agency is one of the abiding preoccupations of this book. Accordingly, we offer a preliminary look at agency here.

      Kairos and Rhetorical Agency

      We sometimes talk about writing and rhetoric as if everything depends on rhetors and their compositions. Rhetors are constructed as rational autonomous subjects who craft efficacious compositions based on their mastery of the art of rhetoric. Kairos, however, reminds us of the numerous factors that rhetors do not control but that nevertheless determine what is rhetorically possible at a given moment. Kairos draws attention to rhetoric’s “bondage to the occasion and the audience” (qtd. in Sutton 415). Kinneavy explores this issue in an interview focused on kairos. Asked if kairos is “beyond the rhetor’s control” or if it can be “manufactured” by the rhetor, Kinneavy replies,

      Well, I can see that a rhetor can choose the right time, and in that sense he can create it. He may realize this is not the right time to bring this up yet, but if he waits too long it’s going to be too late. So timing, or the right time, is sometimes in the hands of the rhetorician, but not always. Sometimes a situation just arises, and if a rhetorician wants to persuade, he has to use the time, and so in that case what he can do is simply to adapt himself to that time. Or, sometimes, say these times are not very good or not very favorable to this idea, then he may show you back historically how this has been a very important idea, and we should not forget that. So, there are different things a rhetorician can do with regard to time. It is not totally in his control. (“Revisited” 77–78)

      Kinneavy goes on to explain that if the time is not right, the rhetor can “tell people, ‘you people nowadays don’t think very much of the importance of this particular concept, but it is important’—you can create that kind of a timing” (78). Kinneavy acknowledges that attention to kairos means candidly confronting the constraints within which the rhetor operates. But he ekes out a space, however uncertain and contingent, for rhetorical agency. The rhetor “reads” the situation to determine what opportunities are and are not available.

      Moreover, in Kinneavy’s view, kairos doesn’t fully precede rhetoric. Instead, rhetoric plays a role in helping to construct the moment of kairos. In Kinneavy’s example, referring to the lack of kairos becomes a way to create kairos. An audience might be resistant; a skilled rhetor might artfully address that resistance. Some audiences, however, might be so resistant