Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War. Elizabeth Schmidt
significant roles in multilateral peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations, and they often engaged in independent diplomatic initiatives.2
The other former Cold War powers, China and Russia, ordinarily opposed political and military intervention in the internal affairs of other nations—their immediate neighbors excepted. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they frequently challenged Western-sponsored initiatives focusing on human rights and governance issues. Like other industrial states, China was particularly interested in regions that were rich in strategic natural resources. In exchange for guaranteed access to such resources, China invested heavily in African industries and infrastructure and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, political repression, and corruption. However, China, like the West, recognized that its economic interests would be best served by peace and stability. In consequence, Beijing expanded its involvement in multilateral disaster relief, antipiracy, and counterterrorism operations. In 2016, it contributed more military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations than any other permanent member of the Security Council. It engaged in mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Sudan and South Sudan, where it had significant investments in oil production and infrastructure, and also in Mali, where its primary interests lay in the oil and uranium of neighboring countries. China also joined France, the United States, Italy, and Japan in establishing a military facility in Djibouti, which overlooks one of the world’s most lucrative shipping lanes.
Russia, like China, viewed post–Cold War Africa as a new frontier of political and economic opportunity. Itself the target of Western economic sanctions, Moscow had no interest in critiquing its partners’ domestic human rights abuses or international transgressions. It offered goods and services to countries sidelined by Western restrictions and used its power on the Security Council to oppose robust military interventions that would encroach on national sovereignty and promote Western interests. Critical of Western influence over peacekeeping structures and initiatives, Moscow also recognized that its participation provided it with an avenue toward increased global prominence. Although its personnel contributions to African peacekeeping missions have been relatively small, Russia has trained African peacekeepers for both UN and AU missions, and it has sought leadership roles in the UN peacekeeping headquarters in New York and in missions on the ground. In Africa, Moscow’s military imprint is more evident in its substantive weapons trade: a major military supplier to African governments during the Cold War, Moscow has continued to expand its arms trade on the continent. It has also used its military connections to extend its influence in other arenas. Although Russia’s commerce with Africa is still small relative to that of China, Europe, and the United States, it has increased dramatically since 2000. Like China, Russia has focused its investments on the energy and mining sectors and on infrastructure development.
Middle Eastern powers also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. Historically, Middle Eastern countries maintained strong political and cultural ties with North Africa, which was commonly considered part of the Arab World. During the post–Cold War period, a number of Middle Eastern nations intervened in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, acting unilaterally or through the intergovernmental Arab League. Most significant for this study, the Gulf states and Turkey provided important political, economic, and military support to established governments and their opponents during the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath.3
African states also implicated themselves in their neighbors’ affairs through the UN, the AU, and subregional organizations, as well as unilaterally. Like other outside powers, they often had mixed motives: they sought to engender peace and stability but also to further their own aims and interests. In some cases, they backed the governments in power. In others, they supported warlords or rebel movements.4 Somalia (chapter 4) was the subject of interference from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda, while the conflict in Sudan (chapter 5) sparked intervention by Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Uganda. Uganda and Zaire implicated themselves in Rwandan affairs before and after the 1994 genocide (chapter 6), while wars in Zaire’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of Congo (chapter 7), engaged Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In West Africa’s Mano River region (chapters 8 and 9), the civil war in Liberia involved intervention by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Libya; the related civil war in Sierra Leone implicated Liberia and Libya; and the ensuing civil war in Côte d’Ivoire involved Liberia and Burkina Faso. The Egyptian military intervened in Libya after the Arab Spring revolt (chapter 10). In Mali, the French-led intervention to counter a secessionist movement and jihadist insurgency was joined by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, while the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was challenged by armies from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (chapter 11).
Some individual states played outsized roles in their own subregions and, in a few cases, wielded considerable influence continentwide. In particular, Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa were notable for both their subregional and continental influence. In North, East, and Central Africa, no single nation could claim subregional dominance. However, Algeria and Egypt possessed considerable clout in North Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia carried significant weight in East African affairs, while Egypt also aspired to wider influence in the Greater Horn.5 In Central Africa, the DRC was large in size and rich in minerals, but internal conflicts prevented it from assuming a leadership role.
Several intergovernmental organizations and nonstate actors played key roles in shaping the post–Cold War order in Africa. The most consequential included one global organization, the United Nations; four regional bodies, the Organization of African Unity, the African Union, the European Union, and the Arab League; and five subregional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The most significant nonstate actors were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates. The composition, purpose, and interests of these organizations are described below.
Global Organization: The United Nations
Established in 1945 to promote international peace, security, and social progress, the United Nations is dominated by the nations that won World War II. The UN General Assembly includes representatives of all member states. However, its resolutions are not legally binding, and it possesses no enforcement powers. The UN Security Council comprises five veto-bearing permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) and ten rotating members that serve two-year terms and have no veto power. The Security Council can impose sanctions and authorize military intervention. The United States, which pays the largest share of the organization’s operating expenses, dominated UN structures throughout the Cold War, when the US agenda generally prevailed. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has continued to promote a Western agenda, although its powers have been limited by Russia and China, which historically have opposed UN intervention in the internal affairs of member nations.
Two chapters of the UN Charter spell out the organization’s role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Chapter VI permits the Security Council to investigate disputes that threaten international peace and security, to issue recommendations, and to monitor peace accords. The main parties to the dispute must consent to UN involvement. Under a Chapter VI mandate, a neutral UN force composed of troops from member states is stationed between warring parties that have endorsed a peace accord and empowered the UN to monitor it and maintain the peace.