The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell
the Hellenistic moral writers (he specifically mentions the Moralia).
103. In examining the later development of the topos, Thom devotes a paragraph of his study to Theon’s treatment of topos in the Progymnasmata. Thom confines his comments to the formal elementary exercise of topos.
104. This same distinction as seen in Cicero and Quintilian, as will be demonstrated below.
105. Kennedy (Classical Rhetoric, 61) notes that the idea had already surfaced in the writings of Isocrates; he states in particular that Isocrates mentioned the topos of possibility/impossibility and arguments which cite authoritative sources (Hel. enc. 4, 38). In his encomium to Helen, Isocrates writes concerning those who would, through the use of rhetoric, attempt to prove those things which are agreed upon to be false: “Nevertheless, although these men [Georgias, Zeno, Melissus] have shown that it is easy to contrive false statements on any subject that may be proposed, they still waste time on this commonplace [περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον]” (Hel. enc. 4). In the same treatise, Isocrates continues, commenting on the appropriateness of praising Helen: “But lest I seem through poverty of ideas to be dwelling unduly upon the same theme [περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον] and by misusing the glory of one man to be praising Helen, I wish now to review the subsequent events also” (Hel. enc. 38). For a somewhat tentative discussion (admittedly; cf. the title of the work) of the origins of the concept of the topos, see D’Angelo, “The Evolution of the Analytic Topoi,” 50–68, esp. 54–61.
106. Aristotle specifically lists five inartificial proofs: laws, witnesses, contracts, that which is revealed by someone being tortured, and oaths.
107. Ryan’s comment is helpful; concerning enthymemes and topoi, he states: “To say, then, that an enthymeme is derived from a topos does not mean that the enthymeme is constructed from the topos as from a premise . . . Instead, the enthymeme follows the structure of the topos . . . The topos is not part of the argument, but it is the argument’s pattern” (Ryan, Aristotle’s Theory, 48–49).
108. J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 107.
109. Inartificial proofs, according to Aristotle, are those which are particularly appropriate for forensic speeches (1.15.1–2).
110. For a similar, albeit much later view of quoting and/or imitating ancient sources, see Longinus, [Subl.] 13.2–4. In this passage, the author, concerning the μίμησις of ancient sources, argues that referring to others’ works is another path to the “sublime.” The author uses the analogy of the steam which came from the earth at Delphi and intoxicated the pythia; the pythia is “impregnated with the divine power and is at once inspired to utter oracles.” In this same way, by the imitation of historians and poets the reader is “carried away” by this use of others’ work. By analogy, readers are captivated by the wisdom of the ancients (“old writers [ἀρχαίων]”). The author goes on to say that quoting or imitation is not plagiarism; rather, it is like “taking an impression from fine characters as one does from molded figures or other works of art.”
111. See Kennedy, Rhetorical Criticism, 20–22, who briefly summarizes Aristotle’s concept of topos; cf. a similar discussion in Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 100–103.
112. This is certainly not to say that the concept of topos disappears between Aristotle and Cicero; on the contrary, many ancient rhetoricians address this subject matter. The evidence is such, however, that Reinhardt can correctly note: “In light of the scanty evidence for the post-Aristotelian development of dialectical τόποι, we may assume that Cicero’s loci reflect a post-Aristotelian tradition of rhetorical τόποι which have been rearranged and supplemented with the help of Top. and other sources” (Reinhardt, Topica, 28–29; emphasis original). See Reinhardt, Cicero’s Topica, 18–35, for a brief overview of the various understandings of topos from Aristotle to Boethius. See also Kemper, “Topik,” 17–32, for a summary of the topoi from Aristotle to Cicero.
113. See Kennedy’s discussion of the situation surrounding Cicero’s writing of Inv. in The Art of Rhetoric, 106–11. Kennedy argues that Cicero and his contemporaries followed the ancient convention of not mentioning a living person to whom they were indebted; only those authorities who were deceased were cited. In Inv. 2.50.111, Cicero does mention Crassus, but makes no reference to Antonius anywhere in the work. According to Kennedy, both of these men would have been well respected by Cicero. Thus Kennedy argues that Inv. was completed after Crassus’s death (91 BCE), but while Antonius was still living (he died in 87 BCE).
114. “For the more shamefully an honourable and worthy profession was abused by the folly and audacity of dull-witted and unprincipled men with the direst consequences to the state, the more earnestly should the better citizens have put up a resistance to them and taken thought for the welfare of the republic” (Inv. 1.3.5).
115. He does define what he means by “common topics”; see below.
116. In this rhetorical treatise, Cicero argues that the following are the parts of a well-organized speech: exordium (1.14.19–18.26), narrative (1.19.27–21.30), partition (1.22.31–23.33), confirmation (1.24.34–41.77), refutation (1.42.78–51.97), and peroration (1.52.98–56.109).
117. The complete list also includes “habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, speeches made” (1.24.34).
118. Grimaldi also recognizes that the loci in Cicero are focused on the content of the arguments rather than on the form of the argument. He goes so far as to state that Cicero misunderstood Aristotle’s method; see Grimaldi, “The Aristotelian Topics,” 176–93, esp. 178. Emrich, in questioning Curtius’s definition of a topos as a cliché, argues that the term locus is a metaphor which helps to explain the concept as seen in the Latin rhetoricians (primarily Cicero and Quintilian). Emrich notes that in these writers, a locus is a place at which arguments can be found (“der Sitz des Beweises”), but can also be the argument or proof in itself. See Emrich, “Topik und Topoi,” 90–120, esp. 102–20.
119. Kennedy argues that it was written in 55 BCE and published in the year following its composition. He also claims that De or. “is one of [Cicero’s] most admired works and stands beside or only slightly behind Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Quintilian’s De institutione oratoria as a rhetorical classic”; see Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric, 205 n. 84.
120. Antonius goes on to say that “the mind must needs return to those headings and those commonplaces [locos] which I have often mentioned as such already, from which every device for every speech whatever is derived” (2.34.146).
121.