Cornelius Van Til’s Doctrine of God and Its Relevance for Contemporary Hermeneutics. Jason B. Hunt
Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 148.
122. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 14–15 (emphasis mine).
123. White, What is Truth?, 59.
124. E.g., he confuses Van Til with Clark’s notion that all truth is propositional and must be deduced from the Bible in order for it to be knowable (White, What is?, 60, 169; Clark, “Bible as Truth,” 158, 167; Trinity, 85).
125. White, What is?, 51–58. For a discussion of how Van Til repudiated fideism, see Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 72–78.
126. White, What is?, 44.
127. White, What is?, 59 (emphasis mine).
128. Packer, “Biblical Authority,” 141.
129. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 129.
130. Geehan, Jerusalem, 204.
131. Packer, “A Response,” 565.
132. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 535–58.
133. Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 22–23.
134. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 549.
135. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 546, 551–52.
136. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 553, 555.
137. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 554–55; Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 101–9, 116–17, 207–8.
138. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 241–43.
139. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 243–84.
140. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 285.
141. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 287.
142. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 289; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 15, 107, 133.
143. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 291 (emphasis his).
144. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 291; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 148.
145. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 292; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 50; Reformed Pastor, 89.
146. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 77–78.
147. Enns, “Response,” 315n6.
148. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 78n45.
149. However, Van Til did write about Philo Judaeus’ hermeneutical method and treatment of the Old Testament, which would fall in the latter part of the Second Temple period (Christ and Jews, 3–22).
150. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 224.
151. Contra Moyise, Beale sees these two questions as inherently related (Erosion of Inerrancy, 225).
152. Wright, New Testament, 31–144. For a helpful, balanced critique of Wright, see: Moritz, “Critical but Real,” 172–95.
153. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 253.
154. E.g., Wright, New Testament, 34, 42, 45–46. Interestingly, shortly after this endorsement, Beale again highlights the Van Tillian ideas that some knowledge can be known, even if not exhaustively or perfectly understood, and that some presuppositions are good and necessary (Erosion of Inerrancy, 255). However, he fails to ground these statements in something more stable than at least the appearance of mere common sense pragmatism mediated through a moderate form of hermeneutical syncretism.
155. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 257, 259.
156. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 254–55.
157. Beale acknowledges his primary influences to be: Hirsch, Vanhoozer, and Wright (Erosion of Inerrancy, 260).
158. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader.
159. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 12, 30, 34, 36.
160. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 300–1.
161. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 14, 30, 34, 35, 37–38, 301.
162. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 61–63.
163. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 68.
164. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 7–8; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 14–15.
165. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader,