Suppression Of Terrorist Financing. Hamed Tofangsaz
33. Ibid.
34. Vittori, above n 5, p. 40.
35. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (Ecco, New York, 2003), p. 273.
36. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 (Paris, February 14, 2003) p. 9. See also Vittori, above n 5, p. 42.
37. Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer, Berlin, 2006), p. 22.
38. Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the bin Laden Brotherhood (Duke University Press, Durham, 2002), p. 128.
39. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1999), p. 178.
40. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 14.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Koh, above n 37, p. 24.
44. Ibid.
45. Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation” 2005 IV(1) Strategic Insights, p. 2.
46. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 21.
47. Martin Runder, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering” 2010 33(8) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 700, p. 706.
48. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, 2004), pp. 245–254.
49. Kiser, above n 28, p. 86.
50. Vittori, above n 5, p. 45. See also Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System (International Monetary Fund, Washington, 2003), p. 6.
51. Kiser, above n 28, p. 90.
52. Dixon Hughes Goodman Risk Advisory, “Understanding Informal Value Transfer System” (June 2015), <https://m.dhgllp.com/Portals/4/ResourceMedia/publications/DHG_Views_RAS_IVTS.pdf>.
53. Financial Action Task Force, above n 2, p. 24.
54. Vittori, above n 5, p. 46.
55. Passas, above n 17, p. 29.
56. Kiser, above n 28, p. 91.
57. Koh, above n 37, p. 30.
58. Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (1st ed., Broadway Books, New York, 2004), pp. 23, 47, and 55.
59. Douglas Farah, “The Use of Gold, Diamonds and Other Commodities in Terrorist Finances” (March 18, 2004), <http://www.douglasfarah.com/presentations/use-of-gold.php>.
60. Passas, above n 17, p. 31.
61. Financial Action Task Force, Trade Based Money Laundering (Paris, 2006), p. 4.
62. Passas, above n 17, p. 31.
63. Ibid.
64. Terrorism Research, “Categories of Terrorist Groups,” <http://www.terrorism-research.com/groups/categories.php>.
65. Vittori, above n 5, p. 7.
66. Terrorism Research, “State Sponsored Terrorism,” <http://www.terrorism-research.com/state/>.
67. Vittori, above n 5, p. 7.
68. Robert H. Deatherage, Terrorism Awareness (Turtle Press, Santa Fe, 2008), p. 31.
69. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
70. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 187.
71. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
72. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (Seven Stories Press, New York, 2005), p. 65.
73. Vittori, above n 5, p. 8.
74. Financial Action Task Force, Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Paris, 2015), p. 12.
75. Vittori, above n 5, p. 10.
76. Some countries such as Iran consider Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement fighting for the liberation of Israeli occupied territories. See Ophir Falk and Henry Morgenstern, Suicide Terror Understanding and Confronting the Threat (Wiley, New York, 2009), p. 233.
77. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds) Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2007), p. 134.
78. Vittori, above n 5, p. 114.
79. Ibid.
80. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism” 2002–2003 27(3) International Security 30, p. 45.
81. Vittori, above n 5, p. 145.
82. R. F. J. Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (Springer, Dordrecht, 2012), p. 15.
83. Vittori, above n 5, p. 115.
84. George Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 2012), p. 1.
85. Fox News and Associated Press, “Terrorism Eyed in Attack at German Airport That Killed 2 U.S. Airmen” (2011), <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/02/shots-fired-bus-carrying-soldiers-germany/>.
86. Kurt Nimmo, “French Terror Attack: All the Hallmarks of an Intelligence Psy-op and False Flag” (March 21, 2012), <http://www.infowars.com/french-terror-attack-all-the-hallmarks-of-an-intelligence-psy-op-and-false-flag/>.
87. Spaaij, above n 82, p. 1.
History of Criminalization of Terrorist Financing
It is difficult to determine precisely when and how the idea developed that countering terrorist financing could play a central role in the fight against terrorism.1 Prior to the adoption of Terrorist Financing Convention, some Western states had adopted laws that deal with terrorist financing in a similar manner that the Terrorist Financing Convention does. For example, in the United States, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 prohibits “provision of material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” specified offenses regarded as terrorist activities.2
Internationally, the idea of expanding the scope of criminalization to include terrorist-related activities seems to be around in 1994 when the UN General Assembly encouraged State Members “to review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter.”3 It appears that the idea of countering terrorist financing through the adoption of international measures originated in the G7 (now G8), which decided to take a leading role against terrorism. In 1995, its members declared that “we are determined as a group to continue to provide leadership on this issue to the international community, using bilateral and multilateral measures and agreements to counter terrorism,” and it seems that the first call for the adoption of measures to counter terrorist financing was officially issued at that meeting in Ottawa where it was agreed “to pursue measures aimed at depriving terrorists of their