The Kremlin School of Negotiation. Igor Ryzov

The Kremlin School of Negotiation - Igor Ryzov


Скачать книгу
a country under constant external pressure. A country whose diplomats, no matter where they were stationed, had to show real toughness and decisiveness simply to withstand such pressure.

      Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, one of the most prominent diplomats and political figures of the age, was a master of the Kremlin school of negotiation. A remarkable man, and a diplomat of his time, he outlived virtually every General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His diplomatic career started young, when he was just thirty, and, under Joseph Stalin’s rule, at an extremely precarious time. Gromyko’s first major posting was as the USSR’s ambassador to the USA.

      What is this man known for? Well, in the West, he earned himself the nickname Mr Nyet, meaning ‘Mr No’. You can probably guess why. Yet the man himself maintained that he heard the word ‘no’ much more often than he said it. And if he did say it, it was almost always with one sole aim: to prevent himself from being manipulated. Or rather, not himself, but the country he was representing. The ability to negotiate – including in its tougher and more brutal forms – was an integral skill for every diplomat of the time.

      So what teachings does the Kremlin school of negotiation build on? This school is based on five postulates, or gambits. Let’s take a closer look at each one.

      The five postulates of the Kremlin school of negotiation

      Postulate 1: keep quiet and listen attentively to what your opponent says Keep quiet and listen. What’s so tough – so brutal – about this, you ask? At first glance, nothing. Nothing at all. But let’s take a closer look. What happens when your opponent stays quiet and listens to you? You talk. When people listen to us – especially if they are attentive, taking note of what we say – we expose ourselves. To keep quiet and listen is to play human flaws to your advantage.

      People are talkative. We toss ‘breadcrumbs’, unwittingly giving away unnecessary information, answering questions no one asked. Anyone who works in procurement will have mastered this ploy and will already know just how effective it is.

      The dialogue below gives you an idea of how this gambit typically goes.

      Sales representative (SR): I would like to present our product to you. Here is our business proposal.

      Buyer (B): Yes . . .

      SR: Well, initially we would propose our starting conditions, but after three months we can give you a longer payment window.

      B: Go on.

      SR: We can also offer you a discount – and a promotion.

      B: Right.

      SR: And free shipping.

      Often all it takes is for us to listen for our opponents to start dishing everything up to us on a silver platter. But when we drop these information ‘breadcrumbs’, offering up insights we haven’t even been asked for, we make our opponent’s task much easier and complicate things for ourselves.

      When we listen, we win our opponent’s favour. We make it clear that we are interested in what they have to say. And when a person sees their opponent show a genuine interest in what they have to say, it is only natural for them to start to reveal more, because they want to be as useful as they can. After all, it’s so rare for anyone to actually listen to us nowadays!

      However, don’t let yourself get too relaxed. This is a very serious trap.

      I agree with Eliyahu Goldratt, originator of the Theory of Constraints: in negotiations, it is important to be ‘paranoid’, so to speak2 – always looking and planning for possible dangers. Every single word we say must be carefully weighed up. When we drop our metaphorical breadcrumbs, we give away extremely valuable information, presenting our opponent with a hook that they will most certainly use to try to reel us in.

      An example from the Second World War: after the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, the prospect of the opening of the second front became a key question. For the Soviet Union in particular, knowing when the USA and UK planned to do this was paramount. This issue came to a head in the run-up to the Tehran Conference, a strategy meeting of leaders of the USA, USSR and UK that took place between 28 November and 1 December 1943. All of the official Soviet agencies – including the secret service – were working around the clock to try to find out their allies’ plans.

      Not long before the conference in Tehran, Kirill Novikov, then acting Soviet ambassador to the UK in London, was instructed to urgently inform the UK Foreign Office that he was to be included in the Soviet government’s delegation for the summit in Tehran. He was told to request permission to travel to Tehran with the UK delegation. Of course, he explained that there was no other way of him getting from London to Tehran. The British agreed.

      Novikov flew on the same flight as Churchill, head of the British delegation. In Cairo, where the flight made a stopover, a dinner was served for Churchill. As the guests dispersed, Churchill offered the Soviet diplomat a drink ‘for the road’. They had a friendly, unconstrained conversation, and Novikov gave the British Prime Minister his full attention, hanging on his every word. Out of the blue, Churchill asked, ‘Mr Novikov, I suppose you want to know when we will open the second front?’ before immediately continuing: ‘Not before 2 May 1944.’

      Novikov was stunned. All of Soviet reconnaissance had been straining to get this information, and he had just got it from Churchill himself.

      Upon arrival in Tehran, Novikov wrote a quick memo and Stalin was immediately informed. So when discussion of the second front came up at the conference, he already knew the Western Allies’ position, meaning he had an extra move up his sleeve. On 1 December 1943, the participants of the Tehran Conference signed a historic document announcing that Operation Overlord would be launched in May 1944.

       Postulate 2: ask questions

      The negotiator listens. Then they ask questions. In doing so, they can steer the conversation as their own interests dictate. Negotiators who find themselves listened to and asked questions will often take the bait and talk more; offer more.

      This is a key moment in any negotiation. It is at this moment that the opponents are assigned their first roles. We will go into roles in more detail later, but for the time being I would just like to highlight a few key points.

      At this early stage of negotiation, it is through tactics like these that the first negotiation roles are assigned: namely, those of ‘host’ and ‘guest’. The ‘host’ is the one who asks the questions; the ‘guest’ is the one who answers them. The ‘host’ enquires; the ‘guest’ offers. And with this, that most well-known pair of roles begins to take root: you offer me something, and I’ll choose if I want it. I am the ‘host’.

      When you entertain a guest in your home, you get to ask the questions. But remember: in negotiations, the host isn’t the party doing the hosting in a geographical sense, but the person asking the questions. The host is the one who controls the agenda, even if their opponent believes the opposite is true. The opponent thinks that because they are doing all the talking, they must be running the show. They equate talking with leading. Not so. The person controlling the conversation is the one asking the questions; the one listening.

      Negotiations in an official’s office:

      Visitor (V): We would like to ask you to free up some land for us to construct a supermarket.

      Official (O): What do you plan to sell?

      V: Consumer goods. These are important items for residents, and we have experience in this retail segment.

      O: Tell


Скачать книгу