Making Arguments: Reason in Context. Edmond H. Weiss
or comfortable in public debates seems to have little effect on the student’s success in studying or mastering the subject.
About the only student who cannot learn to argue is the one we call the “opinion monger”; this student is given to asserting that everyone’s entitled to his or her opinion, that one opinion is as “valid” as another, and so forth. Of course, such students are indeed entitled to that opinion, but, so long as they hold it, they are not likely to learn much or have much influence in their communities. (And if they cannot argue their point, they’ll never convince us.)
What is important is that nearly every student, regardless of temperament, can succeed at, and learn from, this subject matter. And, what is even more important, the skills acquired in the study of argumentation will serve the student well in nearly every academic course —and in most professions as well.
How We Argue: The Principles of Argumentation
Nearly everyone argues. In fact, some people argue so much that we have an adjective that describes them—argumentative. The connotation of this adjective is nearly universally negative. One Communication Theory student, when asked to describe a person she didn't like, provided this description: “He's disagreeable. He challenges me on everything. He's one argumentative son of a gun.”
From the time we are young we are admonished against arguing. “Don't argue with your sister.” “Don't talk back to me.” “I really don't want to argue about this.” Our language and behavior are full of restrictions against arguing. In many situations, arguing is construed as downright rude and offensive. Moreover, arguing with those in authority, including those who have real power over the circumstances in our lives, is profoundly discouraged. Many individuals are hesitant to confront teachers, police officers, and clergy. Many are conditioned to “bite their tongues” when the social conditions for argumentation put them at a perceived disadvantage.
Yet the discouragement of argumentativeness—as well as the social pressure to refrain from arguing—is ironic, when one considers that our society values the ability to argue perhaps above all other abilities. Nearly every important profession and activity is dependent upon success in argumentation. Jurisprudence, politics, religion, and education are highly regarded and widespread vocations that rely on sound argumentative practice. Less obviously, science, the arts, and medicine reward persons with a facility in arguing. And some professions—sales, advertising, and investing, for examples—make such obvious use of argumentation as to become “paradigm cases” of what it means to argue for a living.
The degree to which argumentative ability is rewarded and valued in our culture is not surprising. We exist in an environment where good jobs, good educations, healthful choices, and informed decisions all purport to promote the quality of our lives. Being able to argue well, and effectively, is perceived as closely connected to personal and societal success. Moreover, the ability to discriminate good arguments from specious ones, sound plans from half-baked schemes, helps all of us recognize the best courses of action, pursue the best kinds of living.
So why the contradiction? Why on the one hand is arguing so frowned upon, and on the other so lauded? We know that if we were ever in legal trouble, we would want to hire an attorney with good skills of advocacy. But, in ordinary social circumstances, would we find that tenacious and effective attorney to be abrasive or disagreeable?
The apparent contradiction, the opposite values attached to the powers of argumentation and the traits of argumentativeness, derives from several myths and misconceptions. Let us address the confusion with some principles that clarify what arguing really is:
Principle #1—Arguing is primarily a rational activity.
When one disputes with a family member, a friend, or a stranger (in a confrontation), what characterizes the communication event is its psychology. The motive (as well as expected outcomes) is what drives the contentious situation. No matter how right or justified one feels in “arguing,” the primary aim is to self-satisfy, to have the feeling of interpersonal power. While such a disagreement might entail an attempt to provide good reasons, it is generally not judged for its appropriateness, logic, organization, clarity, or language.
In contrast, argumentation, as we present it in this book, is an idea surrounded by rules and norms that go beyond the emotions and psychological needs of the arguers. Argumentation is rational, meaning that it proceeds according to regularities and traditions over which the participants have little control, but to which they must acquiesce. In the same way that scientists need to adhere to methods and rules of inference, arguers must accept some “rules” for rational discourse.
This is not to say that arguers should lack emotion or that argument must proceed in an emotional vacuum, without regard for the feelings of the advocates. Rather, what we are suggesting is that one should not mistake the passions of the arguers for the arguments they are making. The way we formulate, craft, present, and judge argument is distinct from the circumstances that bring about disagreement. Saying something loudly does not make the statement any truer or more credible.
Further, in interpersonal conflict, the source of the dispute is sometimes purely relational, that is, a contest of wills or a battle for affection or control. In contrast, the controversy in a rational dispute, what this text calls an argument, might rely wholly on the positions arguers are assigned arbitrarily in a controversy. College debaters, for example, are told the positions (affirmative or negative) they are to argue without deference to their feelings or emotions on an issue. So, a student who is committedly anti-drug, but also a skillful advocate, can make a compelling case to legalize all drugs. His or her personal commitment is simply irrelevant to the rational process of adjudicating the defense of a claim.
Emotional advocates can trigger the emotions of an audience, but this does not constitute good arguing. For example, an openly gay student in an argumentation class, while debating in favor of the legalization of gay marriage, personalized the issue: “If you vote against this proposal, then you are telling me that I am less of a human being than you are.” While this is a poignant example of how someone personally experiences injustice, it doesn’t go very far in advancing the case. Interestingly, when the same student had to attack gay marriage (in his next debate), he did a better job, not because the other side of the issue is stronger, but because he detached himself from the issue and saw some larger, demonstrable societal impacts.
Principle #2—Arguing is not just expressing opinions.
Argument is too often confused with the mere expression of one’s opinion, an idea rooted largely in the previously discussed misconception about argument as a form of verbal fisticuffs. Most people view argumentation as a conflict in which competing interests are being aired, perhaps without regard to whether the participants in the dispute “make sense.” For many, argument is “ventilation,” a way of getting emotion and frustration aired.
To study argument, however, one should avoid the tendency to characterize arguments dismissively as “opinions” or “mere opinions.” Any statement or claim can be qualified as an opinion. Adding this qualification to a claim does nothing to diminish its status as the conclusion of a rational chain of reasoning coupled with evidence. Nor does saying something is “just an opinion” put it on an equal footing with a rationally adduced claim, assuming that the baseless claim is made without support. (Calling something “just an opinion” is nearly as vacuous as dismissing a scientific argument as “just a theory.”)
A similar error is to believe that an unsupported opinion, expressed by someone else, is evidence in support of one’s own opinion. There is a tendency among inexperienced advocates to view the opinions of others as all the backing they need to win the adherence of an audience or judge. Novice debaters often read the “opinion” statements of others, and then assert that a claim has been proven. It turns out that an argument might not be advanced one bit by this technique of argument. (In subsequent chapters, we will examine in detail how evidence is handled. We will