The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service 1776â1924. Revised Second Edition. Charles Stuart Kennedy
The belligerents seized neutral ships dealing with their enemies. Joseph Fenwick, the American consul in Bordeaux, did what he could to help stranded American seamen off ships taken by French privateers, or those who were held by the French government. He was able to get the American brig Sally released after its capture by a privateer. This was unusual, for there seldom was a reprieve for seized American ships.15
Consular business in Bordeaux involved distressed seamen and the problems of privateers, but the consul also had to attend to more mundane tasks such as making inventories of the effects of deceased Americans, a tedious task; in one case Fenwick listed “five flowerpots and forty two snuff boxes.”16 He was also chairman of an inquest on the death by beating of a ship’s cook by his captain, with other American merchant captains idled in Bordeaux at the time sitting on the inquest panel. The panel’s decision was to send the murderer back to the United States under arrest.17
Fenwick, feigning optimism, wrote that the problems with the French might have resulted from the “new organization rather than the want of good will.”18 The attitude of the French did not improve toward neutrals, especially the United States, which was considered a fat goose that could be plucked with impunity by French officials and French privateers. This would eventually push the United States and France into their quasi-war of 1798–1800.
The new consular service quickly proved its worth to the United States. American shipping firms and captains were able to get accurate information regarding foreign markets, regulations, and the dangers of war and piracy, as well as legal support, from their consuls in major ports. The secretary of state received reports on local political conditions and trading opportunities and advice on foreign policy matters from experienced men in the field at a time when the European scene was in a dangerous state of flux. The U.S. consular service was given little time to settle into the routine of new work before some of its officers became active participants in the naval war with France (1798–1800) and then the Barbary Wars (1800–1805).
Frustrated by their inability to challenge the British fleet directly, the French unleashed swarms of privateers and exercised little control over their actions, especially those that working out of the French West Indies. American ships were the easy targets of those privateers, as they rarely traveled in convoys and there was no protective American navy.
Indicative of the bad situation, from July 1796 to June 1797 some 316 American ships were seized by the French.19 Although British privateers were also taking American ships; the French were far more effective and dangerous. Sometimes American consuls could help, but not often. The consul in Marseille, a French citizen, reported that he had secured the release of the American ship Flora of Gloucester, which had been taken by a French privateer owned by Lucien Bonaparte,”a brother of the great General Buonoparte [sic]”.20 In doing his duty, this Frenchman acting for American interests against those of the powerful Corsican family was taking an obvious political risk.
Although President John Adams tried to settle American difficulties with the French by diplomacy, French Foreign Minister Talleyrand demanded a bribe from the special envoys Adams had sent in 1797. This incident, dubbed the XYZ affair, caused considerable outrage in the United States when it became public, strengthening the hands of those who wanted to re-create the United States Navy, which had been dormant since the Revolution. The first positive result was that a number of frigates were commissioned.
The young United States Navy and the consular service were often involved in mutual activity that fostered a strong alliance. In times of peace the American consul in a port was surely heartened to see a warship enter the harbor flying the Stars and Stripes. The round of official calls between the naval vessel and the local authorities helped the standing of the American consul. For many foreign officials and civil leaders in Europe and elsewhere the United States was as yet a little-known country. A well-turned-out warship represented a country to be reckoned with. The American consul became more important in their eyes. American naval officers benefited from the consul’s services. He helped them resupply their ships, introduced them to the social delights of the port city after perhaps months at sea, and could get their crews out of the hands of the local authorities if they overindulged in celebrating their shore leave.
In time of unrest or war the close proximity of a frigate might relieve a consul’s mind and make his work easier as the protector of American interests. Mobs had far more respect for cannon than for consular credentials. Local authorities understood the threat a hostile ship presented to the city’s commerce. If a situation came to the worst, the American naval ship could pluck the consul and his family out of danger.
For the captain of an American naval ship, a consul available in a trouble spot was a godsend. Naval commanders out of touch with their superiors for months at a time and often politically unskilled might find almost insurmountable difficulties upon arriving in a foreign port where there was tension, civil unrest, or war. As a commander, the captain was expected to show initiative in protecting American interests, usually shipping. The ability to consult with the consul on the scene eased his burden and his responsibility.
During the time of the American difficulties with the French, the island of Santo Domingo (then called St. Dominique) was of major importance to the United States because of its sugar trade and its controlling position in the Caribbean. As the United States flexed its new naval muscles to put down the French privateers and any regular French naval vessels that might intervene, it was the obvious policy to deny those privateers haven in Caribbean harbors as well as to catch them at sea.
In 1791 there had been a bloody insurrection against the French colonial planters in the part of Santo Domingo that now comprises Haiti. After some ineffectual efforts to put the European overseers back in control, the French in Paris, inspired by their new motto “liberté, egalité, et fraternité,” had made the African inhabitants of the island full citizens. They had been led by Toussaint L’Ouverture, who steered an independent course but never declared independence from French colonial rule.
At this time the United States had moved closer to the British as the French privateers had become more ferocious. Nowhere was the cooperation between the two former enemies more in evidence than in the West Indies, especially in dealing with Toussaint. The new American consul to Santo Domingo, Dr. Edward Stevens of Pennsylvania, arriving in 1799 under instructions from the Secretary of State, proceeded to give Toussaint support to preserve his virtual independence from France.21
Stevens consulted often with the British general in command in the West Indies, and by agreement with the local British naval commander the American consul was allowed to grant passes to ships going through the British blockade.22 France, uneasy with the independence of Toussaint, supported an uprising against him. The leader Riguard, had encouraged French privateers, while Toussaint had kept the ports he controlled clear of these semi-pirates. The United States took the side of Toussaint, as did the British.
Stevens was in a sensitive political situation. He must further American interests without interfering with British, French, Haitian, or even American naval activities. Toussaint needed to have supplies come to his island. The French merchants were concerned that the American navy was scaring away neutral trading ships. Stevens worked closely with the United States Navy, including the captain of the Constitution, to “quiet the Apprehensions of the People here, and prevent any interruptions of Harmony between this Colony and the U. States.”23
Fortunately, Stevens got on well with Toussaint, finding the black leader “so candid - so prudent & liberal that we will do everything that can contribute to supporting the Dignity & Interest of the U. States. It is a happy circumstance for me to have a man of his Character to cooperate with.”24 Cooperation between the United States and Toussaint became increasingly close, with Stevens lending a small American ship under his control to take Toussaint to his army on the coast. Later the American frigate General Greene actually helped force the surrender of Riguard’s troops by bombarding the forts at the town of Jacmel in February 1800.25 Secretary of State Pickering recognized Consul Stevens’s difficult role and wrote him that his work on the troubled island was “distinguished by that intelligence and attention to the interests of the United States which were expected when you accepted your appointment.”26
By the end of 1800 the situation in Santo Domingo had calmed