Philosophy for Believers. Edward W. H. Vick
is that they are not all of the same kind. So, since our task is to analyse what it means to believe, we will distinguish the kinds of belief we have instanced in this list.These beliefs fall into different classes:Belief about historical fact e.g.: about the bookBelief about what the book says took placeBelief about the trustworthiness of the evidence of testimonyBelief in miracle i.e. that the unusual event reported took placeBelief in the possibility of an event which either did not happen or of which we are ignorant.Some of these overlap. For someone who believes that the supernatural can and does intervene in the natural course of events there will be a different assessment of reports about extraordinary events from the one who does not so believe. One will be sceptical about purported testimony to such events. The other will simply accept that testimony. An interesting case is that of the believer who readily accepts reports of miracles within his own religion but is sceptical about those from another religion, even if they are similar. This raises the question about the demands of consistency in the process of evaluation of reports and testimony.The non-believer and the believer would agree about several of the beliefs listed. The ‘non-believer’ would have reservations about several. The beliefs both might agree about are the ones starred on the above list. We may go further and ask whether there could be disagreement about any of the above between believers calling themselves Christian. The one principle all would agree about is that a physical event not considered possible today, for good reasons that can readily be given, could not have happened at any previous time. So people of a different religion have difficulty with reports of miracles claimed within a religious context different from their own. Sometimes this causes them to question the possibility of miracles claimed within their own religious context. If a physical miracle cannot happen now and we can give good reasons for that claim, then it cannot have happened at any time. We know that a lame man is not instantly healed by the mere words of another, that atrophied limbs are not at once made operative, we do not say restored, because, in the case we took as an example, the man was lame from birth. So the believer either does not give the matter thought and takes the account as literally true or, after reflecting on the passage, finds an explanation he can accept but others cannot.
3 Consciousness and BeliefHow many of your beliefs are you conscious of at this moment? Why none at all! Of course, now that the question has been asked you can start recalling one after another till you have an exhaustive list. You can then say, ‘These are my conscious beliefs now.’ But does it seem strange to talk about an unconscious belief?We are interested in the concept of consciousness for two reasons. So we can pursue our discussionin relation to belief: whether to hold a belief I have to be conscious of having it. Must it be explicit to my consciousness? There are related problems, to explain what it means to lack the awareness of a belief/to be aware of a belief.in relation to the possibility of holding contradictory beliefs: lacking awareness of one, or of both, or having awareness of both.in relation to the idea of personal identity. Is identity of consciousness the criterion for identity of the person?What does having the consciousness of a belief, being conscious of a belief, mean? Are either of the following correct?You don’t have to be conscious to have a belief.You don’t have to be conscious of it, to have a belief.We are not conscious of most of the beliefs we have at any given moment, even when we are conscious. To produce such a sentence, we use the word ‘conscious’ in two different ways. There are other ways as well.I am conscious if I am not unconscious, i.e. not under anaesthetic, not suffering the effect of a wallop on the head, not in a dreamless sleep. For example, I have been in a coma. But I have now ‘come round’. So I am conscious. This is the intransitive use of the term.Contrast to this the transitive use of ‘conscious’. This may take various forms, variations of a basic mode, namely ‘I am conscious that . . . .’ I say, ‘I believe that I once lived in Nashville.’ ‘I am conscious that p (‘I once lived in Nashville’). In this case the belief in the proposition is explicit since the content of the proposition is held before my mind and I assent to it. But I can be said to have the belief even when I am not at the moment aware of its specific content, even if I am not now holding it in my consciousness.
What does it mean to believe, say, that Mary was espoused to Joseph? Must the belief be explicit in their consciousness for anyone to say that they believe the proposition? Do I still believe it when I am not thinking about it, when a lot of other things are in my mind, when my concerns of the present have pushed it and many other beliefs out of my conscious thought. Am I a believer when I am asleep?
Take for example, ‘I believe Elizabeth is in the library’. My first level of awareness is of the belief. The belief is explicit in my mind. I am now assenting to the proposition ‘E is in L’. There is also a second level of belief. That occurs when I am aware that I am entertaining this belief. I step back, so to speak, and think of myself thinking my belief. If I express this I will say, ‘I am now aware that I believe that Elizabeth is in the library’. The second level of awareness occurs when e.g. I am aware of my belief that. . . . or when I am aware of my awareness. So, ‘I believe Elizabeth is in the library’, is a first level belief. So, I go looking for her. I walk here and there in the library. Then I reflect on my state of mind and become aware of my belief that Elizabeth is in the library. This is a second level awareness. I am aware that I believe that Elizabeth is in the library. If later I reflect on an act I did not notice at the time, that I walked to the opposite end of the room on the strength of my belief, I am now aware that I may not have been explicitly aware of it then when I was taking significant action at the moment of taking it. Yet I must have been in some sense conscious of taking it, to enable me to have taken it. It was my act, after all. My action is like that of the motorist who avoids an obstacle in the road but at the time is not consciously aware that he is doing so. Such sub-conscious acts sometimes reveal our beliefs, even if while performing those acts the belief that stimulates the act is not then conscious nor the act consciously connected with it. If someone had met me and asked what I was doing rather than say, ‘I am walking in the library’, I would have said, ‘I am looking for Elisabeth’. If he asked, Why? I could then have said, ‘Because I believe she is here, somewhere’, thus appealing to my belief as a reason for my action. I may of course have wanted it to be the case that she is in the building. This might lead to the consequence that, holding fast to my belief, I do not consider the evidence that she is not in the library. It is then that self-deception might take place. I do not permit myself to examine the evidence for what I believe, since I do not want to have to abandon it. There may be at some level a refusal to be aware of my belief. Does that happen? Why would I refuse to believe something that I do not know is false?
An interesting footnote can be added to these remarks. Some propositions are not compatible with explicit awareness, and turn out to be in some cases rather amusing. For example, if I said, ‘I believe that I have forgotten that once I lived in Nashville’ you would probably laugh. That ‘claim’ involves a contradiction, as the following one does not; ‘I believe that I have forgotten where I put my purse’. You will easily discern the difference between the two!
1 Accepting, Doubting And Abandoning A BeliefSometimes we consider a proposition but do not yet believe or disbelieve it. When does entertaining and examining a proposition become believing it? Is there such a thing as half-belief? Consider the following as possible stages:Being aware that there is a proposition to considerEntertaining the propositionGiving myself reasons for thinking it may be reasonable to believe itBeing disposed to assent to itGiving my assent to it i.e. believing it.A note needs to be added. For the fact is that we sometimes find ourselves believing and are not aware that any process has taken place. The child can hardly help believing in Santa Claus. She just does. Sometimes we do not have to ‘make up our minds’. They have already been made up for us. Once we are aware that we have not really done so before, we can as thinking beings reflect and consider those unexamined beliefs responsibly.b [= a in reverse] We can readily find examples of the processes of coming to accept a belief, and also of coming to abandon a belief. When does questioning and doubting a belief become abandoning it? The process is something like the following:Ask what the belief meansWork out its implicationsConsider the evidence for and against itAsk further about its rationality, e.g. Is it consistent, illuminating?Compare it with alternativesGive myself reasons for calling it into questionDoubt itRevise itAbandon itReplace itIf I do not understand, at least to some extent, what I say I believe, my profession of belief may well be an empty one, a kind of front with little or nothing behind it, something akin to a child