The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe)
1 Manpower, Fleets and Changes
The effective strike operations carried out by the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) in 1945 against Japanese strategic, industrial, military and naval targets drew the Royal Navy into a new era of warfare. It had been the only British strike force capable of attacking mainland Japan and had done so with an economy of manpower and equipment that should have demonstrated to post-war British governments how a maritime strategy could be deployed affordably in the nation’s best interests across the world when required in the uncertain years after 1945. The BPF had also harnessed the potential of the Commonwealth to act together in support of a common aim, besides fighting seamlessly alongside the armed forces of the United States. At the dawn of an era when the United Nations was expected to be the guardian of the world’s peace these were factors as important as the fleet’s effectiveness in combat. The BPF’s embarked aircraft had been the core of the fleet’s power and those who understood its achievements predicted a bright future for naval aviation in the post-war era. After the end of hostilities, the BPF had shown further flexibility by transforming a number of ships, especially aircraft carriers, to repatriate former prisoners of war and internees and to provide humanitarian relief to places such as Hong Kong left destitute by Japanese occupation forces. In the power vacuum after the collapse of Japan the BPF had moved seamlessly into a constabulary role to put down piracy and insurrection across the Far East so that peacetime trade could be restored. The fleet demonstrated its ability to deploy the right amount of force or humanitarian aid in the right place at the right time, often using the same resources for both tasks.
For much of late 1945 and 1946, BPF warships and their ships’ companies proved to be not only the most suitable entity for a wide variety of sensitive and difficult new tasks but, in many cases, they represented the only organisation available in the short term to implement UK government policies that had not been anticipated or prepared for. The former French and Dutch colonial empires in Indo-China and the East Indies had to be held against nationalist insurgents until suitable colonial forces could be shipped to them from Europe where the colonial powers were, themselves, trying to recover from German occupation. The restoration of French and Dutch rule in the region, whilst distasteful to some, was supported by the United Nations in the short term to restore stability and was accepted as British government policy. It was an important aspect of the restoration of global trade and, therefore, vital to the recovery of the United Kingdom’s economy after six years of war. The BPF contributed to the restoration of stability and British trade in a number of ways including the protection of shipping against piracy and the illegal use of force by non-state forces. More subtly it ‘showed the flag’ in many ports to emphasise that Britain was a victorious power with global reach, able to act for good as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
The BPF led the Royal Navy into a new era of warfare in which carrier air groups would be used with powerful effect against enemies at sea, in the air and on land, if necessary at considerable distances from the UK. A running range of Corsairs and Avengers is seen here on Victorious, about to take off to strike targets in Japan. RN carrier-borne aircraft like these were the only British aircraft to attack the Japanese mainland during the Second World War. (Author’s collection)
Many urgent operational tasks remained after VJ-Day, among them the clearance of wartime minefields. On the initiative of the Admiralty, an international organisation was created, based in London, to supervise the work of clearance1 and 1900 minesweepers from many nations were employed on the task. Despite this effort, 130 merchant ships and fishing vessels of all nationalities were sunk or damaged in late 1945 and early 1946, most of them vessels that strayed outside specified channels despite published advice, but no minesweepers were lost. At the beginning of 1946 the Royal Navy operated 513 minesweepers across the world on active duty, all of which had to be manned by skilled personnel available for long enough to avoid constant disruptions to their ships’ companies. By the beginning of 1947 the number had reduced to sixty-five2 and over 4600 mines had been swept by British and Commonwealth vessels during 19463 in areas as far apart as the Atlantic, North Sea, Mediterranean, Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Indo-China and Borneo.
Powerful strike carrier operations had continued in the BPF until the last hours of the war but the Home Fleet had already run down considerably before the Japanese surrender and the Mediterranean Fleet had effectively become a training force, providing operational sea training facilities in good weather for newly commissioned ships. The end of hostilities and the urgent need for the UK Government to recover an economy that was on the verge of bankruptcy after re-armament and six years of global war meant that the Admiralty had to carry out a programme of demobilisation and force reduction on a massive scale. In 1945 there was already a manpower crisis, with new ships including sixteen of the new light fleet carriers coming into service and older ships including the carriers Furious and Argus and several battleships having to be reduced to reserve to find the experienced men needed to man them. The Admiralty had expected the war in the Pacific to last into 1946 but, under pressure from the Government to make manpower available for the restoration of British industry, had already begun to release men in certain categories back into civilian life. The Japanese surrender in August 1945 meant that large numbers of men would have to be demobilised while maintaining operational capability where it was still needed urgently. The RN in general, and its Fleet Air Arm in particular faced a number of problems once the imperative to mount major combat operations at long range ceased and the Service had to revert to a peacetime size and structure.
Manpower and Training
In mid-1945 approximately 866,000 men and women were serving in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) but over 75 per cent of the officers were mobilised members of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) and a large percentage of ratings enlisted since 1939 had joined under ‘hostilities only’ rules, although these had allowed for some of them to be retained until ‘normal’ conditions were restored and men on peacetime engagements trained to replace them. This number was far in excess of the Royal Navy’s approved war strength of 450,000 in 1918 and demobilisation had to be carried out, therefore, on a scale and at a pace that was unprecedented. Some organisations could be demobilised quickly as the requirements for them had ended with the enemy’s surrender. These included Western Approaches Command in Liverpool; the wartime Home Fleet base at Scapa Flow; airfields, air yards and stores depots in Ceylon, Australia, the Admiralty Islands and many more. By 1946 the manpower total was reduced to 492,800 and by 1947 it was 192,665.
Demobilisation was not just a question of numbers, although reductions of 300,000 men per year in two consecutive years were difficult enough to manage. The majority of the pre-war regulars still serving had become senior rates or officers and virtually every branch had shortages of junior rates, felt most keenly in the newer branches such as radar, fighter control, electronic warfare and particularly naval aviation. The RN had only regained full control of its embarked aircraft together with their procurement, shore training and support in May 1939, although