The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
a decade, had expanded it rapidly to fight a global war and contracted it in the subsequent demobilisation. The administrative and operational systems were well understood and worked effectively.
The procurement of new aircraft and weapons for all three Services was the responsibility of the MoS, and within that organisation the senior RN representative was known as the Vice-Controller (Air) and Chief Naval Representative MOS/Chief of Naval Air Equipment.28 He took direction from both 5SL and the Controller and had responsibility for ensuring that the MOS fully understood naval staff requirements and acted on them effectively. He had three departments under him, the Directorate of Air Equipment and Naval Photography (DAE), the Directorate of Aircraft Maintenance and Repair (DAMR), and the Directorate of Naval Aircraft Development and Production MoS (DNDP). DAMR was headed by a Rear Admiral (E), the other two by captains, RN. When the MoS ceased to exist, this group of directorates became part of the naval staff under a rear admiral with the title Director General Aircraft (Navy) (DGA(N)), retaining the same directorates.29 In 1951 5SL was a vice admiral and the Vice Controller (Air) was a rear admiral.
Examples of the first generation of RN jets in formation, photographed from a Meteor T 7. Nearest the camera is a Sea Hawk, probably an F 1, then an Attacker FB 1, Sea Vampire F 20 and a Meteor T 7. (Author’s collection)
Operational command of carrier strike forces came under the Commanders-in-Chief of the Home, Mediterranean and Far East Fleets in which they served, through their Flag Officers Second-in-Command. As carrier deployments came to be less rigid and the ships were no longer operated in formalised aircraft carrier squadrons, the post of Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers (FOAC), was introduced with worldwide responsibility. He administered all carriers in commission and took operational command of a task force, when necessary. He took over responsibility for working up ships and naval air squadrons to operational efficiency and for setting standards and practices to be achieved by all carriers and their embarked squadrons from the Flag Officer Air (Home). The Cs-in-C of the Home and Mediterranean Fleets in 1951 were admirals, that of the FEF, a vice admiral. FOAC could be a junior vice admiral or a senior rear admiral. The relevant fleet also directed the tasks of naval air stations within their areas. Carriers were not normally allocated to overseas stations such as the West Indies or South Atlantic but could be deployed for a specific operation under FOAC or the nearest FO2.
Day-to-day administrative control of naval carrier strike forces throughout the RN was the responsibility of the Flag Officer Air (Home), a vice admiral in 1951, who could give advice and support as necessary to overseas fleets and stations. He directed the work to be carried out by the trials carriers and oversaw an organisation split into three sub-commands, each run by a rear admiral. The first two were the Flag Officer Ground Training (FOGT), responsible for the naval air stations at which technical training of officers, artificers, air mechanics and naval airmen were carried out and the Flag Officer Flying Training (FOFT). The latter was responsible for all the air stations at which advanced and operational flying took place,30 the output of aircrew from the training ‘pipeline’ to meet the needs of operational squadrons including, when necessary, the ability to surge numbers in order to form new squadrons quickly in an emergency. FOFT was also responsible for the tasking of the training carrier. The third sub-command was headed by a rear admiral (E) known as the Rear Admiral Reserve Aircraft (RARA), whose reserve aircraft organisation underpinned the worldwide operation of naval aircraft and covered a wide range of disparate tasks.31 These included:
(a) The maintenance of a substantial reserve of aircraft and engines at varying degrees of readiness, both long and short-term, so that peacetime and emergency requirements could be met with the minimum of delay.
(b) Fulfilling the function of Air Equipment Authority including the provision of replacement aircraft for those damaged, lost or due for major overhaul; for re-arming existing naval air squadrons and for the formation of new squadrons.
(c) Administration of the repair of aircraft and engines using the factories of manufacturers and contractors, naval air yards and RN Mobile Repair Units.
(d) Bringing into service new aircraft types direct from the manufacturers, testing and equipping them for the roles in which they were required.
(e) Preparing aircraft and engines for shipment to overseas fleets and stations and receiving shipments from abroad.
(f) The maintenance of records covering all naval aircraft and engines throughout their life from receipt to disposal.
All this work was co-ordinated from RNAS Arbroath and involved AHUs at RN Air Stations Abbotsinch, Anthorn, Culham and Stretton together with civilian-manned RN Air Yards at Fleetlands, Donibristle and Belfast. Reserve aircraft were very different from the ships held in the inactive reserve fleet. All aircraft not actually allocated to a squadron were classified as reserve and this included brand new machines straight off the production line. The great majority were in a ‘live’ state although a proportion were ‘embalmed’ for long-term storage. Admiralty policy was to keep aircraft establishments small by flying a relatively small number of aircraft in the front line as intensively as possible. When anything more than a minor repair was required by an aircraft, it was withdrawn from the unit and replaced. The policy that flying units should concentrate on flying their aircraft gave RARA’s sub-command the high pressure technical task of repairing, modifying, equipping and issuing aircraft to support the flying task. The maintenance of operational capability was achieved by providing the right replacements at the right time in the right place. The sub-command was required to maintain sufficient aircraft to meet the heavy demands of a national emergency and from that it naturally followed that normal peacetime requirements could be met.
Reserve aircraft were maintained in good condition by the ‘throughput’ process under which every aircraft, except those ‘embalmed’, was brought up to full operational standard and test flown at least once a year. Most aircraft were held in hangars in a preserved state that reduced deterioration. They were inspected weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and annually and any deterioration was immediately rectified. After a year in storage, aircraft were de-preserved, modifications and special technical instructions (STI), issued in the previous twelve months were embodied, the guns butt-tested and the compass swung. When all faults were corrected the aircraft was test flown by a fully-qualified maintenance test pilot, usually a lieutenant or lieutenant commander (E) (P). Any snags found in the air were rectified and further check flights carried out until the aircraft was signed off as being at operational standard. It was then considered available for issue to a user unit after which it was either despatched at once or held in a pool of serviceable aircraft which were inspected and test-flown weekly. About eighty aircraft underwent this process every month in 1952. Some aircraft were placed in long-term storage by ‘embalming’, a process similar to the ‘cocooning’ of gun mountings on warships in the reserve fleet. In this instance aircraft were completely sprayed to become encased in an impervious ‘skin’, inside which the air was kept dry by desiccants to prevent corrosion. The ‘skin’ was inspected and the desiccant renewed periodically to maintain the aircraft in good condition. Modification could be carried out but involved removal of a part of the ‘skin’ and re-embalming it, so modification and STI embodiment was usually held until the aircraft was brought forward and the complete ‘skin’ removed.
New aircraft were flown into an AHU by a ferry pilot without much of their Admiralty-supplied operational equipment. The latest modifications were also usually missing as the manufacturer could not hold up the production line to embody them. They were, therefore checked immediately to see that the contractor had supplied all the equipment for which he was responsible and then all the operational equipment required to meet the Admiralty Equipment Standard for that type was fitted (guns, radar etc). By then guns would have been butt-tested and the compass swung. A full functional test flight was carried out, after which the aircraft could be allotted to the serviceable pool. Once allotted to a squadron, aircraft remained with it until they became surplus to its establishment or it required reconditioning at the end of its planned hours-based ‘life’. It would also have to be replaced if it suffered damage beyond the capacity of the squadron or a mobile repair unit to repair or