The Gathering Storm. Geirr Haarr

      Churchill hastening to war on 5 September. (Author’s collection)

      Though controversial and even disliked by some, Churchill was in general warmly welcomed back by the navy – largely for his naval competence, but also for his zeal and charisma. The Royal Navy would not be left in the wake of the other services while he was in office. Nevertheless, his hands-on mentality created additional work for his subordinates and diverted sorely needed resources from mundane everyday naval work to schemes that often came to nought or proved failures. Also, his habit of working late wore down many a lesser man in his staffs and sometimes gave rise to contradictory orders and unnecessary losses.

      Between September 1939 and April 1940, Churchill mostly shared the common view that Britain and France would eventually prevail through German military strength being wasted in northern France, while German industry’s ability to sustain the war would be stalled through maritime blockade and aerial bombardment. Despite pleas from his senior naval advisers to increase the pace of capital ship construction, Churchill did not push the navy to the head of the queue for resources. Instead, he acknowledged that the army and air force were in desperate need for priorities, as was the merchant fleet. Beyond accelerating ongoing construction as much as possible, this meant few additional orders and no increase in the number of battleships, carriers, cruisers or even A/S escorts, beyond what had already been approved.¹³

      Utilising existing resources, it became necessary to plan air and sea operations that would neutralise the surface ships of the Kriegsmarine and then release the capital ships for stations where they would deter Italy and Japan from taking advantage of the situation. Meanwhile, Asdic-equipped escorts and hunting groups would take care of the U-boats, it was believed. With France in the war, the Channel could be closed and German U-boats and surface raiders would have to pass through the northern North Sea to get into the Atlantic, giving the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force a supreme advantage. Denying Germany access to French ports through assisting the French Army on the Western Front and working in an effective alliance with the French Navy on the seas would be the best recipe for keeping Britain’s sea lanes open. The French Navy alone was bigger than the Kriegsmarine, and Churchill believed that there was every reason to use the combined Allied navies in a strategic offensive. The lack of systematic aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence would seriously hamper the use of the superior Allied forces, however, as would the acute lack of escorts and A/S vessels.¹⁴

      Once the War Cabinet had been established, the secretaries of the Cabinet and the CID were merged into a single body known as the War Cabinet Secretariat, with a civilian and a military branch.¹⁵ The War Cabinet was purposely kept small and its members largely free of departmental responsibilities so that they could focus on winning the war in the shortest possible time. Most of the detailed planning and analysis work would be done by sub-committees, and an outer tier of ministers and civil servants would, together with the Chiefs of Staff (CoS), be available to advise and consult as necessary.

      The Admiralty, as the War Office and CID, reported to the Cabinet while the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, consisting of General Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, First Sea Lord Admiral Pound and Air Chief Marshall Cyril Newall, reported through the CID to the Cabinet. The CoS, their deputies and the chiefs of the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee became the primary advisers to the British government on defence policy. Their collective opinion and advice to the Cabinet was usually stated through the chairman – Newall in the period covered by this book – but was often clouded by infighting and lack of inter-service cooperation. Each of the Chiefs of Staff filled a dual role – being individual and collective advisers to the War Cabinet as well as serving their respective ministers – which made them consistently overworked.

      Two inter-service bodies, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee and the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, advised the CoS; each of them comprising one or more officers from the three services, holding executive posts in their own department. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee had a representative of the Foreign Office as its chairman. To lessen the burden of administering the war, the Cabinet established the Standing Ministerial Committee on Military Co-ordination in October, headed by the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Admiral Chatfield, and including the three service ministers but no representative of the Foreign Office. This ensured that all crucial questions were dealt with properly – by the CoS, the Co-ordination Committee and the War Cabinet proper – but it did not favour swift, decisive assessments and quick decisions. The system suited the cautious Chamberlain but annoyed Churchill to the degree that he had it modified later in the war.¹⁶

      At the outbreak of war, five battleships, two battlecruisers and one aircraft carrier were assigned to the Home Fleet, as were four cruisers at Scapa Flow and two at Humber. The cruisers of the 12th and 7th Squadrons were also at Scapa Flow, but used exclusively on the Northern Patrol.¹⁷

      Two destroyer flotillas, the 6th and the 8th, were allocated to the Home Fleet, totalling seventeen ships. The 7th Flotilla, still incomplete, had already proceeded to its war station at Dover on 25 August. The K-class destroyers that were to have formed the 3rd Flotilla and relieve the I-class in the Mediterranean were instead ordered to form the 5th Flotilla and join the Home Fleet as they were completed from October 1939. The 3rd and 4th Flotillas, I-class and Tribal-class respectively, returned from the Mediterranean, and, after brief service in the Western Approaches and East Coast Convoys, joined the Home Fleet in October/November. Four I-class ships were withdrawn, converted to minelayers and formed the 20th Flotilla. In early 1940, the arrival of the 2nd Flotilla from the South Atlantic brought the total number of destroyers with the Home Fleet to forty-nine in six flotillas. The large amount of sea-time per ship in poor weather during the autumn and winter of 1939/40 resulted in unexpected wear and maintenance requirements, however, and at any one time a number of the destroyers would be in the yard for repair, maintenance or refits. The flag of Rear Admiral (D) flew from the cruiser Aurora until December 1939, at which time it was transferred to Titania and later in the month to Woolwich at Greenock.¹⁸

      On 11 November, four cruisers, four Tribal-class destroyers and the 7th Destroyer Flotilla were detached under Vice Admiral 2nd Cruiser Squadron George Edward-Collins to make up the Humber Force, operating under Admiralty orders.¹⁹